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THE NEW ERA OF DOING 
BUSINESS WITH IRAN:  
IRAN’S INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
AND GLOBAL SECURITY 
 
John Changiz Vafai* 
ABSTRACT 
On January 17, 2016, in a statement following his signing 
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, 
President Obama addressed that country’s people, stating that 
“yours is a great civilization, with a vibrant culture that has so 
much to contribute to the world – in commerce, and in science 
and the arts.” While the former U.S. President’s evaluation of 
the Iranian people’s greatness is indisputable, there are 
questions concerning doing business with Iran which transcend 
conventional legal issues and commercial problems.  
Given the juxtaposition of Iran’s duopolistic government 
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structure and ideologically oriented decision-making processes, 
questions arise as to what extent multinational corporations, 
including U.S. companies, should reasonably expect to conduct 
commercial transactions with that country. Specific issues arise 
related to Iranian banks, international credit recognition, terms 
of payment, and the conceptual legality of interest in Iran. In 
addition, more practical issues arise related to the governing law 
of contract and proper dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Furthermore, U.S. regulatory constraints limit the efficacy of 
certain contracts between Iran and U.S. companies. This article 
attempts to illustrate the structural, legal and operational 
issues concerning doing business with Iran and, where possible, 
means for mitigating such issues. 
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Introduction 
After the lifting of some international sanctions against 
Iran in the beginning of 2016,1 President Hasan Rohani of Iran 
embarked on a commercial offensive to major Western European 
countries.2 In a tour that was unprecedented in Iran’s post-
revolutionary history, Rohani peddled across Europe for trade 
deals in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and opened new 
cultural communications with the Vatican.3 On March 23, 2016, 
as Iranians celebrated their time-honored ancient tradition of 
Nowruz,4 the exuberance of some international companies, 
zealously expecting to resume their business with Iran, was 
floating the halls of commerce.  
The media have generally trumpeted the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),5 the agreement 
between Iran and its negotiating E3/EU+3 countries (China, 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, with the High Representative of the European Union for 
Affairs and Security Policy), as a great success concerning the 
lifting of sanctions “in their entireties” against the Islamic 
                                                 
1  See Rick Gladstone, With Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented, What Hap-
pens Next?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2016, at A12. 
2  Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Hassan Rouhani in first Europe visit by Ira-
nian president in 16 years, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2016, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/25/hassan-rouhani-in-first-eu-
rope-visit-by-iranian-president-in-16-years. 
3  See id.; see also Elisabetta Povoledo, Pope Francis and Hassan Rouhani 
of Iran Discuss Mideast Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2016, at A10. 
4  Nowruz is a spring festival that “plays a significant role in strengthen-
ing the ties among peoples based on mutual respect and the ideals of peace and 
good-neighbourliness.” See G.A. Res. 64/253, at 2 (May 10, 2010) (recognizing 
March 21 as “the International Day of Nowruz”). 
5  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization /245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA]; see also JCPOA 
Annex I – Nuclear-related measures, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/ doc-
uments/organization/245318.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex I]; JCPOA Annex 
II - Sanctions Related Commitments, July 14, 2015, http://www.state. gov/doc-
uments/organization/245320.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex II]; JCPOA Annex 
II – Attachments, July 14, 2015, http:// www.state.gov/ documents/organiza-
tion/245319.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex II Attachments]; JCPOA Annex III 
– Civil Nuclear Cooperation, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization /245322.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex III]; JCPOA Annex 
IV – Joint Commission, July 14, 2015, http://www. state.gov/documents/organ-
ization/ 245323.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex IV]; JCPOA Annex V – Imple-
mentation Plan, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/ documents/ organiza-
tion/245324.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA Annex V]. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
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Republic of Iran.6 The JCPOA has been “billed as a once in a 
generation opportunity,” and proponents of the deal claim that 
“Iran is the biggest new market to reenter the global economy in 
decades.”7 In January 2016, President Obama stated that the 
nuclear agreement with Iran “contains the most comprehensive 
inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a 
nuclear program.”8 As a result of this accord, Iran may obtain 
access to billions of dollars of impounded funds.9 Some have 
estimated the amount at $100 billion, resulting in a financial 
windfall to Iran. In proportional terms, that would be equivalent 
to the United States receiving $4.2 trillion.10 The amount of 
money released to Iran, if measured in today’s dollars, would be 
the approximate equivalent to the amount spent by the U.S. 
government on the Marshall Plan, which covered 17 European 
countries over a period of four years after World War II. 11 
Similarly, in January of 2016, British trade officials were quick 
to stretch their sense of economic exuberance, predicting more 
than one trillion dollars of investment in Iran over the course of 
                                                 
6  See, e.g., A Safer World, Thanks to the Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, January 
18, 2016, at A20; Don’t Let Iran’s Progress on the Nuclear Deal Go to Waste, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2016 at A22; Tear up the Iran nuclear deal? Then what?, 
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ edito-
rials/ct-iran-nuclear-obama-trump-cruz-edit-0408-jm-20160407-story.html; 
Iran deal is better than no deal at all, BOS. GLOBE (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/07/14/iran-deal-better-
than-deal-all/bvOdH4HaVOK2QqAUEnS9qM/story.html; Emily Ekins, Sur-
vey: 58% of Americans Favor Iran Nuclear Agreement, but Worry about Its Ef-
ficacy, CATO INST. (July 20, 2015), https://www.cato.org/blog/survey-58-ameri-
cans-favor-iran-nuclear-agreement-worry-about-its-efficacy. 
7  The Over-Promised Land, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2016, at 57-58. 
8  Gary Bauer, Reports Of The Iran Nuclear Deal’s Success Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, DAILY CALLER, http://dailycaller.com/2016/07/18/reports-of-the-
iran-nuclear-deals-success-are-greatly-exaggerated/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2017). 
9  See Rick Gladstone, Value of Iran Sanctions Relief is Hard to Measure, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2015, at A12 (reporting wide variances in the precise 
amount: “Estimates of the sum that could become available to Iran range from 
$29 billion to as much as $150 billion.”). 
10  Ilan Berman, Trump and Iran: What the Next Administration Can Do, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ arti-
cles/united-states/2016-11-15/trump-and-iran (published by the Council on 
Foreign Relations). 
11  Id. 
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a decade, with at least one plutocrat heralding Iran as “a new 
region to conquer.”12  
This article will show that news of the “complete” demise of 
sanctions against Iran is greatly exaggerated.13 Since the lifting 
of international sanctions against Iran, there is mass confusion 
in the United States—and particularly in Iran itself—as to the 
particular kinds of trade deals into which Iran can enter. 
Neither party distinguishes between the lifting of certain U.S. 
nuclear-based sanctions pursuant to the JCPOA, and other 
sanctions that still remain in place. What is underreported in 
the media and other news coverage is the fact that U.S. 
sanctions against Iran still exist related to human rights abuses, 
missiles, and support for terrorism.14 
In addition to the lack of clarity as to which sanctions were 
lifted, there are two additional types of barriers to international 
trade. First, there exist a number of significant policy barriers 
to trade with Iran in the United States concerning the gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights.15 Second, 
there are potent ideological obstructions, extra-constitutional 
institutions, and legal barriers within Iran itself. These forces 
will likely continue to impede and obstruct commercial 
development and business dealings with Iran. 
                                                 
12  Berman, supra note 10 (quoting “an imperial-minded boss of a French 
luxury-goods firm”). 
13  See Mark Twain, Chapters from My Autobiography, 1906 N. AMER. REV. 
160 (relating that upon hearing of his demise, “[Twain] said – ‘Say the report 
is greatly exaggerated.’”). 
14  See Gladstone, supra note 1 (noting that certain American sanctions 
“remain in force”); see also NIAC, Tyler Cullis, Iran Sanctions after the JCPOA: 
Terrorism, Human Rights, Conventional Weapons and Ballistic Missiles Sanc-
tions, NATIONAL IRANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL (July 22, 2015), 
https://28d0so13ppai3ijpls45gl2s4gb-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/up-
loads/scorecard///Sanctions-After-JCPOA1.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
Eighteen years prior to signing the JCPOA, on December 10, 1998, President 
Clinton issued the first Presidential Proclamation concerning the U.S. commit-
ment to protect human rights in the international arena; See Exec. Order No. 
13107, 3 C.F.R. § 234 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
15  See 22 U.S.C. § 2340(d)(1) (defining the term “Gross Violations of In-
ternationally Recognized Human Rights”). Eighteen years prior to signing the 
JCPOA, on December 10, 1998, President Clinton issued the first Presidential 
Proclamation concerning the U.S. commitment to protect human rights in the 
international arena. See Proclamation 7158-Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights 
Day, and Human Rights Week, 1998, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
/ws/?pid=55385. 
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The legal complexities of the new Iranian commercial 
agreements with Europe and China, particularly in the field of 
banking and international finance, remain unknown, 
unresolved, or under-estimated. Such complexities are mainly 
derived from three elements: (1) the ideological discourse within 
Iran concerning money and banking (amongst other things); (2) 
the financial policy of the Western banks, long established to 
cope with the widespread perception of Iran’s ideologically 
motivated conduct abroad; and (3) impediments created by the 
United States laws, court decisions, and executive orders in 
order to cope with acts of terrorism. In fact, while Iran was in 
the midst of changing its previous public policy on international 
trade and was actively seeking to utilize banking and other 
financing facilities through international channels, the 
Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), a global standard-setting 
financial organization for combating financing the acts of 
terrorism and money laundering, issued a public statement 
indicating that: 
The FATF remains particularly and exceptionally concerned 
about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing 
and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the 
international financial system. . . The FATF continues to urge 
jurisdictions to protect against correspondent relationships 
being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk 
mitigation practices and to take into account ML/FT risks 
when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to 
open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction. Due to the 
continuing terrorist financing threat emerging from Iran, 
jurisdictions should consider the steps already taken and 
possible additional safeguards to strengthen existing ones.16  
Here, the FATF’s purpose was to urge members of all 
jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s policies regarding financing acts of terrorism 
in the Middle East.17 In fact, since 2009, the Office of Foreign 
                                                 
16  Public Statement, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/documents/public-statement-february-2016.html [hereinafter FATF 
Public Statement – 19 February 2016]. 
17  Mark Hosenball, Anti-money laundering body urges more scrutiny of 
Iran, North Korea, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-iran-economy-moneylaundering-idUSKCN0VS2LM. 
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Assets Control (“OFAC”), the Treasury’s sanctions enforcement 
office, has imposed fourteen billion dollars in fines to those 
companies that have been dealing with Iran.18 Paradoxically, the 
U.S. Treasury has been unable to define the benchmarks that 
the Islamic Republic has to meet in order to regain access to the 
American banking or financial system.19 It is because of such 
issues that the Central Bank of Iran Governor Valiollah Seif has 
contemptuously stated that “[t]he European banks do not have 
the courage to work with Iran because of the financial penalties 
the U.S. has imposed in the past.”20 
In terms of Iran’s access to the international banking 
system and global financial institutions, the more serious issue 
has been Iran’s logistical difficulties in obtaining international 
credit for various investment projects.21 In this respect, the most 
important and globally adopted banking system is the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(“SWIFT”), a cooperative that runs the international financial 
messaging system among the banks.22 Currently, SWIFT, a 
member owned industry cooperative, manages the worldwide 
cross-border payment instructions between banks.23 After the 
imposition of the sanctions in Iran, SWIFT facilities were cut off 
and some of the most powerful organizations, outside of the 
official ministries that function as extra-constitutional 
establishments in Iran, frequently resorted to money laundering 
or bartered commodity trades with certain countries.24 Upon the 
                                                 
18  The Over-Promised Land, supra note 7, at 58. 
19  See id. 
20  Iran CBI chief visits US, complains of sanctions, IRAN OIL GAS 
NETWORK (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.iranoilgas.com/news/details?id=15824& 
title=Iran+CBI+chief+visits+US,%20+complains+of+sanctions. 
21  KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 
9, 57 (2016) (noting Iran’s investment needs, particularly in the petroleum sec-
tor, where “onshore oil fields are in need of substantial investment” due to 
technology largely not upgraded since the 1990s; noting further that “[s]ome 
experts estimated in 2015 that sanctions relief under the JCPOA might return 
Iran to nearly double-digit growth in the first year if Iran uses the sanctions 
relief mostly to try to rebuild its civilian economy”). 
22  See About Us, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2017). 
23  Katy Burne, Swift Finds Evidence of Second Malware Attack, WALL ST. 
J. (May 12, 2016, 10:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swift-finds-evidence-
of-second-malware-attack-1463102215 (“On average, [SWIFT] handles 25 mil-
lion messages each day.”). 
24  Tom Arnold & Jonathan Saul, Iranians exasperated as U.S. sanctions 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
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rapprochement between Iran and the 5+1 countries, one 
question remains unanswered – by loosening the sanctions, how 
will the new commercial overtures towards Iran work vis-à-vis 
the ideological and social impediments installed for decades in 
that country? 
Part I of this article discusses the JCPOA agreement 
between Iran and the 5+1 countries, which has legitimized the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s undertaking of international 
commercial transactions with certain European countries, and, 
eventually, with the United States. Part I also discusses the 
existing legal impediments in the United States concerning 
doing business with Iran. These include, but are not limited to, 
legal barriers that still exist with respect to doing business with 
Iran, such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act [hereinafter 
TRIA], the President’s executive order prohibiting business 
interactions with certain countries that are on the list of aiding 
and abetting terrorists or acts of terrorism, and Iran’s present 
status as a terrorist aider and abettor under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.25 In this respect, this article will 
discuss the current U.S. policy concerning doing business with 
countries perceived to be involved in acts of terrorism. In 
particular, Part I will deal with the April 20, 2016 Supreme 
Court decision concerning Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of 
Iran.26  
Part II discusses the issues related to the constraints and 
limitations of banking in Iran as a financial conduit in 
international business. This part will also discuss the ideological 
impediments related to interest rates and a legal subterfuge to 
overcome such impediments. Part III engages the post-sanctions 
trade agreements concluded between the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and international bodies on the one hand, and between it 
and several European countries on the other. In this part, issues 
concerning the international financial transactions affecting 
                                                 
frustrate deal making, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com /arti-
cle/us-iran-trade-finance-idUSKCN0WO1Y3 (“In recent weeks SWIFT, the 
global payments network, has reconnected several Iranian banks to its system, 
allowing them to resume cross-border transactions with foreign banks four 
years after they were cut off.”). 
25  See 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2016) (making certain assets subject to attach-
ment in aid of execution on terrorism-related judgments against Iran). 
26  See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.). 
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Iran’s trade with European countries will be discussed. Part IV 
relates issues concerning Iranian international commercial 
transactions and global security concerns, and the development 
of quasi-banking institutions in Iran; in addition, Part IV 
provides an overview of the standing of Iran’s banking system to 
engage in international financial transactions. Part V discusses 
Iran’s recent sanction-free investments and commercial 
agreements with foreign companies. Part VI addresses the 
dispute resolution mechanism between Iran and foreign 
commercial companies. Part VII addresses the governmental 
structure and unique decision-making processes in Iran that 
affect foreign corporations that intend to undertake commercial 
transactions in that country. Such issues relate to the role and 
functions of the extra-constitutional institutions active within 
Iran. Finally, Part VIII discusses Iran’s integration in the 
international trade community and the impact of the regional 
organizations concerning commercial transactions with Iran. 
This article will show the impact of the extra-constitutional 
institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran as institutional 
impediments that severely diminish Iran’s capability to 
ostensibly participate in, and benefit from, its international 
commercial transactions. The extra-constitutional 
institutions—a vestige of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in 
Iran—are the non-governmental organizations that are 
effectively nonfunctional: they do not function under the 
auspices of the President or any other body recognized or 
mandated by Iran’s Constitution to engage in economic, 
business, administrative, or policy making activities. These 
institutions are engaged in ideological, military, investment and 
commercial activities throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
In this respect, one may say that Iran has a dual system of 
government. 27  The post-sanction investment and commercial 
agreements between Iran and several European countries, 
particularly France and Italy, have significant commercial and 
legal implications. These agreements, in the long run, will have 
                                                 
27  See EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI, THE PASDARAN, INSIDE IRAN’S ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 41-59 (2011); see also SAEID GOLKAR, CAPTIVE 
SOCIETY: THE BASIJ MILITIA AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN IRAN 151-74 (2015). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
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a pivotal impact not only on commercial policies, but also on the 
ideological posture of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East.28  
I. Demise of the Regime of Sanctions 
Since the revolution of 1979, Iran’s transnational 
investments and official commercial activities with Western 
countries, especially the United States, have been sporadic at 
best. Iran’s investments and assets continue to be subjected to 
the utmost national and international judicial scrutiny.29 
Various trade restrictions, particularly Congressional sanctions 
enforced by the Department of the Treasury, rendered nearly all 
commercial transactions with Iran to be in violation of U.S. 
law.30 Furthermore, the Department of State, through the Office 
of Economic Sanctions Policy Implementation (“OESPI”), has 
enforced effective sanction programs that handicap access to the 
U.S. for corporations engaging in commercial transactions in 
Iran. While the act of lifting the sanctions against Iran has 
abolished certain prohibitions concerning doing business with 
the Islamic Republic, it also creates continued complexities in 
the international community.31 These complexities fall into 
                                                 
28  In terms of modifying sanctions, this article addresses the issues re-
lated to Iran’s policy with respect to proliferation of nuclear energy. This article 
does not discuss other issues affecting sanctions against the Islamic Republic, 
i.e. Iran’s policy with respect to human rights as well as international terror-
ism. 
29  For instance, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certi-
orari to review certain issues related to Iran’s banking assets in the United 
States. The writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court on October 
2015. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, No. 14-770, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7643 (U.S. Nov. 
30, 2015). On April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision concerning 
this case. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). Iran has instituted 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice [“ICJ”] against the 
United States concerning sanctions and the Bank Markazi decision. See gener-
ally Press Release, International Court of Justice, Iran Institutes Proceedings 
Against the United States with Regard to a Dispute Concerning Alleged Viola-
tions of the 1955 Treaty of Amity (June 15, 2016) (on file with author), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/164/19032.pdf. 
30  See generally CONGRESS AND THE NATION 2009–2012, VOLUME XIII: 
POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE 111TH AND 112TH CONGRESSES (CQ Press 2014); 
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–44; International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701 (“IEEPA”); Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act of 2006 (“ILSA”). On September 30, 2006, the title of the Act was renamed 
to the “Iran Sanctions Act” (“ISA”). 
31  See infra Part IV and accompanying text. 
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primarily two categories: (1) the convoluted division of powers in 
Iran, mainly reflected in centers of decision-making (including 
issues related to international commercial transactions); and (2) 
the conflicting goals established by organizations—both 
international and within the United States, that are concerned 
with doing business with Iran. 
A review of the investment and commercial agreements 
between Iran and international commercial companies will be 
perfunctory without a brief reference to the agreement reached 
between the 5+1 countries and Iran, and the ideological point of 
view of banking and interests in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
A. Parameters Concerning Iranian Sanctions Relief 
On July 14, 2015, the 5+1 countries and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran agreed on the JCPOA, which ensured the 
signatory nations that the nuclear program of the Islamic 
Republic will be exclusively peaceful.32 In terms of the timing of 
the JCPOA accord, one scholar adroitly observed that “[w]hile 
the United States and its allies must achieve their core goals — 
effectively and dependably blocking Iran’s path to a nuclear 
bomb — in any compromises they make, they need to remember, 
too, that getting a deal itself could be a game-changer in Iranian 
politics.”33 There was a general accord between Iran on the one 
hand and the 5+1 countries on the other. Based on a verification 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), Iran had 
implemented the key nuclear-related obligations specified in the 
JCPOA on July 14, 2015, when the 5+1 countries finally agreed 
to lift the nuclear-related sanctions on the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (“5+1 Agreement”). Consequently, the international 
community marked January 16, 2016 as “Implementation 
Day.”34 Following Implementation Day, the next crucial 
                                                 
32  See GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE LIFTING OF CERTAIN U.S. SANCTIONS 
PURSUANT TO THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON IMPLEMENTATION 
DAY, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf [hereinaf-
ter U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT] (noting that October 18, 2015 marked 
the “Adoption Day” of the JCPOA, in which the agreement came into effect). 
33  Vali R. Nasr, A Nuclear Deal, Now or Never, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/opinion/vali-nasr-a-nuclear-deal-now-or-
never.html. 
34  See Thomas Erdbrink, In Tehran, Iranians Play Down Milestone, N.Y. 
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milestone in the JCPOA will be “Transition Day,” an event 
scheduled to occur eight years from Adoption Day, or upon a 
report from the Director General of the IAEA Board of 
Governors, and parallel to the United Nations Security Council 
(“UNSC”), stating that the IAEA has reached the conclusion that 
“all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities,” 
whichever date is earlier.35 The U.S. Government has sought to 
terminate or modify certain statutory provisions and to remove 
the individuals and corporations from the Treasury Department 
OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 
List (“SDN List”) provided this process bears fruit.36 Iran’s 
President Rohani considered the 5+1 agreement as evidence 
that Iran “has a big power called the power of diplomacy.”37 In 
reference to the conclusion of the nuclear deal, the Iranian 
President stated that:  
After 12 years of steadfastness and resistance as well as 
patience and sacrifice and also martyrdom of a number of 
nuclear scientists and on account of indefatigable efforts of our 
nuclear scientists, diplomats, politicians, lawyers as well as the 
economic officials of the country, today we are at a turning 
point.38  
As a result of the accord between the 5+1 countries and Iran, 
the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions on significant 
Iranian products and services.39 However, it is important to 
                                                 
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/ 
middleeast/iran-implementation-day-nuclear-sanctions.html (noting “[t]he 
low-key reception given [to] ‘implementation day’” within Iran). 
35  The White House, The Iran Nuclear Deal: What you need to know 
about the JCPOA, at 88, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
/jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf [hereinafter “What you need to know 
about the JCPOA”]; see also id. at Appendix, Key Excerpts of the Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), at 4. 
36  See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32. 
37  See Barbara Slavin and Laura Rozen, Obama, Rouhani Hail Diplo-
macy as Americans Fly Home, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.al-mon-
itor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/obama-rouhani-praise-diplomacy-americans-
freed-iran-us.html (contextualizing the statement and noting Rouhani’s con-
comitant assurances that Iran would not use the resources unfrozen from the 
deal for hostile purposes). 
38  See President Rouhani’s speech on the day of the conclusion of the 5+1 
Agreement, ETTELA’AT, January 13, 2016, at P.1. 
39  David E. Sanger, Iran Complies with Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are 
Lifted, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/ 
middleeast/iran-sanctions-lifted-nuclear-deal.html. 
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indicate that the removal of the sanctions by the United States 
was on a case-by-case basis and not categorical.40  This has been 
the main cause of confusion in Iran and the major source of 
complaint by the Iranian officials.41 These complaints are also 
shared by the European and South American companies who 
were under the impression that lifting the sanctions under the 
JCPOA would result in “free trade” with Iran.  
To understand the limits of free commercial transactions 
between Iran and the U.S., it is important to distinguish 
between nuclear-based and terrorism-based sanctions. 
Generally, under the JCPOA, foreign banks and companies may 
engage in commercial transactions with Iran without violating 
the nuclear weapons-based sanction laws.42 However, the 
United States’ primary embargo concerning terrorism-based 
sanctions remains in place under existing statutory laws and 
executive orders.43 The policies behind these sanctions largely 
relate to Iran’s reputed activities involving state-sponsored 
terrorism, disregard of basic human rights, extrajudicial 
killings, aircraft sabotage, and torture. Several statutes address 
these terrorist activities and their consequences.44 The JCPOA 
exclusively addresses nuclear-based sanctions, and not those 
sanctions based on claims as to Iran’s terrorism or human rights 
violations. In commercial terms, the U.S. Department of State’s 
                                                 
40  See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32. 
41  See The Over-promised Land, supra note 7 (“‘It was better when sanc-
tions were still in place,’ grumbles a wheat merchant, who traded with Ameri-
can suppliers (OFAC approved) throughout the sanctions era. ‘At least the 
banks then knew what they could and couldn’t do. Now the lawyers, not the 
bankers, are making decisions, and nothing is moving.’”). 
42  JCPOA, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 19(ii), 21(i); see also JCPOA Annex II, su-
pra note 5. 
43  See, e.g., Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act, 22 
U.S.C. § 8772 (2012); Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian 
Financial Institutions, Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 
2012). As of January 25, 2017, Executive Order 13,599 remains in effect. 
44  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A); Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2337 (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immun-
ities Act). Throughout the past two decades, U.S. laws have facilitated the 
means and ways of compensation for U.S. citizens damaged by the conduct of 
terrorist groups, sponsored, or assisted, by a sovereign country. See, e.g., the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C §§ 1701-
1707; Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(2002) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 248, 15 U.S.C. § 6701, and 28 U.S.C. § 
1610). 
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Office of Iran Nuclear Implementation clarified that “the United 
States has no objection to foreign banks engaging with Iranian 
banks and companies as long as those banks and companies are 
not on our sanction list for non-nuclear reasons.”45 Most 
importantly, in April 2016, in a case related to the attachment 
of the Central Bank of Iran’s assets in the United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court approvingly put its judicial seal with 
respect to the power of the U.S. President, in cases related to 
terrorism.46   
The confusion and frustration with respect to commercial 
transactions with Iran, after lifting the JCPOA-related 
sanctions, is not limited to Iran’s common marketplace, 
colloquially referred to as the “bazaar.”47 The bazaar’s 
frustration is also felt in the halls of large European companies 
where executives anticipate the opportunity to do business with 
Iran.48 In a statement addressed to the senior executives of some 
of Europe’s largest banks, the U.S Secretary of State indicated 
that “we want to make it clear that legitimate business which is 
clear under the definition of the [JCPOA] agreement, is 
available to banks as long as they do their normal due diligence 
and know who they are dealing with. They are not going to be 
held to some undefined and inappropriate standard.”49 
Nevertheless, having been punished by the Treasury 
Department’s OFAC office in the past, European banks have 
been cautious in opening credit for Iran.50 For example, HSBC 
                                                 
45  Steve Mull, Letters to the Editor, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/news/letters/21698215-letters-editor. 
46  See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310. 
47  See ARANG KESHAVARZIAN, BAZAAR AND STATE IN IRAN: THE POLITICS OF 
THE TEHRAN MARKETPLACE 39-44 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
48  See Matthew Spivack, What to Know About Doing Business in Iran, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 5, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/what-to-know-about-
doing-business-in-iran (noting the hesitancy of European banks to provide cap-
ital for business ventures, despite strong European interest in business devel-
opment in Iran); see also Ben Morris, Iran: Business Eyes New Opportunities, 
BBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35344179. 
49  Felicia Schwartz & Margot Patrick, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
Meets with European Bankers in Iran-Business Push, WALL ST. J., (May 12, 
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kerry-meets-with-european-bankers-in-
iran-business-push-1463045793. 
50  See e.g., Fabio Benedetti Valentini & Ladane Nasseri, Europe’s Banks 
Are Staying Out of Iran, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2016, 11:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-03/europe-s-banks-haunted-
by-u-s-fines-forgo-iran-deals-amid-boom (noting a record fine paid by BNP 
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bank “has shunned business with Iran to meet its pledge to 
follow U.S. standards on sanctions and anti-money-laundering 
as part of its 2012 deferred prosecution agreement with the 
Justice Department.”51 
In an attempt to reduce the confusion concerning 
determination as to which trade items are exempt from 
sanctions restrictions, the classification below is a simple—
albeit incomplete—categorization of major items and activities 
that are allowed for investment and commercial transactions, 
services, and activities as a result of the lifting of sanctions:  
• Banking and financial services;  
• Energy, petrochemical, shipping, shipbuilding;  
• Automotive sectors; 
• Iran’s port operations;  
• Commercial insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting 
service; 
• Iran’s commercial activities in precious metals including 
gold, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum 
and steel and coal; and 
• Software in connection with activities that are 
consistent with JCPOA and the provision of associated 
services for each of the above mentioned categories.52  
The United States government removed individuals and 
entities listed in the JCPOA from the SDN List, the so-called 
FSE List (Foreign Sanctions Evaders), and the NS-ISA list (non-
SDN Iran Sanctions Act List).53 Further, pursuant to its 
commitments under the JCPOA, the U.S. terminated certain, 
                                                 
Paribas as a major factor); Standard Chartered hit by $300m in Iran fines, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20669650 (reporting, 
in 2012, that Standard Chartered agreed to pay a total of $670 million to settle 
complaints brought by the U.S. federal government as well as New York State 
authorities for commercial dealings with its Iranian clients); US fines Deutsche 
Bank $258m for working with Iran, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34726690. As a result of these 
fines, international banks have expressed continuous caution in doing business 
with Iran. See Jonathan Saul & Thomas Atkins, Global banks to steer clear of 
Iran until sanctions finally go, REUTERS (July 16, 2015), http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/iran-business-banks-idUSL5N0ZW3SC20150716. 
51  Schwartz & Patrick, supra note 49. 
52  See U.S. Treasury Guidance Report, supra note 32; 31 C.F.R. § 560 
(2016); see also Morris, supra note 48. 
53  See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32. 
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but not all, executive orders which would preclude doing 
business with Iran.54  
With respect to investments and commercial transactions, 
the following sanctions were lifted: (1) sanctions on Iran’s energy 
and petrochemical sectors; (2) sanctions on transactions with 
Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators; (3) 
sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals; (4) 
sanctions on trade with Iran in graphic, raw or semi-finished 
metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for 
integrating industrial processes, in connection with activities 
that are consistent with the JCPOA; and (5) sanctions on the 
sale, supply, or transfer of goods and services used in connection 
with Iran’s automotive sector.55 
There were also certain commercial services and activities 
allowed subject to special conditions. Three categories of 
activities, which would otherwise be prohibited under the 
Iranian Transactions and the Sanctions Regulations will be 
treated as a special category.56  These transactions are allowed 
provided that they do not involve individuals and entities on the 
SDN List and are also consistent with the provisions of the 
JCPOA as well as United States laws. 
B. Iran’s Terrorism-Based Sanctions and U.S. Courts 
Contrary to common belief, commercial and banking 
sanctions adopted in the U.S. against Iran are not exclusively 
derived from the perceived activities of Iran concerning 
proliferation of nuclear products which could be used for 
production of nuclear weapons. Following the aftermath of the 
1983 bombing in Beirut, which killed 241 members of the U.S. 
Marine Corps, and similar victims of terrorist attacks attributed 
to Iran, the United States adopted various statutory laws and 
executive orders imposing diverse economic (including banking) 
sanctions against Iran.57 In particular, the Central Bank of Iran 
                                                 
54  See JCPOA Annex II, supra note 5, ¶ 5; JCPOA Annex V, supra note 5, 
¶ 17.1. 
55  JCPOA Annex II, supra note 5, ¶ 4.7. 
56  31 C.F.R. § 560.210 (2016). 
57  See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codifying criminal long-arm jurisdiction, includ-
ing for inchoate acts, related to similar terrorist activities at 18 U.S.C. § 2331); 
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has argued that seizure of the Bank’s assets under the 
camouflage of the U.S. statutory laws or President’s executive 
orders, are unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of 
powers.58  In its April 2016 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
supported the position that the President’s act, concerning the 
attachment of the assets belonging to the Central Bank of Iran, 
was constitutional.59  
Therefore, in the United States, unlike most European 
countries, the justification for maintaining trade sanctions 
against Iran primarily rests on Iran’s perceived policy in support 
of terrorism. Such justification is delineated by statutory laws 
and presidential executive orders.60 The Bank Markazi Court’s 
majority opinion was clear in its support of the statutory 
provision that permitted the executive branch to seize the 
Central Bank of Iran’s assets, and rejected the argument that 
such acts will be the usurpation of power by the executive in 
violation of the separation of powers.61 The Supreme Court was 
unequivocal that the President may adopt a policy for 
prohibition of doing business with Iran. Further, the Bank 
Markazi majority opinion unequivocally stated that, “American 
nationals . . . may seek ‘money damages . . . against a foreign 
state for personal injury or death that was caused by’ acts of 
                                                 
Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326–27 (noting the historical background and 
procedural interests giving rise to such legislation); Justin Jory, Anti-Terror-
ism Legislation: A Constitutional Problem, 17 BYU L. REV. 35, 36 (2006) (not-
ing the enactment of a long-arm statute in the 1983 bombing’s aftermath). Iran 
has vigorously denied awareness of, or participation in, the bombing or insti-
gating Hezbollah to participate in aiding or abetting the acts of terrorism re-
lated to the 1983 bombing event. See Thomas Erdbrink, U.S. Ruling Over Com-
pensation for ‘83 Beirut Bombing Riles Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2016, at A7 
(“Iranian officials have repeatedly denied responsibility, however, and they ac-
cuse the United States of using the pretext of an attack to steal money that is 
rightfully theirs.”). Other terrorist acts, such as the Lockerbie Bombing, have 
contributed to jurisdiction over state-sponsored terrorist acts occurring abroad 
applicable to the Bank Markazi case. See Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605) (creating “Civil 
Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism”). 
58  Peterson v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp.2d 25, 36 (D.D.C. 
2007). 
59  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329. 
60  See, e.g., Brett Stephens, Truth Catches the Iran Deal, WALL ST. J. (July 
12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/truth-catches-the-iran-deal-
1468278677. 
61  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329. 
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terrorism, including ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support’ to 
terrorist activities.62“  
Thus, the Supreme Court addressed two issues in its 
sweeping opinion: first, with respect to the Act of State Doctrine, 
the Court would maintain the validity of the suits against 
foreign sovereigns (an exception to the doctrine) for the purpose 
of “compelling Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability” that “can be effectively achieved through a 
comprehensive policy that includes economic sanctions. . .”63 
Moreover, courts have taken the position that the Act of State 
Doctrine does not apply where the executive and legislative 
branches grant express jurisdiction over terrorist acts or 
attempted acts to the judiciary.64 Thus, in Bank Markazi, the 
President’s seizure of the Central Bank’s assets was justifiable 
because the funds were used in “support for terrorism,” and were 
not under the negotiated terms of the 5+1 Agreement.65 The 
statutory justification for the President’s authority was Section 
8772 of the “Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012.”66  In his vigorous and impassioned dissenting opinion, 
Chief Justice John Roberts stated that Section 8772 “strips the 
Bank [Markazi of Iran] of any protection that federal law, 
international law, or New York State law might have offered 
against respondents’ claims. That is without any analogue or 
precedent.”67 
The President’s executive order disrupts individuals and 
corporations engaging in the financial support network for 
                                                 
62  Id. at 1317 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)). 
63  See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-158, 126 Stat. 1214, § 101 (2012) (the relevant language is codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 8711). 
64  See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-24, 
superseded by statute on other grounds, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Act of State 
Doctrine derives from judicial concern that “passing on the validity of foreign 
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both 
for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international 
sphere.”); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 55 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(declining to apply the Act of State Doctrine where Congress and the Executive 
use “the threat of legal action in the courts as an instrument of foreign policy” 
by designating Iraq as a terrorist state). 
65  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317, 1329. 
66  22 U.S.C. § 8772. 
67  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1336 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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terrorists and terrorist organizations by “blocking property and 
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to 
commit or support terrorism.”68 The order is derived from the 
terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign 
state statute in which  “money damages are sought against a 
foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an 
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support” to terrorists 
activities.69   
As a result of Bank Markazi, Congress and the executive 
branch can make legal and policy decisions concerning foreign 
assets. As Chief Justice John Roberts stated, “hereafter, with 
this court’s seal of approval, Congress can unabashedly pick the 
winners and losers in particular pending cases. [The majority’s] 
decision will indeed become a ‘blueprint for extensive expansion 
of the legislative power’ at the judiciary’s expense.”70 The 
Supreme Court does not directly discuss the question of 
sanctions against Iran. However, it supports the authority 
concerning the right of the victims of terrorist activities to sue a 
foreign government and its political subdivision, particularly 
where the executive branch acts in tandem with Congress.71 
Therefore, Iranian assets, including commercial assets, could be 
within the legal orbit of U.S. law. 
Among the sanctions that remain in place are U.S. trade 
embargoes against Iran concerning reputed acts of terrorism 
and basic human rights violations; these sanctions persist even 
after Iran’s acquiescence to the JCPOA Agreement and its 
renunciation of activities related to nuclear weaponry.72 As a 
                                                 
68  Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sep. 23, 2001). 
69  28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008). 
70  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
71  See Yishal Schwartz, Bank Markazi v. Peterson: Implications for Sep-
aration of Power, LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
bank-markazi-v-peterson-implications-separation-power (commenting that 
“Bank Markazi . . . stands as an affirmation of Congressional power in foreign 
policy. But the affirmation comes with a warning: without the President stand-
ing alongside Congress, the Court may not be so deferential.”). 
72  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain 
U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Im-
plementation Day, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ jcpoa_faqs.pdf (last 
updated June 8, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. Treasury JCPOA FAQ]; Katherine 
Bauer, One Year Post-JCPOA, Not Post-Sanctions, WASH. INST. (July 13, 2016), 
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result, U.S. corporations are subject to certain prohibitions that 
enjoin them from engaging in business transactions with Iran or 
its governmental subdivisions.73 Thus, the fundamental 
question remains: To what extent will Iran be able to engage in 
meaningful international trade on a global level? 
Iran’s global commercial and investment relations must be 
divided into two categories: Iran’s commercial relationship with 
U.S. companies, and commercial transactions outside of the 
United States. As to the first category, under Bank Markazi, 
Iranian financial institutions remain persons whose property 
and interests may be subject to executive order or legislative 
decree.74 In the absence of an exemption or an authorization by 
OFAC, sanctions blocking property and interests in property of 
most Iranian individuals and corporate entities will continue.75 
In addition, non-U.S. persons (corporate or actual) are most 
                                                 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis /view/one-year-post-jcpoa-
not-post-sanctions (reporting on sanctions imposed on Iran related to its bal-
listic missile activities, trade with Iran, and private airline Mahan Air’s activ-
ities “on behalf of the Qods Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps.”). 
73  50 U.S.C. § 4605(j); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332d; 31 C.F.R. § 596.310; 
U.S. Treasury JCPOA FAQ, supra note 72; see also generally Buhm Suk Baek, 
Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations, Cornell Law School In-
ter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers. Paper 11 (2008), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039& con-
text=lps_clacp. These trade sanctions may be enforced on U.S. persons in case 
of a foreign country’s association with acts of terror. Further, Iran could be 
subject to sanctions on account of human rights violations. See, e.g., Press Re-
lease, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, Treasury Sanctions Iranian Security Forces for 
Human Rights Abuses (June 9, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/ press-cen-
ter/press-releases/Pages/tg1204.aspx; Press Release, Fact Sheet: New Execu-
tive Order Targeting Iranian Officials Responsible for or Complicit in Serious 
Human Rights Abuses (Sep. 30, 2010) (reporting U.S. imposition of sanctions 
on Iran for “sustained and severe violation of human rights.”) The reference 
was human rights abuses during the re-election campaign by Mr. Ahmadinejad 
the former President of Iran. See Robin Wright, U.S. Sanctions for Human 
Rights Abuses, Iran Primer, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Oct 11, 2010), http://iranpri-
mer.usip.org/resource/us-sanctions-human-rights-abuses (claiming that such 
abuses included “arrest, killing, torture, blackmail and rape.”). See also Press 
Release, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
USCIRF Applauds Obama Human Rights Sanctions on Iran (Sep. 29, 2010), 
http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/uscirf-applauds-obama-hu-
man-rights-sanctions-iran. Under U.S. law, U.S. nationals may file suits 
against state sponsors of terrorism in U.S. courts. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1317; see also 28 U.S.C § 1605A. 
74  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317; see also 31 C.F.R. § 560.211 (2016). 
75  See generally U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32. 
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likely also prohibited from knowingly engaging in conduct that 
would seek to evade U.S. restrictions on transactions or dealings 
with Iran, or that cause the export of products or services from 
the United States to the Islamic Republic of Iran.76  
Any U.S. prohibition concerning trade with Iran will not 
apply as a sweeping generalization. It seems more likely that for 
each transaction, a permit should be requested from the 
regulatory agencies,77 such as post-Implementation Day OFAC-
issued statements and licenses authorizing the conduct of 
business with specific Iranian entities. Accordingly, OFAC has 
implemented a case-by-case licensing and authorization system 
for individuals and entities seeking to sell, export, re-export, 
lease or transfer to Iran commercial passenger aircraft, and 
related parts and services, for exclusively commercial passenger 
aviation.78 
The lifting of nuclear-related sanctions has removed some 
of the conceptual and legal impediments to conducting business 
with Iran. However, such a limited removal of sanctions serves 
little practical benefit without legal and policy reforms in Iran’s 
financial and banking fields. Moreover, Iran’s future adherence 
to fundamental principles of conduct of business globally, as 
provided by international organizations, such as the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”), is another important requirement. In any 
international transaction, joint venture, foreign investment, or 
purchase agreement, the role of the host government concerning 
its payment guarantees, depository functions, and credit 
recognition by international banks is key to successful 
integration into the global marketplace.  
Finally, several other factors play a vital role in any 
commercial agreement between a country and international 
                                                 
76  See Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Legal Alert, International Trade Law – 
Sanctions on Iran Lifted – but not for Most U.S. Companies (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.btlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/2016%20Alerts/Alert%20-
%20Sanctions%20on%20Iran%20Lifted%20-
%20But%20Not%20for%20Most%20U.S.%20Companies.pdf (last visited Jan. 
24, 2017). 
77  See id. 
78  U.S. Treasury JCPOA FAQ, supra note 72; see also Maryam Jazini 
Dorcheh, Status of U.S. Sanctions after Implementation of Iran Deal, N.Y. L.J. 
(Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=120275106030 9/Sta-
tus-of-US-Sanctions-After-Implementation-of-Iran-Deal. 
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corporation, including the interest on the funds, inter-banking 
financial communications, and the degree of recognition of the 
host country’s national banks in the international community.  
Bank Markazi is Iran’s central bank, and the largest in the 
Middle East. In any investment and commercial transaction 
between Iran and its American or European corporate partners, 
participating Iranian banks, especially Bank Markazi, will play 
a pivotal role. With respect to the post-sanction commercial 
agreements that Iran has entered into, there are significant 
legal issues and barriers in which the Central Bank of Iran is 
directly involved. 
The post-sanction investment and commercial agreements 
between Iran and several European countries, especially France 
and Italy, have significant commercial and legal implications. In 
the long run, these agreements will have pivotal impact on 
political posture and policy position of the Islamic Republic in 
the Middle East. By signing sizeable commercial agreements 
with international companies from France, Italy, China, and 
(eventually) the United States, Iran has opened a gate for 
provocative and intellectually challenging questions concerning 
the Islamic Republic’s concept of interest and banking, the role 
of the extra-constitutional economic institutions upon Iran’s 
international trade, and the looming impediments caused by 
institutional irregularities practiced by extra-constitutional 
organizations in that country.  
 
C. Iran’s Banking Assets in the United States and the 
 Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court  
1.  Sovereign Immunity under U.S. Law 
Contrary to the commonly accepted view, commercial 
transactions between Iran and U.S. companies will be hampered 
unless the current legal encumbrances facing the Islamic 
government of Iran are resolved. Unlike the United States and 
most of the Western European countries, the operation of the 
banking system in Iran is highly centralized in the sense that 
the banking system operates as part of a ministry or a 
25
26 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 29:1 
government bureaucracy.79 Historically, Bank Melli was the 
National Bank of Iran.80 Even now, it remains an integral part 
of the executive branch and a de facto governmental 
bureaucracy.81 
Consistent with this tradition, Bank Markazi, now the 
Central Bank of Iran, follows the Islamic Republic government’s 
policies economically as well as in reflecting such policies upon 
the banks throughout the world. At one point, the head of the 
Central Bank of Iran, addressing the European Banking 
Congress in reference to the nuclear deal, stated that “this is the 
reason our government put forth such a substantial effort in 
dialogue with the 5+1 [ostensibly a non-banking issue] in order 
to reconstruct its relationship with the international 
community.”82 Thus, as a governmental body, the Central Bank 
often presents the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran with 
respect to economic policy. 
Considering the above structure and pattern of executive 
operation, it is safe to say that the Central Bank of Iran is an 
executive body of the Islamic government of Iran. Based on this 
assumption, the Central Bank of Iran, pursuant to U.S. law, 
should be treated as an integral system of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. This assumption places the Central Bank of Iran as a 
                                                 
79  See Ardalan Sayami, Iranian Banks Under Sanctions: Government 
Looking Towards Foreign Banks, PAYVAND.COM (July 7, 2010), http://www. 
payvand.com/news/10/jul/1063.html (“Ever since banks in Iran were national-
ized by the government and brought under its direct control, the executive 
branch sees it as its right to intervene in the most detailed aspects of banking 
operations while those who deposit money into banks and constitute its main 
donors, do not have any rights in electing bank managers. The result is the 
absence of independence of the Central Bank from the executive branch of gov-
ernment.”). 
80  History of Bank Melli Iran, BANK MELLI IRAN, http://www.bmi. 
ir/En/BMIHistory.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2017) (reporting that Bank Melli, 
as the first Iranian commercial bank, was established in 1928; it began to 
gather momentum in strengthening the economic structure and development 
of Iran and suspension of foreign banks’ licenses. Also reporting that Bank 
Melli was instrumental in channeling credits for Iran’s productive activities). 
81  Id. 
82  Iranian and European Banks Prepared to Re-Establish Banking Rela-
tionships, Central Bank of The Islamic Republic Of Iran, CENTRAL BANK OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.cbi.ir/ show-
item/13926.aspx, (speech by Dr. Seif, the Governor of the Central Bank of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran addressing European Banking Congress). 
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political instrumentality, subjecting it to customary policies and 
conventional rules of international law.  
Under international law, governments and other 
international legal persons enjoy certain immunities from the 
exercise of jurisdiction, including litigation, with respect to their 
official acts.83 However, this type of immunity does not generally 
apply in the event of domestic prosecutions of foreign officials for 
most international crimes.84 The concept of sovereign immunity 
has been traditionally established in U.S. courts.85 In the United 
States, suits against the government by foreign entities require 
the consent of the United States.86 Such consent, by statute, in 
cases of tort or contract claims, would include suits concerning 
violations of international obligations.87 Moreover, jurisdictional 
requirements limit tribunals in cases involving sovereign 
immunity.88 Chief Justice Marshall’s Supreme Court opinion in 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, rendered in 1812, 
established that a foreign property that entered or otherwise 
existed in the United States “must be considered as having come 
                                                 
83  See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judg-
ment, 2002 I.C.J Rep. 3, ¶ 75 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, noting that “. . . immunities are granted to high 
State officials to guarantee the proper functioning of the network of mutual 
inter-State relations, which is of paramount importance for a well-ordered and 
harmonious international system.”); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-
AR108, Objection to the Issue of Subpoena Duces Tecum, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997), (noting the well-established custom-
ary norm that state officials “are mere instruments of a State and their official 
action can only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the subject of sanc-
tions or penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of 
the State.”), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ blaskic/acdec/en/71029JT3.html. 
84  See generally R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate et. al. [1999] 3 
AC 97 (HL) (former head of state not immune with respect to acts committed 
under his administration that violated the Convention Against Torture). 
85  See e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
86  See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“To sustain a claim that 
the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sov-
ereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.”). 
87  See Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 268 (D.D.C. 2004). 
(“[N]ot only does precedent instruct that a waiver of sovereign immunity must 
be explicit but it also teaches that such immunity cannot be implied unless a 
government has “indicated its amenability to suit” even for the most heinous 
of crimes against international law.”), (citing Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 
26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
88  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907, at n.2 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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into the American territory, under an implied promise, that 
while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly 
manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the 
country.”89 The denial of such immunity by another state may 
create a claim for violation of international law.90  
Under the original and classic international law, 
jurisdictional immunity was regarded as absolute; a state could 
invoke immunity irrespective of the nature of its sovereign 
activities.91 At times, U.S. courts have refused to grant relief 
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity even though such 
sovereign may not have been recognized by the United States.92 
In one case, the state court held, in part, that “our courts . . . may 
not bring a foreign sovereign before our bar, not because of 
comity, but because he has not submitted himself to our laws. 
Without his consent he is not subject to them.”93  Justice 
Marshall was an unwavering defender of sovereign immunity. 
In McFaddon, he famously pronounced that “[t]he jurisdiction of 
the nation, within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and 
                                                 
89  McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 147. 
90  See id.; cf. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece 
Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J., ¶ ¶ 57-58 (Feb. 3) (while “[e]xceptions to 
the immunity of the State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign 
equality,” the denial of immunity itself is procedural, rather than substantive, 
in nature). 
91  See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, I.C.J. Reports 2012, ¶¶ 56-
57; cf. id. ¶ 59 (noting that “many States . . . now distinguish between acta jure 
gestionis [commercial acts], in respect of which they have limited the immunity 
which they claim for themselves and which they accord to others, and acta jure 
imperii [public governmental acts].”). The United States has also adopted this 
distinction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; see also Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting 
Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Let-
ter] (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign 
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure 
gestionis).”). 
92  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) 
(recognizing Cuba as a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts despite the severance 
of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba; ruling that “the act of state 
doctrine proscribes a challenge to the validity of [a] Cuban expropriation de-
cree” and thus precludes the exercise of jurisdiction over that decree). 
93  Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 
376 (1923); see also LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 262–263 (2d ed. 1987). 
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absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by 
itself.”94  
Following this time-honored concept of foreign sovereign 
immunity, the United States has (with certain exceptions 
beyond the scope of this writing), traditionally adopted the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as the cornerstone of its 
foreign policy concerning the treatment of the assets owned by, 
or connected to, a foreign sovereign state.95   
2. The Terrorism Exception to Sovereign Immunity 
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States 
passed TRIA, a significant amendment to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.96 Under TRIA, victims of terrorism are allowed 
to litigate against countries as designated by the U.S. 
government to be State Sponsors of Terrorism.97 After Hezbollah 
was reportedly involved in the 1983 bombing of the Beirut 
Marine compound, President Reagan added Iran to the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism.98 As such, the U.S. government 
classifies the Islamic Republic of Iran as a sponsor of acts of 
terrorism and subject to TRIA, which creates an exception to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Doctrine. TRIA’s exception is 
codified as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as 
provided [in this law], in every case in which a person has obtained 
a judgment against a terrorist party is not immune . . . or for which 
a terrorist party is not immune under [the law] . . . the blocked  
assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any 
agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party), shall be subject 
to execution or attachment in aid of execution, in order to satisfy 
such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for 
which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.99  
                                                 
94  McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 136; see also Henkin, supra, note 85 at 891-979. 
95  28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602 et seq. (1976). 
96  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, supra note 44. 
97  See id. at § 201; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (2012) (referencing the 
terrorism exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A). 
98  SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: A GUIDE TO TARGETS, TERMS, AND TIMETABLES 
3 (Gary Samore ed. 2015) [hereinafter Belfer Center Report]. 
99  28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
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Separately, Section 1610(g) of TRIA extends the exception 
to the tradition of enforcing foreign sovereign immunity by 
permitting attachment in aid of an execution of a judgment 
entered. That exception provides that: 
[T]he property of a foreign state against which a judgment is 
entered under Section 1605A, and the property of an agency or 
instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a 
separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly 
in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid of 
execution, and execution upon that judgment as provided in this 
section, regardless of the level of economic control over the 
property by the government of the foreign state.100  
 
This significant exception provides pivotal facilitation in 
attaching specific foreign property, such as the real property in 
which a member of a terrorist group has a fee simple ownership, 
and restricts movement of any property in which Iran or its 
instrumentalities have an interest. The only requirement for 
courts to allow attachment or execution of property is evidence 
that the property in question is held by a foreign entity that is 
in fact an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state against 
which the Court has entered judgment.101 Under this definition, 
the Central Bank of Iran is an instrumentality of Iran, and its 
transactions and assets in the United States are subject to the 
TRIA exception to sovereign immunity. 
II.  U.S. Supreme Court v. Iran’s Nuclear Deal Accord 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bank 
Markazi, JCPOA notwithstanding, commercial relations 
between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain 
substantially limited. In its decision, the majority not only 
endorsed the exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine, but also 
enhanced the President’s power to limit commercial acts of a 
foreign state’s financial and commercial agencies in the United 
States.102  Specifically, the Supreme Court asserted, “the 
                                                 
100  28 U.S.C. § 1610 (g)(1)(A) (2012). 
101  Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 807 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 
2011); see also Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d. 1117, 1123, n. 2 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
102  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310 (approving Iran Threat Reduction 
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772 concerning Sovereign 
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Executive has historically made case specific sovereign 
immunity determinations to which courts have deferred.”103 
Therefore, considering the sweeping authorization granted to 
the executive branch by the Supreme Court, the executive 
branch (through the Department of the Treasury) may continue 
to seize assets deposited with Citibank by the Central Bank of 
Iran, and may distribute such assets among the victims of the 
alleged acts of terrorism.104 
So, what impact does the Supreme Court’s decision in Bank 
Markazi have on the JCPOA accord? To answer this question, 
we must first examine the relevant provision of the U.S. law 
with respect to commercial transactions with Iran. The Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 makes 
available a post-judgment execution of a set of banking assets 
held ultimately by Citibank of New York on behalf of the Central 
Bank of Iran for over 1,000 victims of terrorist acts allegedly 
sponsored by Iran.105 In 2012, the President signed Executive 
Order 13,599, which directly addressed the question of assets 
claimed by the Central Bank of Iran.106 The order explicitly 
states that: 
[I]n light of the deceptive practices of [Bank Markazi] . . . To 
conceal transactions of sanctioned parties . . . [a]ll property 
and interests in property of the Government of Iran including 
[Bank Markazi], that are in the United States . . . Or that are 
or hereafter come within the possession or control of any 
United States person . . . are blocked.107  
In Bank Markazi, the Supreme Court was unequivocal that 
based on Congressional authorization, American nationals “may 
file suit against state sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the 
United States.”108 The Supreme Court in Bank Markazi, 
decidedly ascertained that the victims of terrorism are 
authorized to, “seek money damages . . . against a foreign state 
for personal injury or death that was caused by acts of terrorism 
including torture, extra-judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, 
                                                 
Immunity determination). 
103  Id. at 1317. 
104  See id. 
105  22 U.S.C § 8772 (2012). 
106  Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012). 
107  Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012). 
108  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2008)). 
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hostage taking, or the provision of material support to terrorist 
activities.”109 
The decision of the Supreme Court has resulted in blocking 
$1.75 billion of the assets belonging to the Central Bank of Iran 
in the United States. It is, however, estimated that the total 
assets of the Central Bank of Iran in the United States may be 
over $30 billion.110  
In light of Bank Markazi, the TRIA exception to the 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine remains operative.111 Thus, the 
Central Bank of Iran and its blocked assets in the United States 
remain subject to restrictions imposed by TRIA.112 Under such 
circumstances, the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, with respect 
to Iran, remains non-operative in the United States.113 
Therefore, future commercial agreements between Iran and U.S. 
corporations will be hampered by the operation of the exception 
to the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine or executive orders.  
The Bank Markazi decision may have considerable impact 
on another major Middle Eastern country – Saudi Arabia. That 
country has a history of asserting the Act of State Doctrine as a 
defense in civil litigation.114 A legislative transgression against 
Saudi Arabia began on May 17, 2016, when the U.S. Senate 
passed a bill authorizing the U.S. Government to sue Saudi 
                                                 
109  Id. 
110  See Matt Pearce, Where are Iran’s billions in frozen assets, and how 
soon will it get them back?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.latimes. 
com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-frozen-assets-20160120-story.html (reporting 
that according to the estimates by Professor Nader Habibi of Brandeis Univer-
sity, the total Iranian bank assets in the United States are approximately $30 
billion; further reporting that Iran’s Central Bank Chief, Valiollah Seif, has 
indicated the Central Bank’s assets in the U.S. to be approximately $32 bil-
lion). 
111  Id. 
112  Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 556 U.S. 366, 374 (2009) (observing that TRIA per-
mits “a person with a terrorism-related judgment to attach an asset . . . pro-
vided the asset [is] a ‘blocked asset’”). 
113  See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). 
114  See, e.g., UNC Lear Servs., v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210, 
214 (5th Cir. 2009) (contract-related claims); Spectrum Stores Inc. v. Citgo Pe-
troleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 956 (5th Cir. 2011) (claims of price-rigging by 
OPEC nations, including Saudi Arabia, barred on both political question and 
act of state doctrine theories); Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 332 
F. Supp. 2d 189, 201 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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Arabia in U.S. court regarding 9/11 acts of terrorism.115 In Bank 
Markazi, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision 
granting an exception to the Act of State Doctrine based on the 
specific acts related to the claims of terrorism and abuse of 
human rights by the government of Iran.116 However, other 
legislative tools not exclusively limited to claims against Iran 
exist, including the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (hereinafter “IEEPA”).117 Therefore, there is no justification 
for the Senate’s legislative act based on seemingly political 
grounds. The President has adequate ammunition to deal with 
situations like these, such as the IEEPA or the President’s 
executive orders. The overzealous Senate bill to abandon the 
framework provided by the Act of State Doctrine has serious 
political consequences. Saudi Arabia has various monetary 
deposits in the United States of about $750 billion in treasury, 
securities and other assets. Saudi Arabia has indicated that in 
the event this bill becomes law, it might begin selling off these 
assets.118  
Immunity of foreign countries against judgments of 
legislative powers is a facet of acta jure imperii, a principle that 
foreign courts cannot judge the liability of a nation state for acts 
and omissions in the exercise of the nation state’s authority.119  
Thus, under international law, the U.S. Congress is operating in 
a position of judgment with respect to the official governmental 
acts of a foreign country.120 Such a position runs counter to 
                                                 
115  Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(as introduced in the Senate, Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter JASTA]. 
116  See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329. 
117  91 Stat. 1625, 50 U.S.C. § 1570 (2015). 
118  Mark Mazzetti, Senate Passes Bill Exposing Saudi Arabia to 9/11 
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/us/ 
politics/senate-passes-bill-that-would-expose-saudi-arabia-to-legal-jeopardy-
over-9-11.html. 
119  See Tate Letter, supra note 91. 
120  See David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Govern-
ment Controlled Investors, OECD 18-27 (OECD Working Papers on Interna-
tional Investment No. 02, 2010) (noting the limitations on execution and adju-
dication that is the general practice of most states, and favors immunity from 
jurisdiction and execution as a customary norm with respect to acta jure impe-
rii). While immunity from jurisdiction is distinct from immunity from execu-
tion, an execution against State property generally requires a link between the 
property and the original claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). 
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generally established norms of international law.121 Saudi 
Arabia’s alleged involvement relates to 28 pages of the 9/11 
Commission Report released by the House Intelligence 
Committee.122 However, such allegations are far from clear and 
this matter should not be treated haphazardly. As Lee Hamilton 
and Thomas Kean, the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report, 
have adroitly reacted to the news of the Senate’s bill, 
“[a]ccusations of complicity in that mass murder from 
responsible authorities are a grave matter . . . Such charges 
should be levied with care.”123 Thus, the Bank Markazi decision 
should not be interpreted by sweeping generalizations and 
indiscriminate standards of judgment; in light of foreign policy 
discretions, it may not prove to be universally applicable.  
The extra-constitutional institutions under the present 
system of social order in Iran are organizations which are not 
part of the official body of the government.124  Nevertheless, 
these organizations function as semi-governmental entities.125 
Whether the extra-constitutional institutions of Iran should be 
subject to the acts of foreign states such as the United States is 
an important question. According to the late Professor 
McDougal, “the competences over individuals achieved by states 
under . . . [p]rimary principles of jurisdiction are not lessened by 
certain secondary allocations of competence under such 
                                                 
121  See Gaukrodger, supra note 120. 
122  Jim Sciutto, Ryan Browne & Deirdre Walsh, Congress releases secret 
‘28 pages’ on alleged Saudi 9/11 ties, CNN (July 15, 2016, 10:44 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/politics/congress-releases-28-pages-saudis-9-
11/. 
123  See Thomas Kean & Lee Hamilton, Flashback - 28 pages reveal noth-
ing new: 9/11 Commission chairmen, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/04/27/911-report-28-pages-
saudi-arabia-kean-hamilton/83597386/; see also Carol Giacomo, A Warning 
About the Secret 9/11 Pages, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE BLOG (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/a-warning-about-the-secret-
911-pages/. 
124  See Mehran Kamrava & Houchang Hassan-Yari, Suspended Equilib-
rium in Iran’s Political System, 94 MUSLIM WORLD 495, 508-512 (2004) (noting 
the presence of “informal power centers” in Iran that are “under the control of 
the Supreme Leader, that exert considerable power.” These include “Repre-
sentatives of the Leader,” pervasive in state organs, including universities; 
Bonyads, “powerful public enterprise foundations tasked with specific eco-
nomic functions,” including charity or veterans’ affairs; Friday Prayer Imams; 
and the Special Court for the Clergy). 
125  Id. 
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doctrines as those of act of state and sovereign immunity.”126  In 
other words, the state courts will not, or should not, deny their 
own jurisdiction with respect to the acts of foreign states 
disregarding certain fundamental principles of international 
law or state laws, i.e., laws concerning terrorism.  It seems that 
this view has been adopted where the targeted acts are within 
the category of “state sponsored acts of terrorism.” According to 
the Supreme Court, 
American nationals may file suit against state sponsors of 
terrorism in the courts of the United States . . . Specifically, 
they may seek “money damages . . .  against a foreign state for 
personal injury or death that was caused by” acts of terrorism, 
including “torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, 
hostage taking, or the provision of material support.”127  
Thus, to qualify as acts by “state sponsors of terrorism” 
under the prohibitive language of Bank Markazi, such acts must 
be either undertaken directly by the state, or by state-sponsored 
or state-directed organizations. As a result, the illicit acts 
undertaken by an unaffiliated non-state party (e.g., private 
corporate entities of Iran) would likely not be acts directed by 
the government of Iran, and the terrorism exception statutes 
would not apply.  
It is conceivable that based on Bank Markazi (coupled with 
the statutory laws and accompanying President’s executive 
orders), the Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran (“IRGC,” 
“Sepah Pasdaran Engelabeh Islami” or “Pasdaran”) may qualify 
as a “state sponsored organization.”128 However, the extent to 
which the Revolutionary Guards are constitutionally within the 
orbit of the government of Iran is an open question. Under the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, organized in the 
early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained 
so that it may continue its role of guarding the Revolution and 
                                                 
126  MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, & LUNG-CHU CHEN, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 216 (Yale Univ. Press 1977). 
127  See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added). 
128  RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, [KASHF AL-ĀSRĀR] [UNVEILING OF SECRETS] 65, 
(Sherkat Ketab 1943). Today the mission of charity is a comparatively insig-
nificant part of the IRGC’s vast scheme of activities. See generally GOLKAR, 
supra note 27. 
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its achievements. The scope of the duties of these corps and 
areas of its responsibility . . . to be determined by law. . .129 
A strict textual reading does not indicate whether or not this 
organization is part of a constitutional governmental branch in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. This question was not addressed in 
the fact-finding District Court in Bank Markazi, and 
consequently, it did not come under judicial inquiry or part of 
the discussion in the appellate phase of the case in either the 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.130  
The official activities of the IRGC could be divided into three 
basic categories; military, economic, and ideological. It must be 
noted that neither the vast military nor the extensive economic 
institutions, functioning under the network of the IRGC, are 
subject to any official government ministry or bureaucracy.131 In 
terms of its military activities, the IRGC has its own Navy, 
Army, and Air Force. These are separate military entities that 
do not report to the President. In the past, the IRGC’s military, 
when necessary, has entered into defense arrangements with 
other countries. For example it has undertaken to acquire 
vessels including military speedboats from Italy.132 The IRGC 
also has a record of contacting other countries such as South 
Africa, Austria, and Pakistan to bolster its military strength or 
for social wellness such as combating drug epidemics.133 
Moreover, the IRGC, through its Quds Force, maintains a 
combination of militarily and ideologically related activities.134 
                                                 
129  ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION] 1368 [1989] (Iran), art. 150. At present, the vast and inter-
twined network of the activities of the Revolutionary Guards far exceed the 
targeted singular original constitutional mission as the “Guardians of the Rev-
olution.” 
130  See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10-CIV-4518, 2013 WL 
1155576 (May 20, 2013). 
131  See CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, art. 110 (deline-
ating that the Leader shall appoint the Commander in Chief of the “Pasdaran,” 
or Revolutionary Guards). 
132  See Giulio Meotti, The Rome-Tehran Axis, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2010 
4:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703510 
304574625620914295450 (reporting Italian Boat Manufacturer FB Design’s 
admission that it “regularly sold design and technology to the Iranian secret 
services”). 
133  See EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI, THE PASDARAN: INSIDE IRAN’S ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 50–53 (FDD Press 2011). 
134  See Dexter Filkins, The Shadow Commander, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 
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The military branch of the IRGC is a dynamic force driven by 
transformative military technologies.135 
The IRGC also has vast economic power, exemplified by its 
active participation in economic activities throughout Iran. 
Estimates suggest that the IRGC controls a total of 25% to 40% 
of Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP).136 According to a report 
by the Department of the Treasury to the U.S. Congress, the 
IRGC has historically undertaken a coordinated campaign to sell 
Iranian oil to evade international sanctions. In fact, the 
Treasury Department reported that at one point, the IRGC was 
“Iran’s most powerful economic actor dominating many sectors 
of the economy including energy. . .”137  The Treasury Report 
went to the extreme in that it called the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) “an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps”.  In order to coordinate Iran’s oil 
policy during the sanction period, the IRGC has supervised the 
management of Iran’s production and exports of petroleum and 
petroleum product; according to the Department of the 
                                                 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow- comman 
der (reporting that the Quds force has become “an organization with extraor-
dinary reach, with branches focused on intelligence, finance, politics, sabotage, 
and special operations . . . divided between combatants and those who train 
and oversee foreign assets”). 
135  See Michael Knights, Rising to Iran’s Challenge: GCC Military Capa-
bility and U.S. Security Co-operation, Washington Institute for Near East Pol-
icy, at ix (June 2013), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Docu-
ments/pubs/PolicyFocus127_Knights.pdf. The IRGC’s military is a major 
countervailing force in the Persian Gulf vis-à-vis the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC). 
136  OTTOLENGHI, supra note 133, at 43; see also Entering the Iranian Mar-
ket: Opportunities and Risks, KPMG, at 4 (Jan. 2016), https://home.kpmg. 
com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/02/Entering-the-Iranian-Market-Oppor-
tunties-and-Risks-KPMG.pdf (“Some estimates suggest the IRGC controls a 
third of the country’s GDP, using holding companies and ‘bonyads’, charitable 
organisations that carry tax-exempt status and are involved in an array of con-
sumer goods production.”). Based on the last available figures Iran’s GDP in 
2014 was approximately $425.33 billion. In 2011 it reached $592 billion. See 
World Bank – Iran, Islamic Rep., WORLDBANK.ORG, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-rep?view= chart (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2017). 
137  Press Release, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, Treasury Submits Report to Con-
gress on NIOC and NITC (Sept. 24, 2012), https://www.treasury. gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1718.aspx [hereinafter NIOC and NITC Press 
Release]. The Department of the Treasury’s report was issued as a result of 
requirements provided in The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
Act of 2012 (ITRSHA). See 22 U.S.C. § 8773. 
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Treasury, in one case Iran’s Islamic Assembly (the Parliament) 
approved the appointment of a high-ranking military official of 
the IRGC, Brigadier General Rostam Qasemi, to serve as Iran’s 
Minister of Petroleum.138 One of the major activities of the IRGC 
is to secure contractual bids for trade and development of Iran’s 
infrastructure.139 The IRGC undertakes its bidding and 
construction activities mainly through an organization called 
Khatam-al-Anbia, both an engineering firm and one of Iran’s 
leading industrial contractors.140 Khatam-al-Anbia has 812 
subsidiaries throughout Iran and has about 40,000 employees. 
It has reportedly 1/17,000 no-bid contracts primarily in the 
energy sector, and has also won a $1.2 billion contract to build a 
line on the Tehran Metro. 141 At times, there are no substantive 
and genuine bidding for the sister companies of the IRGC.142 
According to an expert writing in the United States Institute of 
Peace, over the course of 25 years, “the Guards [have become] 
Iran’s largest economic force.”143  
The extra-constitutional organizations in Iran are not 
limited to the IRGC. The ideological activities of the IRGC 
include a vast umbrella of organizations. Under this 
institutional umbrella, there is an expansive array of organized 
groups covering charitable and ideological foundations.144 These 
agencies function through subsidiary companies and enterprises 
as diverse as spreading propagation of piety, combating against 
                                                 
138  See NIOC and NITC Press Release, supra note 137. 
139  Id. (“Prior to his appointment, Qasemi was the commander of Khatam 
Al-Anbia, a construction and development wing of the IRGC that generates 
income and funds operations for the IRGC.”). 
140  See IRGC Campaign, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN, 
http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irgc (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). The 
name “Khatam-al-Anbia” references the “Seal of the Prophets.” In Islam, the 
Prophet Mohammed is revered as the last prophet. See KORAN, Al-Ahzab, 
33:40. 
141  See UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN, supra note 140. 
142  See Parisa Hafezi, Iran’s Elite Guards to Gain Regional Economic 
Power in Post-Sanction Era, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-iran-sanctions-guards-insight-idUSKCN0UX2M3. 
143  Alireza Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, THE IRAN PRIMER, United 
States Institute of Peace, http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/default/files/ 
Military_Nader_Revolutionary%20Guards.pdf (updated as of August 2015). 
144  See FREDERIC WEHREY ET AL., THE RISE OF THE PASDARAN: ASSESSING 
THE DOMESTIC ROLES OF IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS 56–64 
(RAND Corp. 2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs 
/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf. 
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immoral decorum, blasphemous or sinful conducts, and holding 
unethical gatherings and ceremonies in private homes. Their 
activities also include policing the propriety of individuals’ 
appearance in public, and behavior against public pieties and 
moral or Islamic virtues.145 
There are several other entities in the same category, 
although they are not a match to the IRGC in terms of their 
economic power, political authority and social command.146 
These extra-constitutional entities are not within the 
jurisdiction of any ministry and act independent from the official 
bureaucracy of the government. According to a study by the 
RAND Corporation: 
Rather than framing the IRGC as a purely military 
organization marked by mafia-type economic tendencies and a 
homogeneous ideological outlook, this monograph has 
surveyed its broad ranging roles in Iranian society and its 
emerging internal divisions. Our analysis underscores that the 
twin poles of commonly held assumptions about the IRGC are 
both incorrect. 
The IRGC is neither a corrupt gang nor is it a firebrand 
revolutionary vanguard with the aim of exporting Iran’s 
revolution across the region.  
Rather, its vested and increasing interests in the country’s 
economy make it an increasingly conservative force rather 
than a radical one.147 
 
Bank Markazi does not address whether the plaintiffs’ 
§1605A claim may properly attach assets belonging to “non-
governmental” or extra-constitutional entities. Instead, the 
main focus of the Supreme Court in Bank Markazi was the 
constitutionality of the statutes and certain executive powers 
concerning limitations to, and exceptions on, the sovereign 
                                                 
145  See id. The functions related to maintaining public morality and vir-
tues are the responsibility of an associate organization called the Basij. See 
GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 1-69 for a history of the Basij and its activities. 
146  These organizations include the Office of the Great Leader, the Office 
of the command of Imam Khomeini under the Supervision of the Leader, the 
Council of Cultural Revolution and a few other establishments. See LAURA 
SECOR, CHILDREN OF PARADISE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF IRAN 35–36,109 
(Riverhead Books 2016) for the factions in Revolutionary Guards during the 
early days in the Islamic Revolution. 
147  WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144, at 92. 
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immunity derived from the Act of State Doctrine. 148 Therefore, 
in a commercial agreement between a U.S. corporation and a 
non-state Iranian corporate entity, certain assets under an 
extra-constitutional entity’s control may be within a plaintiff’s 
reach under Bank Markazi.  
III.  Ideological and Legal Constraints Related to 
Banking   in Iran 
The post-sanction international commercial transactions 
engaged in by Iran do not enjoy the same creditworthiness as is 
customary in most transnational commercial transactions. Some 
of these limitations are internal, and as time passes, they will be 
curtailed, if not eliminated. Limitations with respect to 
international commercial transactions facing Iran can be 
divided into two parts: First, the ideological, structural and 
operational issues concerning Iran’s banking policy, and second, 
constraints as a matter of public policy. 
With respect to the first limitation, the Central Bank of Iran 
does not enjoy prerequisite independence in dealing with the 
inflationary economy of the country. According to a report by the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), “While a decade of 
financial and economic isolation has taken its toll on the 
country’s banking system, populist policies under former 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad  . . . have left the country 
undercapitalized with a high percentage of non-performing 
loans—as high as 20 percent, according to some estimates.”149  
In a joint annual meeting between the IMF, the World Bank 
Group, and Iranian representatives, Ali Tayyeb Nia, Iran’s 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, indicated without 
hesitation that as a result of President Rohani’s reformist 
policies, the “inflation rate has decreased from 40% in 
September 2013 to 21% in September 2014,” with less than 20% 
inflation projected for subsequent years.150 In Iran, the most 
                                                 
148  See Bank Markazi, 136 S.Ct. at 1310. 
149  Aaron Arnold, The Real Threat to the Iran Deal: Tehran’s Banking 
System, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 22, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-
real-threat-to-the-iran-deal-tehrans-banking-system/. 
150  Dr. Ali Tayyeb Nia, Iran’s Minister of Economics, Governor of the 
Bank for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Governor’s Statement No. 7 at the 2014 
Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund World Bank Group (Oct. 
10, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/am/2014/speeches/pr07e.pdf. 
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significant categories in the consumer pricing index are 
primarily housing, electricity, gas and other fuels, totaling 29% 
of the consumer price index.151   
Nevertheless, the overall fiscal deficit in 2015 declined from 
2.25% of the GDP to 1.25% of the GDP, thanks to largely 
eliminating the popular, but economically pernicious, subsidies 
policy adopted during the presidency of Mr. Ahmadinejad.152 
A.  Islamic Ideology Concerning Interest 
In a pure Islamic banking system, interest is categorically 
forbidden.153 Therefore, capital enhancement through usury is a 
strictly forbidden practice.154 Nevertheless, unlike engaging in 
usury, it must be noted that trading has been permitted in 
Islam.155 Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran, has condemned usury as included in the 
category of “[t]he lascivious and immoral acts including the 
shameful act of unveiling women, dancing and swimming of 
young girls and boys, drinking alcoholic beverages and engaging 
in usurious business.”156  
                                                 
151  See Iranian Inflation Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www. 
tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
152  See IMF, 2015 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annual 
Report 2015, Report No. 15/349, at 6 (Dec. 2015), https://www.imf.org/ exter-
nal/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15349.pdf [hereinafter IMF 2015 Iran Report]. 
153  See KORAN, Al-Baqara, 2:276 (“God does not bless usury, and he causes 
charitable deeds to prosper, and God does not love any ungrateful sinner”). 
Based on the prohibitive Surat of the Koran, and various pronouncements of 
the Islamic theologians, interest on money is categorically forbidden. 
154  KORAN, Al-Baqara, 2:278 (“O, you who believed be careful of [your duty 
to] God and relinquish what remains [due] from usury, if you are believers.”) 
KORAN, Al-Emran, 4:130 (“O you who believed do not devour usury, making it 
double and the readable and be careful of [your duty] to God that you may be 
successful.”); KORAN, Al-Nisa, 4-161 (“Taking usury though indeed they were 
forbidden and devouring the property of people falsely and we have prepared 
for the unbelievers from among them a painful chastisement.”); KORAN, Ar-
Rom, 30:39 (“And whatever you lay out as usury, so that it may increase in the 
property of man, it shall not increase [its value] with God.”). 
155  KORAN, Al-Bagharah, 2: 275 (“Those who engage in Riba [interest] will 
not stand on the Day of Resurrection . . . whoever receives an admonishment 
from his Lord and then stops engaging in usury shall not be punished for the 
past conduct . . . but whoever returns [to usury] are the dwellers of the fire.”). 
156  KHOMEINI, supra note 128, at 65 (translated by the author). 
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Some Iranian clerics have considered interest as merely an 
exchange of money for money, selling the present cash to a long 
term or predetermined time of calendar days.157 According to 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Republic, if 
parties to monetary transactions undertake such transactions in 
order to escape the prohibited nature of the interest and, in 
reality, the transaction is to gain interest, it would be considered 
“haram” (forbidden).158 According to an Iranian professor from 
Beheshti School of Law, “[t]he outcast nature of interest in Islam 
is definitive and is not subject to doubt or debate.”159 In some 
jurisdictions outside Iran, a 12% annual interest rate may be 
acceptable. However, this view is rejected by Iranian clerics. 
That is, no matter how small the rate of interest is, it would be 
considered as an additional mandatory exchange and thus 
becomes taboo. 
B.  Treatment of Interest under the Law of Iran 
The prohibition of interest on banking and monetary 
transactions in Iran is not confined to debates by the interested 
groups, participants in Islamic mosques and seminaries, or 
participants in meetings of ecclesiastical deliberations. The 
issue of giving or taking interest in Iran has indeed more 
temporal and serious consequences. Twenty-eight years after 
the Islamic Revolution, the Criminal Code of Iran was amended 
to reflect the clerical prohibition concerning interest. The 
amended law squarely and directly addresses the issue of giving 
or taking interest. The Criminal Code of Iran, under the title of 
“Bribery, Interest and Fraudulent Conduct,” among other 
actions punishable by law, addresses the question of giving or 
taking interest. Article 595 of the Criminal Code, ratified by the 
Islamic National Assembly is as follows: 
                                                 
157  See Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, Banking Transactions from the Per-
spective of the Shia Ayatollahs, Institute of Monetary Research of the Central 
Bank of Iran, at 206 (2008). 
158  See FAQ, THE OFFICE OF THE SUPREME LEADER, GRAND AYATOLLAH 
SAYYID ALI HOSSENINI KHAMENEI, http://www.leader.ir/tree/index.php?catid 
=38 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
159  See MOHAMMED SOLTANY, BANKING LAW 2d Ed. 39 (Mizan Legal Foun-
dation 2015). 
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Any agreement between two, or among several, individuals 
based on any agreement including purchase, borrowing money 
or exchange of money, and alike, to buy, borrow, accept [money] 
and alike, with the condition of receiving additional sums for 
[re]payment, will be considered as usury and [therefore,] a 
criminal conduct. Persons who commit such acts, whether the 
receiver or the payer of such interest, shall be convicted to 
between six months to three years’ incarceration and up to 74 
lashes as well as payment of sums equal to the amount of 
interest, as [his/her] financial punishment.160  
Thus, according to the Islamic Criminal Code of Iran, giving or 
taking interest is statutorily a criminal offense and punishable 
by law.  
The statutory and Sharia-based prohibitions 
notwithstanding, the banking business in Iran is thriving. 
Presently in Iran, approximately 75% of adults have a bank 
account, and some Iranian banks are considerably large.161 In 
fact one study shows that five of the largest Iranian banks are 
among the top 1,000 banks in the world. Further, Iran’s banks 
hold over a third of the total Islamic banking assets globally.162 
The middle class and the ordinary people, despite such pungent 
and stern prohibition of interest-based transactions, are 
routinely engaged in interest generating banking. 
So how, despite the fierce and torrential religious and legal 
prohibition on giving or taking interest, have the Iranian banks 
been able to provide interest to depositors? Of course, both the 
religious taboo and the legal prohibitions concerning 
interest operate. Under the patrimonial system, such acts are 
considered to be elements of corrupt behavior. However, the 
answer to the interest bearing corrupt conduct, otherwise 
forbidden by law, could also be found in the patrimonial code of 
conduct.  
                                                 
160  MAJMUAHI QAVANINI JAZAI [CODE OF CRIMINAL LAWS], art. 595 [1996] 
(Iran) (translated by the author). 
161  MOHAMMAD R. JAHAN-PARVAR, THE PRACTICE OF CENTRAL BANKING IN 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: IS THERE ROOM FOR REFORM? 8 (2013), 
http://www.li.com/docs/default-source/future-of-iran/the-future-of-iran-(econ-
omy)-the-practice-of-central-banking-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-is-there-
room-for-reform-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
162  See Top 1000 World Banks, THE BANKER, http://www.thebanker.com 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2016). 
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C.  Judicial Accommodations Concerning Interest  
To overcome the prohibitive position of the Islamic Criminal 
Code of Iran, one might attempt to classify a banking 
transaction as something else. The most common classification 
for an Iranian banking transaction is a “partnership.” There is 
no prohibition, religious or under the law, for a bank in Iran to 
enter into a legitimate and lawful “partnership agreement” with 
its client; the depositor. In a partnership, the bank will pay a 
fixed amount of funds to the depositor (the partner). Classifying 
transactions as a “partnership” provides a platform for ordinary 
banking transactions, and the depositor will, theoretically 
participate in a “partnership” scheme by depositing partnership-
based cash. The partnership scheme is best illustrated as 
follows: 
1. The depositor (D) provides funds in the bank and, thereby, 
becomes a partner in a fictitious business project (such as 
construction or investment, etc.). 
2. The bank (B) collects capital (accumulation of funds 
received from various depositors such as D) to the hypothetical 
project. (It may be that the bank will provide a loan to a de 
facto business entity or, alternatively, will wait until a suitable 
business entity could be found). 
3. The depositor (D), under the rubric of partnership, becomes 
a de jure partner of the construction project.   
4. Periodically, the depositor (D) receives a fixed amount of 
funds from the bank as the depositor’s share of profit in such 
partnership agreement. 
5. The depositor’s right over the periodical payments is not, 
(in theory only), based on the “percentage” of the interest to be 
paid by the bank. Such pattern of payment would be: a) against 
the principles of Islamic law; and b) in violation of the Islamic 
Criminal Code of Iran.  
6. The Bank will periodically pay a fixed amount of funds to 
the depositor. In reality, however, such fixed amount will be 
equal to the otherwise pre-arranged percentage that the 
Government of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran have 
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determined at the time to be the monetary interest for the 
country.163   
In applying the above-mentioned scheme, banks can engage 
normal interest paying financial institutions without exposing 
themselves to religious constraints or the punitive action as 
provided in the Criminal Code. According to Business Monitor 
International, “[t]heoretically, the Iranian banks are Islamic 
institutions. In practice, earnings rates and other metrics are 
dictated by the government – and not necessarily according to 
commercial needs. The Iranian banks are not generally regarded 
as Islamic institutions by the rest of the Islamic world.”164  
In the above scenario, the payment to the depositor of the 
funds by the bank is based on a perceived profit received by the 
customer of the bank in a de jure partnership. Unlike genuine 
partnerships, however, such income is fixed. Therefore, the 
parties (the bank and the depositor) effectively designate the 
depositor as a de jure partner who shares in the profits 
associated with the perceived partnership.  
It must be noted that due to a hyper-inflationary economy, 
interest rates in Iran in the recent past have reached 16.2% to 
19.7% annually.165  Depositors use the high interest rate as an 
attempt to escape from the diminishing value, and purchasing 
power, of the Iranian Riyal. According to one observer, “Iran is 
one of a handful of countries that have sustained double-digit 
inflation for over three decades. Zimbabwe and Venezuela are 
among the other members of this group.”166 Despite the high 
returns on deposited funds with de facto interest rates, it has not 
worked well. According to a Coface report issued in March 2016, 
a European economic research group, the Iranian banking sector 
is primarily dominated by state-owned banks.167  
                                                 
163  MAJMUAHI QAVANINI JAZAI [CODE OF CRIMINAL LAWS], art. 595 (trans-
lated by the author). 
164  Business Monitor International, Iran Commercial Banking Report, Q1 
2014, at 9 (on file with the author). 
165  See IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 10. 
166  JAHAN-PARVAR, supra note 161, at 3. 
167  The Group Mediterranean and Africa Economists, Iran: Sharp Turn 
Ahead, Drive Carefully, COFACE, 9 (Mar. 2016), http://www.coface.com/News-
Publications/Publications/Iran-sharp-turn-ahead-drive-carefully [hereinafter 
Coface 2016 Iran Report] (stating that “[t]he Iranian banking sector is domi-
nated by state-owned banks. Six of the largest are commercial banks (the main 
one being Bank Melli) and five are specialised banks. Iranian banks operate 
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Another problem with the Iranian banking operation is that 
it competes with unlicensed individuals (Havaleh) and financial 
institutions. These individuals and businesses act on the basis 
of mutual trust, and can absorb up to 16% of deposits in some 
cases. However, the ability of the banking system in Iran to meet 
the rising post-sanction financial needs associated with the 
expected growth is questionable. The contribution made by the 
financial institutions to the economy’s growth via banking credit 
“is not efficient and is heavily controlled by the authorities.”168 
As one expert has observed, “[r]eal interest rates that remain 
negative for extended periods typically herald flight of capital, a 
perennial feature. Capital owners are reluctant to commit to 
long term investment. In short, it [has resulted] in the 
misallocation of resources and loss in economic efficiency.”169 
D.  Customary Requirements for Commercial Transactions
with Iran 
Considering the above, as will be seen later, despite the 
relative and moderate resumption of certain transactions 
between Iran and a few countries, the channels of credit in the 
United States will not be readily available to Iran. According to 
the U.S. Export-Import Bank (“U.S. Exim Bank”), “Iran is still 
closed to [U.S.] companies.  President Obama [had] made 
enormous progress but in terms of trade, it’s still closed. I don’t 
know what the future is but they’re still registered as state-
sponsored terrorism.”170   
In many cases, the sources of credit for international 
commercial transactions are not different from credit for 
national transactions. They involve the prerequisite banking 
credit and security similar to those normally found in 
                                                 
according to Islamic principles. The strengthening of sanctions and 2012 and 
the exclusion of Iranian banks from the international trading system have en-
feebled the banking sector. Their profitability remains low and the return on 
assets was estimated at only 1% in 2012/2013.”). 
168  Id. 
169  JAHAN-PARVAR, supra note 161, at 8. 
170  Melodie Michel, Who will finance Iran’s €40bn of deals with Europe?, 
GLOBAL TRADE REVIEW (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.gtreview.com/news/mena 
/who-will-finance-irans-e40bn-of-deals-with-europe/ (statement of Fred 
Hochberg, Chairman of the U.S. Exim Bank). The U.S. Exim Bank has also 
been a longtime supporter of Boeing, a U.S. Company. See id. 
46https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
2017] THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN 47 
transactions that do not cross-national borders. Commercial 
transactions with Iran will require various forms of contractual 
arrangements, credit facilities and financial security. Many of 
these instrumentalities are normally operative and available in 
transnational commercial agreements as well as in transactions 
that do not cross-national borders. 
A commercial or investment transaction with Iran will 
require the basic sales agreement between the seller country and 
Iran, and Iran’s application for letter of credit with its 
corresponding bank in Iran. Any transaction with Iran will 
involve the following: 
a) The letter of credit whereby the Iranian bank will 
commit itself to the European or American company on 
certain conditions. The letter of credit will probably be 
forwarded through the seller’s bank which will act as agent. 
b) The contract for shipping the products to Iran (usually 
in the form of a bill of lading). 
c) The contract for insurance of the cargo.  
d) The security interests in the products Iran is buying (in 
case the Iranian buyer is borrowing from the domestic bank 
to pay for the products). 
e) A bill of exchange forwarded by the seller with the bill 
of lading. 
In any transnational commercial transaction, the seller 
performing such a transaction would rely on the buyer’s 
creditworthiness, as established by the respective banks. Due to 
the absence of any active commercial relationship between Iran 
and European or American sellers in recent memory, such 
sellers may prefer to use their own financing arrangements 
related to the commercial transaction. For example, a French 
seller may borrow money on the strength of its own financial and 
credit history. To add to the complexity of the transaction, there 
are a number of legal requirements and regulatory regimes on 
the part of the Western European companies concerning tariffs 
and customs, shipping contracts, the power of the banks to issue 
letters of credit, and parameters for financing international 
commercial transactions. Significant issues related to conflict of 
laws may emerge between the Western corporate partners and 
entities operating within the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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IV.  Iran’s International Commercial Transactions 
and Global Security Issues 
As a result of the JCPOA, Iran is permitted to engage in 
limited commercial transactions with the international 
community.171 Further, European banks are able to release at 
least 100 billion dollars of Iranian funds.172 Iranian banks will 
have access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (“SWIFT”) network. Access to SWIFT will 
enable Iran to transfer funds across the global electronic 
banking system.173 Despite the post-JCPOA facilities available 
to the Islamic Republic, however, Iran could still face problems 
and difficulties in the conduct of its international commercial 
transactions. 
A.  Iran’s Position with Respect to International Financial 
Organizations. 
The main impediments to Iran’s international banking 
transactions are not because of the prohibition of money interest 
under the laws of Iran,174 nor are they due to the strict Islamic 
treatment of interest.175 Rather, Iran’s main obstructions with 
                                                 
171  See JCPOA, supra note 5, ¶¶ 19, 21. 
172  Matt Pearce, Iran’s Frozen Money has Begun to Thaw, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-frozen-as-
sets-20160120-story.html (reporting a statement made to the U.S. Congress by 
David S. Cohen, former Undersecretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Finan-
cial Intelligence). 
173  Patrick M Connorton, Tracking Terrorist Financing Through Swift: 
When U.S. Subpoenas and Forgery Privacy Law Collide 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
283, 287 (reporting that SWIFT was founded in 1973 with a group of 239 banks 
from 15 countries, and that the founding banks hoped to create “a shared 
worldwide data processing and communications link and a common language 
for international financial transactions.”). SWIFT is an internationally recog-
nized identification code used by banks for global funds transfers, and is used 
for international financial transactions among the member banks worldwide. 
Without the membership in SWIFT, financial messages by banks could not be 
transferred promptly and securely. With thousands of member organizations 
all over the globe, Swift provides instructions to financial institutions. Virtu-
ally “every major commercial bank, as well as brokerage houses, fund messages 
and the stock exchanges, use its services.” See Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, 
Bank Data Shifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, 
at A1. 
174  MAJMUAHI QAVANINI JAZAI [CODE OF CRIMINAL LAWS], art. 595 [1996] 
(Iran). 
175  See KORAN, Al-Baqara, 2:276. 
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respect to international banking operations are derived from its 
pursuit of two-dimensional policy concerning international 
banking transactions.176 While making a considerable effort to 
establish customary financial relations with a global banking 
system, the Central Bank of Iran is simultaneously constrained 
with the pursuit of ideologically oriented financial policies 
started since the 1979 Revolution.177 These policies primarily 
relate to claims concerning money laundering and terrorist 
financing. On May 17, 2016, for the first time after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, and in an overall and on-the-scene 
examination of the banking policy and operation of Iran, the IMF 
Deputy made the following announcement concerning Iran’s 
international banking policy:  
Two important priorities for the short term relate to the 
banking system. First, it will be critical to begin restructuring 
banks – both at their operational level and their high level of 
non-performing loans . . . Second, given the difficulties for 
Iranian banks in reintegrating to the international financial 
system, the authorities should persevere with strengthening 
the framework for anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), which should be critical to 
facilitate such reintegration.178 
Thus, in order for Iran to conduct international trade with the 
help of the international banking system, there is a crucial need 
to reform those policies concerning money laundering and 
                                                 
176  Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran’s ‘outdated’ banks hamper efforts to rejoin 
global economy, FT.COM (Jan. 19, 2016), http://on.ft.com/1ZK0ko0 (reporting 
that “Iran’s lenders — most of which are nominally private but affiliated to 
state bodies — have long operated with low capital adequacy requirements and 
inadequate regulatory and supervisory mechanisms. They were further weak-
ened by the policies of [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad], who forced them to provide 
cheap loans to small businesses and the poor, as well as the sanctions.”). 
177  See Ebrahim Hosseini-Nasab & Yousef Shabbani Balanchi, Govern-
ment Banking and Economic Growth in Iran, 8 IRANIAN ECON. REV. 23, 26-30 
(2003) (providing an overview of the Central Bank’s efforts and Iranian gov-
ernment policies with respect to banking); see also Sima Motamen-Samadian, 
The Role of Government in the Iranian Banking System, 2001-11, in IRAN AND 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: PETRO POPULISM, ISLAM AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
(Parvin Alizadeh & Hassan Hakimian eds., 2014). 
178  Press Release, Statement by Mr. David Lipton, First Deputy Manag-
ing Director of the IMF, at the Conclusion of his Visit to Iran, No. 16/224 (May 
17, 2016), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/ 14/01/49/ pr16224. 
Mr. Lipton was the first senior IMF official to visit Iran since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. 
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financing international groups that Western states consider to 
be security risks.179 Established in 1989 by the G7 Heads of the 
States or governments and the President of the European 
Commission, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is a 
global anti-terrorism and anti-money-laundering financial 
watchdog that observes the financial activities of various 
countries with respect to their contribution to terrorism 
degrading global security.180 The Islamic Republic of Iran is a 
member state of the FATF. However, a major banking and 
credit-related problem facing the Islamic Republic of Iran 
concerns its international transactions with the world 
community in general, and the FATF in particular, such as the 
periodical policy declarations that the FATF requires.  
The FATF issued a public statement in early 2016 
concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
The FATF reaffirms its call on members and urges all 
jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give 
special attention to business relationships and transactions 
with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial 
institutions. . . . The FATF urges Iran to immediately and 
meaningfully address its . . . deficiencies, in particular by 
criminalising terrorist financing and effectively implementing 
suspicious transaction reporting requirements.181  
Thus, a major impediment to Iran’s international trade is 
political in nature. Although Iranian oil—and, to a lesser extent, 
agricultural goods—will return to the global market, and foreign 
financial institutions, banks, and corporations will legally be 
able to renew business with the Islamic Republic of Iran, several 
key restrictions, which started in 1983, remain potent. These 
restrictions are associated with Iran’s reported state-sponsored 
acts of terrorism, its weapons program, and its human rights 
                                                 
179  See Stuart Levey, Kerry’s Peculiar Message about Iran for European 
Banks, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kerrys-pecu-
liar-message-about-iran-for-european-banks-1463093348. Mr. Levey was the 
former Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of Treasury. 
180  The G7 Heads of State is an informal block of industrialized democra-
cies composed of the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Japan. Until 2014 Russia was a member of the Group 
(then termed the G8). However, after the annexation of Crimea in March 1998 
Russia’s membership was suspended. 
181  FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16. 
50https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
2017] THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN 51 
violations.182 Further, embargo-related restrictions prohibiting 
the export of arms and missiles to Iran for a period of five years 
and eight years, respectively, will remain operative, and must 
be enforced by all members of the United Nations.183  
The main issue concerning Iran’s standing in gaining the 
trust of the international community regards the perception of 
international financial organizations concerning Iran’s 
perspectives on global security. Iran’s perception with respect to 
global security is substantially different from—and at times 
opposes—the notions generally accepted in the U.S. and 
Western European countries. Further, from the perspective of 
Western corporations, Iran’s extra-constitutional 
establishments, associated with its vast and constraining 
domestic financial network, add to the complexity of conducting 
trade with Iran.184   
For these reasons, international financial organizations 
have taken a cautionary approach in advising their members 
concerning the Islamic Republic’s policies in obtaining credit to 
engage in commercial transactions with Western banks. 
Particularly, the FATF’s strategy towards Iran has been 
incremental in a manner befitting its nature as an international 
                                                 
182  See Jay Solomon, Shift Clouds Iran Nuclear Deal, June 26, 2015, WALL 
ST. J., at A9. In 1995, the United States ended all U.S. investments in Iran, 
including investments related to oil and gas, and exporting U.S goods to Iran. 
These sanctions are expected to survive, the JCPOA notwithstanding. See Iran 
Sanctions and the Implementation of the JCPOA: Lots of Changes, but Little 
Impact on U.S. Businesses?, MCGUIREWOODS (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2016/1/Iran-Sanc-
tions-Implementation-JCPOA.aspx (“notwithstanding the news stories de-
scribing the lifting of sanctions, very little has changed for most U.S. busi-
nesses.”). Exceptions to such sanctions include sale of civilian aircraft to, and 
import of goods including pistachios, rugs, and caviar from Iran. See U.S. 
Treasury JCPOA FAQ, supra note 72. 
183  See The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement: 
Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 113th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement from the Hon. Juan Zarate, Senior Ad-
viser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies), https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/ts150805_ 
Zarate.pdf. See www.Chamber-International.com. 
184  See generally OTTOLENGHI, supra note 27, at 41-59. The extra-consti-
tutional establishments in Iran are entities that are independent of, and sepa-
rate from, the governmental bureaucracy. The most powerful of such organi-
zations is the Islamic Revolutionary Corps (IRGC) which was created during 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and received its constitutional legitimacy under 
Article 150 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. 
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financial police watchdog.  The FATF has urged its members “to 
monitor their financial institutions such as the banks to give 
special attention to their business relationships and 
transactions with Iran,” including Iranian companies and 
financial institutions.185  
Following the agreement between Iran and the 5+1 
countries, the Islamic Republic has undertaken a commitment 
to an “Action Plan” concerning anti-money laundering in 
international trade, as well as financing entities engaged in 
international terrorism.186 As a result, on June 24, 2016, the 
FATF announced that it would welcome Iran’s adoption of “high-
level political commitment” to a plan to address “its strategic 
AML/CFT deficiencies.”187 Thus, the Paris-based organization 
amended its previous restrictions on Iran’s international 
banking and issued the following recommendations:  
The FATF . . . has suspended counter measures for 12 months in 
order to monitor Iran’s progress in implementing the Action Plan. 
If the FATF determines that Iran has not demonstrated sufficient 
progress in implementing the action plan at the end of that period, 
FATF’s call for counter-measures will be reimposed. If Iran meets 
its commitments under the Action Plan in that time period, the 
FATF will consider next steps in this regard.188  
B.  Quasi-Banking Institutions in Iran 
Traditionally, Iran’s quasi-banking organizations were 
small financial companies that engaged in lending money to the 
demanding market.189 The individuals and financial institutions 
engaged in the business of lending money have developed a 
considerable network of quasi-banking activities for two 
                                                 
185  FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16. 
186  See Iran: six months after sanctions relief – a briefing for financial 
institution clients, ASHURST LLP, (July 29, 2016), https://www.ashurst. 
com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/iran-six-months-after-sanctions re-
lief/. 
187  Public Statement, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdic-
tions/documents/public-statement-june-2016.html. 
188  Id. 
189  See IMF, Islamic Republic of Iran—Selected Issues Paper, Country Re-
port No. 04/308, at ¶ 61 (Sept. 2004), https://www.imf.org/external 
/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04308.pdf (detailing certain quasi-banking practices in 
Iran, including those engaged in by Bonyads). 
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reasons. The first reason was the impact of sanctions, coupled 
with an inability of Iranian institutions engaged in traditional 
banking business to utilize financial connections, such as 
SWIFT, that were associated with Western banks.190 The second 
reason was related to the financial need for a banking system by 
the extra-constitutional organizations in Iran. The extra-
constitutional entities in Iran have the clout of both companies 
and agencies, and “their release from financial curbs could of 
itself help ease return of swathes of the economy to the 
mainstream of world trade.”191 These extra-constitutional 
organizations have developed a vast network of business 
throughout the country. Doing business in capital-incentive 
activities such as imports/exports, building infrastructure, and 
developing ports and airports would, inevitably, require banking 
services by traditional banks. These organizations, in the 
absence of a traditional banking system, or in order to expand 
their economic activities to yet another sector, engaged in the 
banking business, or quasi-banking activities.192 Although 
sanctions imposed on Iran’s economy were not the only reason 
for the development of the quasi-banking system in Iran, 
sanctions played a considerable role in their expansion.  
It is unclear if these Iranian extra-constitutional 
organizations will be allowed to do business with U.S. and 
Western European countries in the wake of the JCPOA 
agreement. One example of such an organization is Mehr Bank. 
Mehr was an umbrella firm, which included Mehr Housing 
Development and Investment Company, Mehr Ayandeh-e 
Neghar Commerce and Services Company, and Tadbirgaran-e 
Atiyeh Iranian Investment Company. These subsidiaries 
originally operated as somewhat separate entities, but later 
ballooned into a holding conglomerate that engaged in buying 
and selling ship, truck, and industrial equipment.193 
                                                 
190  See ABDELALI JBILI, VITALI KRAMARENKO & JOSÉ BAILÉN, ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN: MANAGING THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY 21 (2007) 
(“Informal finance [in Iran] is common with high rates of return, reflecting lack 
of access to bank financing by small and medium-size enterprises.”). 
191  Babak Dehghanpisheh and Yeganeh Torbani, Firms linked to Revolu-
tionary Guards to win sanctions relief under Iran deal, REUTERS  
(Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSL 
5N10G1TD20150809. 
192  See JBILI, KRAMARENKO, & BAILÉN, supra note 190, at 20–21. 
193  GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163. 
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Tadbirgaran-e-Atiyeh was initially involved primarily in 
accounting and financial services.194 Following an annual 
growth of 70% to 80% within a period of five years, Mehr Finance 
and Credit Institution was upgraded to Mehr Bank. Today, 
Mehr Bank has an expansive network of reportedly 700 
branches throughout Iran.195 
As a result of their association with organizations such as 
the IRGC, and through a systematic financial modus operandi, 
these corporate entities have organized a virtual and high-
volume banking operation within Iran.196 However, these 
institutions did not have any legitimate global banking 
qualifications and were not recognized by the major banking 
associations, credit organizations, or credit-setting institutions 
of the world.197  The FATF was unequivocal that “[i]f Iran fails 
to take concrete steps to continue to improve its CFT regime, the 
FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all 
jurisdictions to strengthen counter measures in June 2016.”198 
As a result, the FATF has given a window of opportunity to Iran, 
its banks and its financial organizations to perform within the 
norms established by the international financial community. 
This will enable Iran to conduct banking and financial 
transactions at an international level. As a result, in conducting 
its international commercial transactions, Iran’s banks and 
financial institutions will have access to credit, and will use such 
credit to enable Iran to attract investment and conduct trade at 
a global level. Presently, however, the suspension of the FATF’s 
banking and credit recognition counter measures against Iran is 
temporary, and their continuation will depend on Iran’s 
business conduct within those spheres. That means adherence 
to international norms concerning money laundering, unofficial 
banking transactions, and cash transfers of money across 
international borders to finance ideologically oriented clienteles. 
                                                 
194  Id. 
195  GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163; see also The Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Establish Own Bank, RADIO ZAMANEH (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www. za-
maaneh.com/enzam/2009/09/ iran-revotutionary-guards.html. 
196  GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163 (noting that “Mehr Bank has an expan-
sive network of more than seven hundred branches throughout the country.”). 
197  See FATF Public Statement – 19 February 2016, supra note 16. 
198  Id. 
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C.Money Laundering Act of Iran 
The FATF has major concerns with respect to money-
laundering across international banking borders. Every year 
since 2007, the Basel Institute, a Geneva-based non-profit 
organization, has evaluated the money-laundering activities of 
various countries around the globe.199 Iran remains one of the 
highest money-laundering countries in the region and beyond.200 
Nevertheless, Iran has anti-money-laundering legislation which 
precludes money laundering among individuals and financial 
corporate entities. That legislation defines money laundering as: 
a)  Acquisition, possession, keeping or using the proceeds from 
illegal activities with the knowledge that they have been 
acquired . . . through a criminal offence.   
b)  Change, exchange or transfer of proceeds with the intention 
of hiding their illegal origin . . .  
c)  Hiding or covering up the real nature, origin, source, 
location, movement, displacement, or possession of proceeds 
obtained . . . as a result of an offence.201  
Violators of the Money Laundering Act will “be sentenced to 
a fine of one fourth of the value of the proceeds of the crime which 
should be deposited into the public Revenues Account with the 
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”202 Further, the 
violator must return assets of the original money, “and the 
proceeds derived from the crime comprising the original assets 
and the profits thereof.”203 
 
                                                 
199  See Annual Reports, BASEL INST., https://www.baselgovernance.org/ 
about_us/annual_reports (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
200  Basel AML Index 2016 Report, BASEL INST. 4 (July 27, 2016), https://in-
dex.baselgovernance.org/sites/index/documents/Ba-
sel_AML_Index_Report_2016.pdf (including Iran among the “10 highest risk 
countries in the 2016 Basel AML Index”); see also Samuel Rubenfeld, Iran Re-
mains Atop Money-laundering Index, WALL ST. J.: RISK AND COMPLIANCE J. 
(Aug. 18, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompli-
ance/2015/08/18/iran-remains-atop-money-laundering-index/. 
201  QANUNI SHSTSHWI POOL [Anti-Money Laundering Act of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran], 1386 [Jan. 22, 2008], art. 2 (Iran), 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Anti-money_ Laun-
dering_Law.pdf. 
202  Id. art. 9. 
203  Id. 
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D.Standing of Iran’s Banking System to Engage in 
International Financial Transactions 
Despite Iran’s seemingly reasonable anti-money-laundering 
legislation, the money-laundering activities in Iran have been 
among the highest in the world. According to the 2015 edition of 
the money-laundering index, Iran was amongst the highest risk 
countries with respect to money-laundering along with 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Mozambique, Ethiopia and a few 
others.204 The sources for such findings consist of the World 
Bank, the World Economic Forum, and FATF.205 In light of a 
fairly progressive anti-money-laundering legislation in Iran, 
why does the Islamic Republic retain a high score of money-
laundering and violations in international banking transactions 
comparable to Afghanistan, Uganda, and Cambodia? 
One reason for such classification is the existence of the 
Unlicensed Financial Institutions (“UFI”), vastly active in Iran. 
According to a report by the IMF, the use of UFI in Iran is highly 
prevalent to a point that enforcing agreements between the 
Central Bank of Iran and commercial banks has been difficult 
“due to weak bank balance sheets and competition from 
unlicensed financial institutions.”206 According to the IMF, “[s]ix 
UFIs reportedly represent 15% of deposits” in Iran.207 Thus, 
Iran’s UFIs are a reason for its prevalent high domestic interest 
rates. Further, the UFIs are the cause of high money-laundering 
and non-performing loans.208  
Iran’s efforts to expand domestic and international trade 
could be hampered if it fails to eliminate these prevalent UFIs. 
However, despite the inhospitable financial environment 
prevailing in Iran throughout the past decade and prior to the 
JCPOA, the Central Bank of Iran reasonably cooperated with 
                                                 
204  See Basel AML Index 2016 Report, supra note 200, at 4. 
205  Basel AML Index 2016 Report, supra note 200, at 12-13. To assess a 
country’s money-laundering risk the AML index assigns each country a score 
on a 0 to 10 scale based on a framework that aggregates and weighs data re-
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206  IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 6. 
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208  Id. at 26. 
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the Swiss International Finance with respect to the repayment 
of its loans.209 In fact, Swiss banking authorities have indicated 
that Switzerland is “keen to expand its banking relations with 
Iran in post-sanction era and provide the Iranian banking 
system with consultations in the areas of training, technical and 
legal issues as well as finance.”210  
E.  Organizational Constraints on the Central Bank of 
Iran, Impeding Banking Transactions in International 
Trade 
One of the main problems that U.S. companies transacting 
with Iran may face in the future is identifying Iran as a 
sovereign government with the Central Bank of Iran. The U.S. 
may have to determine the identity of the Iranian bank as an 
alter ego of the Islamic government of Iran. Therefore, it is 
important to know to what extent, if at all, the Central Bank of 
Iran is an institutionally independent agency (e.g. similar to the 
Federal Reserve Bank in the U.S.), separate and independent 
from the government of Iran in terms of its fiscal policy.  
The seemingly independent commercial banks in Iran do 
not enjoy the relative independence that their counterpart 
Western banking institutions do. In fact, the Central Bank of 
Iran, like a state-owned organization, is institutionally subject 
to constraints by the executive branch.211  Thus, in terms of 
administrative hierarchy, the Central Bank of Iran functions 
more like the U.S. Treasury Department. As an expert in 
Iranian banks has stated, “[t]he chairman of the BMI (the 
Central Bank of Iran) serves at the pleasure of the Iranian 
President. Administratively, BMI is an extension of the office of 
                                                 
209  Press Release, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran and 
Switzerland to Cooperate in AML and Combating Financing Terrorism (Mar. 
1, 2016), http://www.cbi.ir/showitem/14403.aspx. 
210  Id. 
211  BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2014 - IRAN COUNTRY REPORT (2014), 
https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2014/pdf/ 
BTI_2014_Iran.pdf (“the central bank is not an independent institution, as the 
banking interest rate is often set by the government”); see also JACOB ENGWERD 
ET AL., GOVERNMENT AND CENTRAL BANK INTERACTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A 
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES APPROACH (2016), https://pure.uvt .nl/ws/files/ 
11022577/2016_012.pdf (concluding that “in the Iranian economy . . . [the] gov-
ernment acts as leader and central bank acts as follower”). 
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the President and largely subservient to the Ministry of 
Treasury and Economic affairs. . .”212  
Organizationally, the Monetary Committee of the Central 
Bank of Iran is the highest body in the Central Bank to decide 
on monetary policies of Iran. One of the members of this high-
ranking committee is in fact the General Prosecutor (Attorney 
General) of the Islamic Republic of Iran who must, by 
constitutional mandate, be a member of the clergy.213  
As a result of the structural composition of the banks and 
the state control of the Central Bank, the executive branch of the 
government could directly and unabashedly exert its monetary, 
banking and fiscal policies on the Central Bank. Because of the 
state controlled nature of Iran’s Central Bank, the U.S. plaintiffs 
in Bank Markazi were able to successfully argue that the 
Central Bank of Iran was an instrumentality of the executive 
branch of Iran. Therefore, the assets of the Central Bank could 
be used as a partial redemption of plaintiffs’ damages.214 In the 
case, Bank Markazi conceded, and the Supreme Court did not 
dispute, that the bank holds equitable title over the amount it 
deposited with Citibank.215  
There are a number of powerful monetary organizations in 
Iran that are affiliated with extra-constitutional organizations 
in that country.216 In practice, these organizations act like 
banking institutions.217 Their corporate charters enlist such 
institutions as banks.218 It was partially because of these issues 
that Jack Lew, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury during the Obama 
                                                 
212  JAHAN-PARVAR, supra note 161. 
213  Monetary and Banking Law of Iran, approved Tir 18, 1351 (July 9, 
1972), at art. 18, www.cbi.ir/page/2234.aspx. Under the current Constitution 
of Iran, the Chief Justice of Iran, who is appointed by the Leader, would retain 
his office for five years. While in office, the Chief Justice is also able to sit on 
the Board of the Central Bank of Iran. See GISBERT H.FLANZ, NICHOLAS M. 
NIKAZMERAD, & CHANGIZ VAFAI, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Oceana Publications 1980). 
214  Peterson, 627 F.3d. at 1123, n. 2. 
215  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1321. 
216  See Jennifer Rubin, How Obama’s deal would make the West complicit 
in funding terrorism, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www. washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/08/11/how-obamas-deal-would-make-
the-west-complicit-in-funding-terrorism/. 
217  Id. 
218  GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 163-64 (“Different forms of the Basij’s In-
volvement in the Economy.”). 
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Administration, was asked by the Senate Financial Services 
Committee, “are you considering permitting Iranian banks to 
clear transactions in dollars with the U.S. banks or foreign 
financial institutions including offshore clearing houses?”219 The 
Treasury Secretary was relentless that “the Iranian banks will 
not be able to clear U.S. dollars through New York . . . [or] hold 
correspondent account relationships with U.S. financial 
institutions or enter into financing arrangements with U.S. 
banks.”220 Nevertheless, as a result of the JCPOA agreement, 23 
major Iranian banks formerly designated as financing the 
proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missiles and related 
activities are no longer under any international restriction in 
their financial transactions.221 The funds of many Iranian banks 
that are languishing in banks outside of Iran, unable to be used 
because of the global sanctions, can now successfully transfer 
billions worth of their assets from one banking jurisdiction to 
another. For example, after the demise of the sanctions, Iran 
successfully transferred “billions worth of assets from banks in 
South Korea and Japan to banks in Germany and the United 
Arab Emirates.” According to one expert, the lifting of nuclear 
sanctions “will probably free up only about $30 billion worth of 
assets.”222   
However, Iranian banks require significant 
recapitalization. The IMF has made the following 
recommendations concerning strengthening the Iranian banks: 
1. The reintegration of the domestic financial system into the 
global economy, lowering transaction costs and reducing the 
size of the informal sector. 
2. Better detection of illegal proceeds, including those related 
to tax evasion and corruption. 
3. Adoption of a comprehensive CFT law that properly 
criminalizes terrorist financing (TF), and contains mechanisms 
                                                 
219  Mark Dubowitz & Jonathan Schanzer, More Dollars for the Ayatol-
lahs, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-dollars-
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220  Id. 
221  See JCPOA Annex II Attachments, supra note 5. Bank Saderat was 
the only major Iranian bank that, because of its facilitation of financing terror-
ist groups, remained on the prohibitive list. See Rubin, supra note 216 (noting 
that Bank Saderat will also be de-listed in eight years under the JCPOA). 
222  Pearce, supra note 110. 
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for the implementation of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions related to terrorism and (TF).223 
The capability or willingness of Middle Eastern banks to 
monitor terrorist financing is of particular concern to Western 
banking and security authorities.224 The Paris-based Financial 
Action Task Force has indicated that it “remains particularly 
and exceptionally concerned” about, what it called, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s “failure to address the risk of terrorist 
financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the 
international financial system.”225 The government of Iran has a 
direct position in policing monetary transactions in that 
country.226 Nevertheless, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
during the Obama Administration announced, based on the 
authority of Section 311 of the Patriot Act, that he found 
“reasonable grounds exist for concluding that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s account is of ‘primary money laundering 
concern’ which would require the domestic financial institutions 
and agencies in the United States to take certain ‘special 
measures’ against the primary money laundering concern.”227 
Under the JCPOA, on Implementation Day, foreign banks 
can engage with Iranian banks and companies.228 However, as 
far as the U.S. government is concerned, it lifted nuclear-related 
secondary sanctions against Iran and certain non-U.S. 
persons.229 In order to meet the requirements of the Department 
                                                 
223  See IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 18. 
224  See TOM KEATINGE, IDENTIFYING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS: THE 
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INTELLIGENCE ix-x (2015), https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 07/OP 
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REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-
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227  31 U.S.C. § 5318A. 
228  See JCPOA, supra note 5, ¶¶ 19(ii), 21(i). 
229  See U.S. TREASURY GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 4 n.7. (“For 
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of State, the Central Bank of Iran, as an ombudsman for the 
private banks in that country, must ensure that client 
organizations are not engaged in transfer of money to or from 
terrorist organizations. However, given the organizational 
structure and work pattern of the some of the Iranian banks, it 
is highly unlikely that the Central Bank of Iran would easily be 
in a position to monitor the nature of the activities of each bank 
and police its financial transactions. 
F.  Iran’s Access to SWIFT and Related Developments 
SWIFT is a globally recognized banking communication 
system.230 With over 11,000 financial companies worldwide, it 
allows the member companies to communicate and transfer 
finance.231 From March of 2012 through February of 2016, the 
Central Bank of Iran and fifteen other major banks in that 
country were banned from using SWIFT’s inter-banking 
communication system.232 
Throughout the regime of the economic sanctions, Iran’s 
government has had a problem with communication and 
creditworthiness with respect to its banks. The practical 
problem that Iranian banks faced was accepting the credibility 
of these banks by the international banking community. After 
                                                 
the purpose of this guidance, the term ‘non-U.S. person’ means any individual 
or entity excluding any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity 
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230  Discover SWIFT: Messaging and Standards, SWIFT.COM, https:// 
www.swift.com/about-us/discover-swift/messaging-standards (last visited Jan. 
24, 2017) (SWIFT’s messaging services are trusted and used by more than 
11,000 financial institutions in nearly 200 countries and territories around the 
world.). 
231  Id. 
232  See Rick Gladstone & Stephen Castle, Global Network Expels as Many 
as 30 of Iran’s Banks in Move to Isolate Its Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/world/middleeast/crucial-comm unica-
tion-network-expelling-iranian-banks.html; Iranian banks reconnected to 
SWIFT network after four-year hiatus, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSKCN0VQ1FD. 
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2012, Iranian banks were almost entirely deprived of, and 
disconnected from, the Belgium-based SWIFT.233 A SWIFT, also 
known as a Bank Identifier Code (“BIC”), is an international 
bank code that identifies particular banks worldwide.234 
Approved by the International Organization for Standardization 
(“IOS”), the network of SWIFT related organizations do not 
require a specific format for commercial transactions.235 The 
identification of accounts and the type of transaction is based on 
the agreement between the contractual parties.236 Thus, in any 
transnational commercial transaction, the role of the banks 
associated with such transactions is vital. The SWIFT code is 
also applied when banks engage in transferring money between 
their sister-institutions.237 For example, in order for a bank in 
the purchasing company of Iran to transfer funds to a seller in a 
European country, the respective banks of the contracting 
parties must have a credible SWIFT account.238 At times, some 
buyers of Iranian crude oil, such as China, reportedly resorted 
to paying for its Iranian oil in Chinese currency, the Yuan.239 In 
some cases, Iran and its buyer of the crude oil have bypassed the 
banking system by surreptitiously selling oil for gold.240 In 
international oil transactions, attempting to use gold or apply 
barter procedures is inefficient and does not meet the 
requirements of modern banking transactions.241 Using precious 
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239  Dan Collins, Rise of the Petro Yuan, FIN. SENSE (Apr. 15, 2012), 
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ECONOMIST, June 23, 2012, at 76; see also Alfred Adask, Iran to Sell Crude Oil 
for Gold, ADASK’S LAW (Jan. 24, 2012), https://adask.Wordpress .com/2012/01/ 
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62https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
2017] THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN 63 
metal also lends itself to significant corrupt practices by the 
governments as well as outside institutions.242  
As a result of the JCPOA, major Iranian banks have 
reconnected to the SWIFT network. The SWIFT country 
manager, Onur Ozan, announced that “Swift has completed the 
on-boarding process for [the Iranian] banks” and that, “[w]e will 
continue to work with the remainder of the entities that have 
applied rejoin SWIFT to ensure their smooth reconnection.” 
Iranian banks reconnected to the SWIFT network after a four 
year hiatus.243 The SWIFT limitation on the Iranian banks, 
though considerably improved, is not complete, since the JCPOA 
does not repeal all EU sanctions on Iranian banks; as a result, 
those banks are unable to use SWIFT, which otherwise provides 
financial facilitation to those Iranian banks that remain listed 
under EU regulations.244 The major reason for such disconnect 
is that SWIFT is incorporated under the laws of Belgium and 
has to comply with related EU codes.245 On their own, neither 
SWIFT nor the IOS could claim authority to make decisions 
concerning sanctions or lifting a banking embargo.246 Further, 
decisions on the legitimacy of financial transactions, such as 
reinstalling sanctions, rest within the financial institutions 
handling them and national authorities legally in control of 
banking transactions. Nevertheless, SWIFT’s global transaction 
network has reconnected a number of Iranian banks to its 
system, allowing these delisted banks to resume transactions 
with foreign financial organizations.247  
Considering the tumultuous nature of the recent inter-
banking financial transactions, the vast majority of countries 
active in international financial transactions have adopted some 
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246  Id. 
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form of anti-terrorism policies. Until early 2016, Iran did not 
have such laws in its books. Such legislative omission indicated 
the lack of seriousness and resolve on the part of Iran’s decision 
makers to combat terrorism. Whatever the reason, it resulted in 
the denial of Iran’s access to SWIFT and consequently to active 
transnational banking transactions commensurable with Iran’s 
substantial needs for economic development. 
On March 5, 2016, Iran’s Council of Guardians, which 
has the authority for judicial review, approved the earlier 
legislative draft passed by the Islamic National Assembly, 
entitled “Combating the Financing of Terrorism” (“CFT”).248 The 
Central Bank of Iran played a major role in drafting and 
presenting this bill with the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs.249  
G.  Agreement Between the Central Bank of Iran and 
Coface State Guarantees 
The Coface Group is a global credit insurance system 
operating throughout the world.250 The primary function of 
Coface is to provide insurance to companies engaged in 
international transactions against the possible risk of financial 
default by their clients.251 With the support of approximately 
                                                 
248  See Press Release, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Rat-
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4500 employees, 252 Coface functions in both developed and 
developing countries; as of 2014, the company had a direct 
presence in 67 countries, with delivery guarantees in nearly 200 
countries.253 Periodically, Coface makes assessments of a 
country’s risk for about 160 countries in the world.254 
Considering the importance of a reliable insurance system, 
it would have been extremely difficult for Iran and its corporate 
contractual partners, both in Europe and elsewhere, to embark 
on a new phase of international commercial transactions 
without having reliable insurance coverage for commercial risks. 
Thus, in transatlantic commercial transactions of late January 
2016 by President Hasan Rohani, a contractual agreement was 
reached between the parties. The Central Bank of Iran and 
Coface State Guarantees acting on behalf of the government of 
France, entered into the export credit insurance agreement.255 
More importantly, this agreement encompassed fees due by 
Iran, and Coface State Guarantees on behalf of the government 
of France received dues in the field of export credit insurance.256 
The Coface agreement was an effective way for restoring 
commercial transactions between France and Iran. In 
particular, French companies will be able to negotiate with Iran, 
knowing that the contractual obligations of the parties will be 
guaranteed for the medium and long-term projects in compliance 
with the customary rules of international commercial 
transactions.257 
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V.  Iran’s Sanction-Free Investments and 
Commercial Agreements with Foreign Companies  
A.  Investment and Commercial Agreements with French 
Companies 
France and Iran opened a new chapter in their relations as 
France’s President Hollande pronounced: “I want this 
relationship to be useful, useful to our two countries, useful to 
the region . . . [and] to the world.”258 These pronouncements 
were made during the two-day visit of his guest, President 
Hasan Rohani, to France. Some 30 agreements were signed 
between the government of Iran and French companies.259 The 
French export bank, Companies Francoise d’ Assurance pour le 
Commerce Exte’rieur, agreed that, if necessary, it would 
guarantee French investments in Iran. 
The agreements between France and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran encompass various commercial fields including the: (1) 
purchase of petroleum; (2) purchase of civil aviation fleet; (3) 
purchase of passenger cars and buses; and (4) expansion or 
renovation of Iranian airports. Of these commercial 
transactions, the agreement between Iran and Total, the French 
international oil company, may be the most consequential in 
terms of its overall impact in Iran’s future global transactions 
with the Western world. According to the Minister of Oil of Iran, 
this agreement encompasses exploration and exploitation of 
Iran’s South Azadeghan oilfield, which it shares with Iraq.260 
Total would be “studying its participation in the (development 
of) the oilfield.”261 The main question concerning Iran’s 
agreement with Total is what is the nature of the French 
company’s commercial transaction with Iran? 
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The highlights of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MOU”) between Total and the National Iranian Oil Company 
(“NIOC”) most likely include the following: 
1. Preliminarily, Total will purchase up to 200,000 barrels of 
crude oil per day from Iran.262  
2. Upon Iran’s request, these sales will be in Euros. This 
request follows an Iranian policy that promotes the reduction 
of the Islamic Republic’s obligations to, and financial 
dependence on, the U.S. dollar with respect to its international 
creditors.263 
3. The French party may, if needed, provide the NIOC with 
technical assistance.264 
The details of the MOU between Total and NIOC have not 
yet been publicly announced.265 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Iran seeks to gain access to the European market demand for 
crude oil.266 In this respect Iran, in a relatively short period of 
time, would be able to successfully compete with both Saudi 
Arabian and Russian crude oil. Further, Iran would have access 
to the modern Western European oil technology to mend its 
petrochemical industry such as Nouri Petrochemical 
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Complex.267 The MOU is also important because it shows Iran’s 
willingness to invite U.S. international oil companies for 
cooperation with the NIOC, and it is an indirect reference for 
U.S. international companies to enter into business 
rapprochement with various Iranian governmental 
corporations. In fact, Iran’s Minister of Oil reportedly stated that 
the Iranian government has “no problem with the presence of 
American companies in Iran. But it is the American government 
which is creating restrictions for these companies.”268 
In addition to Total, the car manufacturer PSA Peugeot-
Citroën has entered into various agreements with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.269 Prior to the sanctions, both companies were 
trading partners with Iran. Peugeot-Citroën has agreed to invest 
$450 million with its counterpart in Iran, Iran’s Khodro 
Corporation, to modernize an automobile factory in Iran.270 
According to the joint venture agreement, the two companies 
plan to contractually cooperate in modernizing Iran’s largest car 
factory.271 The new products of this factory will enter into the 
Iranian market by mid-2017.272 The initial production target of 
the joint venture company is planned to be 200,000 vehicles a 
year.273 The PSA has indicated that it would sign a final 
agreement with SAIPA, Citroen’s partner in Iran, before the 
imposition of sanctions.274 
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The Iran–France joint venture is planned to produce 
modern Peugeot models with estimated investment of $436 
million over five years. Moreover, Airbus has agreed to sell 
approximately 127 aircraft to Iran Air, and Alstom will complete 
the Tehran metro lines. Iran’s government also intends to build 
a second terminal at Imam Khomeini Airport by entering into a 
planning agreement with the French companies of Bouygues 
and Aero Ports de Paris (“ADP”).275  
As for the aviation fleet, Iran has concluded a major 
agreement to purchase over 100 airliners from Airbus Group in 
a deal totaling approximately $27 billion.276 This includes 45 
medium haul planes, as well as the world’s largest passenger 
plane, the A380. The deal also covers new aircraft orders, and 
according to Airbus, “a complete package of cooperation in the 
civil aviation sector.”277 In early 2017, the Airbus agreement 
with Iran finally materialized.278 Iran’s agreement with France’s 
Airbus Group is one of the major post-JCPOA success stories in 
international commercial agreements between the Islamic 
Republic and its European trade partners. 
The agreements between Iran and respective French 
companies are intended to renovate the severely dilapidated 
industries in certain areas such as air and surface 
transportation systems. For example, Iran’s civil aviation fleet 
numbers 140 aircraft with an average age of approximately 25 
years, and Iran reportedly has “one of the world’s worst air 
safety records.”279 Finally, after approximately four decades, 
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from the Islamic Revolution of Iran, on January 8, 2017, Airbus 
announced that “technical acceptance” of the first plane to Iran’s 
flagship state-owned carrier, Iran Air, was completed thus 
effectively marking the transfer of ownership of the planes to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.280 Because the international financial 
channels between Iran and various European countries are not 
yet completely normalized, the contractual parties have agreed 
to use a different source of financing transactions that enjoy 
priorities.281 That is, until the reopening of export credit 
agencies’ credit coverage to the Islamic Republic of Iran, certain 
banks in Italy and the Netherlands will likely reopen letters of 
credit with non-designated Iranian banks. In the long run, and 
as a more reliable financial solution, Coface will likely be 
working with Iran and European financial institutions involved 
in Iranian–European transactions.282 
B.  Investment and Commercial Agreements with Italian 
Companies 
Italy has actively sought negotiations with Iran in order to 
initiate the expansion of the commercial and investment 
agreements in that country.283 Almost immediately after the 
JCPOA agreement was signed, the Italian investment 
development mission composed of 57 Italian oil and gas 
companies, active in the fields of engineering, equipment supply, 
refining, and extraction are “ready for investment agreements 
with Iranian partners.”284 Further, the Italian food producing 
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companies announced that they might be willing to undertake 
direct investments in the Islamic Republic of Iran.285 On 
January 2016, Danieli, a major European steel company, 
entered into a total of four major agreements with Iranian 
commercial entities, worth approximately $18.4 billion. The 
main agreements between the two contractual parties included 
the following: (1) a pipeline contract with Saipem, Italian oil 
services group, worth approximately $4–5 billion; (2) various 
contractual agreements between Iran and Italian steel firm 
Danieli, amounting to $6.1 billion; and (3) an agreement 
between Iran and infrastructure firm Condotte d’Acqa worth 
approximately $4.3 billion. These agreements are primarily 
related to developments in steel and the mineral sector.286 The 
overture by President Rohani was enthusiastically positive as he 
stressed that Iran’s market “offers Italian and European 
investors the opportunity to establish themselves in the entire 
region.”287 
Iran’s major agreement with the Italian partners was in the 
area of oil and gas.288 In a memorandum of understanding signed 
between the Italian ENI Oil Company and National Iranian Gas 
Export Company, the parties agreed to work on exploration, 
exploitation, and development of natural gas resources in 
Iran.289 However, Matteo Renzi, the former Prime Minister of 
Italy, whose country was a major European beneficiary of the 
JCPOA accord, acknowledged during his post-JCPOA visit to 
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Iran that the main issue would be bank credits.290 These bank 
credits, consisting of establishing banking links and opening 
credit lines, were emphasized by the Italian party as “key to 
strong economic and trade flourishing.”291  
C.  Investment and Commercial Agreements with German 
Companies  
Since Iran started its industrial modernization program 
over 100 years ago, German companies have been the traditional 
investment and commercial partners of Iran in various business 
transactions. After the JCPOA, a representative of Siemens 
indicated: “We have a close dialogue with the Iranian 
government and local partners in the area of infrastructure, 
energy and technology. We have been active in Iran for 150 
years . . . and we have never left the country.”292 Thus post-
JCPOA, Iran has sought various German companies’ 
cooperation with the Islamic Republic. There are also reports 
that Iran’s National Petrochemical Company (“NPC”) is 
negotiating with investors from Germany who “have expressed 
their readiness to invest €4 to €8 billion in petrochemical 
projects” in Iran.293 
D.  Iran’s Transactions with the United States 
1.  Iran’s Commercial Transactions with U.S. 
Corporations 
With a population of approximately 80 million, including a 
large generation composed of educated, middle class young 
people with a vigorous demand for travel after decades of 
isolation, Iran represents one of the few remaining untapped 
world markets for multinational corporations, such as Boeing, 
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Royal Dutch Shell, and Airbus.294 Historically, the U.S.–Iranian 
commercial relationship has been vibrant.295 Prior to the Islamic 
Revolution, American exporters sold annually $3.7 billion worth 
of products to Iran.296 Iran also exported annually $2.9 billion 
worth of Iranian products to the United States.297 In general, 
exports from the United States to a foreign country are subject 
to, and governed by, Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR).298 The EAR are issued by the Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).299  
After the JCPOA accord, some U.S. companies began taking 
preliminary steps toward engagement with Iran. The Boeing 
Company, a Delaware corporation, is one of the most noteworthy 
U.S. companies engaged in such negotiations.300 In early 2016, 
Iran expressed interest in purchasing 737 jets and 777 long-
range planes from the Chicago-based manufacturer.301  
Commercial aircraft sales to Iran currently fall into a special 
permitted category of post–JCPOA regulations. The U.S. 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has 
provided a “Statement of Licensing Policy” (“SLP”), under which 
U.S. and non-U.S. persons, including corporate entities, may 
request specific authorization from OFAC to engage in 
transactions “for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and 
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related parts and services to Iran.”302 According to the special 
licensing provision: 
As of Implementation Day of the JCPOA, specific licenses may 
be issued on a case-by-case basis to authorize U.S. persons and, 
where there is a nexus to U.S. jurisdiction, non-U.S. persons to 
(1) export, re-export, sell, lease, or transfer to Iran commercial 
passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, (2) 
export, re-export, sell, lease, or transfer to Iran spare parts and 
components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (3) provide 
associated services, including warranty, maintenance, and 
repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the 
foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used 
exclusively for commercial passenger aviation.303  
Licenses issued under the SLP are designed to ensure that 
aircraft sold to Iran will not be resold to any person on the 
Treasury Department’s sanctions list.304 Prior to leaving office, 
the Obama Administration reportedly agreed that Boeing could 
enter into negotiations with select Iranian carriers.305 Under 
present conditions, however, the Boeing deal may be highly 
complex for a number of reasons, including questions regarding 
potential dual-use of commercial equipment sold under the 
agreement, the potential impact that dual-use could have on 
U.S. national security, intellectual property concerns, and the 
deal’s conformity with the JCPOA accord.  
2. The Dual Use Contractual Agreements- Sale of 
Aircraft to Iran 
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA), any U.S. license application to sell dual use items to 
Iran is reviewed under a presumption of denial.306 Accordingly, 
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any licenses to sell aircraft to Iran will be contingent on their 
exclusive use for commercial aviation purposes. Therefore, in 
any commercial agreement, such as the sale of aircraft to Iran, 
significant operational issues concerning surveillance and 
reliability will arise. Such operational issues are not per se 
related to enforcement of the Boeing contract, and may only 
become apparent during or after the contract’s implementation. 
This is because some of Iran’s extra-constitutional institutions 
may have aided and abetted acts of terrorism while 
camouflaging as commercial or charity organizations.  
One such company is Mahan Air, a private Iranian airline 
company which is engaged in the customary commercial airline 
business of transporting passengers, but has also reportedly 
participated in operations to carry weapons and paramilitaries 
through various Iranian cities to a suspected IRGC hub in 
Abadan, Iran, and from there to their ultimate destination: 
Damascus.307 Mahan Air is owned by a ‘charity’ establishment, 
Mol-Al-Movahedin Charity Institute, which the U.S. has linked 
to the IRGC.308 Predictably, the U.S. Treasury Department has 
designated Mahan Air as a Specially Designated National 
(“SDN”) on account of its “providing financial, material and 
technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps’-Quds Force.”309 Specifically, the Treasury Department 
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sanctioned nine aircraft associated with Mahan Air in March of 
2015 on the grounds that the airline company helped the IRGC 
to “ferry operatives, weapons, and funds in support of the 
[Syrian President] Asad regime,” an identification which would 
presumably make it “more difficult for Iran to use receptive 
practices to try to evade sanctions.”310 
These dual-use issues create additional complexities with 
respect to day-to-day operational issues; it is difficult to make a 
clear distinction between the usual operations of a traditional 
‘state-owned’ company and a ‘private’ company when each is 
engaged in the same line of commercial activities. On March 24, 
2016, OFAC designated Mahan Air as an entity in support of 
Iran’s ballistic missile program.311 Shortly thereafter, a bill was 
submitted in Congress “[t]o prohibit the Secretary of the 
Treasury from authorizing certain transactions by a U.S. 
financial institution in connection with the export or re-export of 
a commercial passenger aircraft to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.”312 This bill attempted to “prohibit U.S. financial 
institutions from facilitating the sale of commercial aircraft to 
Iran,” thereby preventing planes from falling into the wrong 
hands, and would provide conditions for engaging in such 
transactions with Iranian entities.313 However, once Boeing sells 
its planes to Iran, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for 
the U.S.-based company to engage in effective and workable 
surveillance with respect to any relationship between state-
owned Iran Air and privately owned carriers that may 
conceivably employ their aircraft for a dual-use purpose. 
These security hazards concerning Boeing’s transactions 
with Iran are compounded by the fact that even if the Trump 
Administration and the Treasury Department were able to undo 
the Boeing deal, there would nevertheless be similar 
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outstanding transactions between Iran and the French aircraft 
manufacturing company Airbus. Airbus, the world’s second 
largest plane maker after Boeing, has entered into an agreement 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran to deliver 100 planes to Iran 
Air.314 This contract is valued at over $18 billion. In mid-January 
of 2017, the first of 100 planes that Iran expected to receive 
through its landmark deal with Airbus landed in Iran’s 
airport.315 The introductory French deliveries of the aircraft to 
Iran notwithstanding, the United States could use its leverage 
in order to contain the Airbus contract to complete the 
transaction. Even though Airbus is a European company, it 
could be subject to, and impacted by, U.S. regulatory 
restrictions.316 For example, OFAC regulations concerning 
transactions with Iran could easily be reapplied or 
reinterpreted. 317 In addition, the Treasury Department could 
choose to broaden the SDN list.318 These regulations could 
somewhat restrict foreign corporate entities doing business with 
Iran.  
Further, in a practical sense, Airbus needs to cooperate with 
Boeing. Airbus jets contain many American parts and 
technology that are subject to American export controls.319 In 
fact, prior to entering into its agreement with Iran, Airbus 
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received a general approval from the U.S. Treasury.320 
Therefore, in the event that Iran Air did not, or could not, adhere 
to the strict commercial terms of the agreement between Iran 
Air and Airbus, OFAC could review the original permit of Airbus 
and decide whether or not American suppliers could continue 
delivering parts or technical equipment to Airbus. Admittedly, 
this is not a perfect solution, and it is conceivable that after 
Airbus and/or Boeing effectuate delivery, Iran’s extra-
constitutional entities could use a number of American or 
French planes (or available local aircraft) for restricted non-
commercial purposes. 
3.  The Iran-Boeing Contract and U.S. National Security 
Considerations 
Despite the inclusion of Treasury Department provisions 
concerned with preventing major Iranian companies from using 
Western aircraft for anything other than strictly commercial 
activities, enforcement or policing of such provisions once the 
aircraft reach Iran will prove a complex task. The Iran-Boeing 
deal and similar contracts create three issues related to the U.S. 
national security: First, it is not clear how a U.S. company, such 
as Boeing, could reasonably or reliably surveil operational 
activities within Iran to ensure that an impermissible 
commingling of finances will not take place during or after a 
given subject transaction. Second, given the nature of the airline 
business, it would not be practical— much less possible—for an 
American company, such as Boeing, to monitor activities taking 
place in a foreign country, much less the day-to-day operations 
of ordinary passengers and persons potentially subject to OFAC 
controls. Third, it would be impossible for a U.S. company to 
engage in systematic monitoring, intelligence surveillance, or 
classifications with respect to cargo—much less passengers’ 
luggage—to determine intent to engage in activities that are 
illegal under U.S. law. 
Iran’s perceived reputation in the United States as a state 
sponsor of terrorism has resulted in the creation of substantial 
obstacles to financial investment and trade with it or its alter 
ego entities. As long as this perception exists, Iran will be subject 
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to intermittent restrictions to international credit facilities and 
financing for products and services that international financial 
organizations could otherwise provide. For example, the U.S. 
Exim Bank is unlikely to make financial guarantees for any sale 
of U.S. export products to Iran while Iran is listed as a state 
sponsor of terrorism.321  
4.  Intellectual Property Protection Issues 
Another issue of concern in contemporary international 
transactions is the protection of intellectual property.322 Iran has 
enacted the “Patents, Industrial Designs and Trademarks 
Registration Act” to provide such protections.323  However, this 
law provides rather weak oversight for intellectual property. 
According to one study by U.S. based advocacy group “Property 
Rights Alliance,” Iran ranked 111th out of 131 countries for 
intellectual property safeguards.324  Under the “Patents, 
Industrial Designs and Trademarks Registration Act”, the 
owner of intellectual property has the privilege to certain rights 
against infringement, including the following: 
a) The exploitation of the patented invention in Iran by persons 
other than the owner of the patent shall require the agreement 
of the latter. Exploitation of a patented invention includes any 
of the following acts: 
1)  If the patent has been granted for a product: 
i)making, exporting and importing, offering for sale, 
selling or using; 
ii)stocking such product for the purpose of offering for 
sale, selling or using; 
2)  If the patent has been granted with respect of a process: 
i)using the process; 
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ii) doing any of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) (1) of the 
present Article in respect of a product obtained directly by 
means of the process. 
b) The owner of the patent shall, subject to subsection c) thereof 
and Article 17 [of this Act], have the right to institute court 
proceedings against any person who performs any of the acts 
referred to in paragraph (a) above and infringes the patent 
rights or performs any other acts which will result in 
infringement of his rights.325  
 
As to Iran’s commercial transactions abroad, U.S. concerns 
with the concept of intellectual property are broadly two-
dimensional; they concern both national security issues and the 
value of the intellectual property, in the traditional legal sense, 
to the owner (e.g. a corporate entity). Challenges to the valuation 
of aircraft transactions will be of great significance with respect 
to not only the sale of aircraft or other manufactured products to 
Iran, but also to technical procedures employed in exploration, 
exploitation, and production of oil and natural gas with the 
assistance of foreign companies. In this respect, Iran has laws 
that may reasonably protect relevant intellectual property. For 
instance, the “Act for Protection of Authors’, Composers’ and 
Artists’ Rights” protects “any technical work, innovation and 
initiation.”326  In terms of its international obligations 
concerning intellectual property, Iran has signed and ratified 
the Stockholm Convention Establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization of July 1967.327 Moreover, Iran has 
included the WIPO Convention in its compilation of the articles 
of its civil code.328  
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art. 15 (Iran), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=197776. 
326  See QANUNI HEMAYAT HUQUQ MUALEFYN VA MUSENEFAN W 
HONARMANDAN [Act for Protection of Authors’, Composers’ and Artists’ Rights] 
1348 [1970], art. 10 (Iran), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp? file_id 
=197798. 
327  Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (“WIPO”), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO 
Convention]. The WIPO Convention was amended on October 2, 1979, and en-
tered into force on June 1, 1984. 
328  See Golamreza Hojati Ashrafi, Complete Compilation of Laws and 
Regulations of Civil Law. 
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For purposes of the Iran-Boeing deal, Iran’s most relevant 
international intellectual property obligations could be derived 
from its indirect relationship with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).329 Iran is not a member of the WTO, partly as a result of 
U.S. objections and veto power.330 Nevertheless, in the absence 
of Iran’s accession to an effective internationally bonded 
intellectual property obligation, a somewhat viable alternative 
for Boeing and Airbus could be:  
1. Conducting independent investigations for the purpose of 
collecting intelligence that will ensure that Iran Air is 
engaged exclusively in the business of commercial 
transportation; 
2. Conducting periodic intellectual property audits; 
3. Limiting disclosures by Boeing or Airbus concerning 
intellectual property rights; 
4. Ensuring, to the extent possible, that state-owned Iran Air 
will not sell or lease its aircraft to privately owned Mahan Air, 
or other private airlines, such as Iran Aseman Airline 
Company, without adequate security surveillance; 
5. Ensuring that Iran Air will not fly its aircraft to politically or 
strategically volatile regions (such as Syria, Yemen, Libya, 
certain parts of Iraq, and North Korea); 
6. Ensuring in the contract that Iran will not transfer or allow a 
real or corporate person to have access to the intellectual 
property owned by Boeing; and 
7. Ensuring that Iran Air will not allow other airlines such as 
Mahan Air or Iran Aseman Airlines to use Iran Air’s aircraft, 
parts, or equipment.331 
Boeing and Airbus could also provide contractual 
stipulations for snap inspections or remote real-time 
surveillance in various cities in which Iran Air provides 
passenger, flight, or cargo services. 
                                                 
329  For the role of the WTO as to the member countries’ obligations on 
intellectual property see: Frank X Curci, Protecting Your Intellectual Property 
Rights Overseas, 15 Transnat’ Law 15, 28 (2002). 
330  See Maysam Bizaer, Long road ahead for Iran’s bid to join World 
Trade Organization, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.al-moni-
tor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/iran-world-trade-organization-wto-acce ssion-
bid.html. 
331  Omar S. Bahir and Eric Lorber, Boeing’s Art of the Iran Deal: How to 
Use Civilian Aircraft to Pressure the Regime, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Aug. 28, at 16. 
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Considering the vastly different Iranian and U.S. 
governmental structures and division of governmental powers 
with respect to the enforcement of contractual obligations, these 
measures are admittedly difficult to enforce.332 Further, there is 
no reference in the JCPOA accord that would compel Iran to 
follow specific principles with respect to signatory countries’ 
patent and intellectual property laws in effectuating its 
investment and commercial agreements with the 5+1 countries. 
Moreover, there is no provision granting JCPOA signatories 
the right of inspection with respect to any technology transferred 
to Iran based on signatory states’ commercial agreements with 
Iran. Nevertheless, in the absence of a viable alternative with 
respect to intellectual property protection by the 5+1 countries, 
the provisions, as indicated above, are the only viable 
requirements which could probably be monitored to any degree 
through remote legal control. In addition, Boeing and Airbus 
could contractually stipulate that they will provide services, 
spare parts, know-how, and training to Iran Air, if Iran Air 
reciprocates with certain contractual and security assurances. 
Another issue concerning post-sanction trade with Iran that 
could attenuate some of these security issues relates to the use 
of U.S. currency in the international market. The dominant 
status of the U.S. dollar in global commercial transactions 
makes it a medium of exchange between bartered commodities 
among nations.333 Thus, the U.S. dollar is frequently used in 
transactions between two countries to set a price-evaluation for 
                                                 
332  See Wagdy Sawahel, Iran’s New Law On IP Protection Moves It Onto 
International Stage, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 13, 2008), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2008/06/13/irans-new-law-on-ip-protection-moves-it-onto-interna-
tional-stage/ (relating key provisions of Iran’s 2008 intellectual property law; 
reporting that “[t]he Iranian law has attempted to harmonise itself with exist-
ing laws and practices to the extent possible . . . But there are some fundamen-
tal differences that cannot be removed, such as nullifying IPR protection when 
a public interest matter arises.”). An important problem for a foreign contrac-
tual party in Iran may be the pressures that the foreign company might sustain 
from extra-constitutional institutions or on account of corrupt practices. 
333  See Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, Officials: US considers easing 
ban on dollars to help Iran, AP (Mar. 31, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/ arti-
cle/d527c4f64b464801a2ed4573a13b4627/officials-us-mulls-new-rules-dollars-
help-iran. 
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products or services.334 In this respect, the availability of the 
dollar to Iranian banks is of vital interest.335   
The influence and enforcement power of the United States 
government lies in its predominance in the world financial 
system. Thus, in the event that an unforeseeable security issue 
appears on the horizon, a congressional act could conceivably 
prevent U.S. banks from providing credit for the Iran-Boeing 
deal. These contingencies are not ordinary commercial 
provisions, and should only be used as a last resort.  Further, as 
noted above, OFAC could revoke Boeing’s license to sell aircraft 
to Iran.336  
5.  U.S. Aspirations Under the JCPOA Accord  
The JCPOA accord does not deal with questions other than 
Iran’s obligations with respect to production of nuclear 
substances at the weaponry level. Nevertheless, the accord was 
intended to be a prelude for a broader rapprochement between 
Iran on the one hand and major political and economic powers of 
the world on the other. For the Western signatories to the 
accord, this meant (or so they hoped) that Iran would review its 
policies with respect to two major complaints on part of the 
United States and other major Western powers: First, the 
question of Iran’s policies on human rights and second the 
question as to claims by the European countries and specifically 
the U.S. with respect to perceived acts of extrajudicial killings. 
The parties to the JCPOA accord understood that Iran and other 
negotiating partners of that accord, would live up to their 
international commitments. The Department of State has 
emphasized that “the government of Iran’s actions beyond the 
nuclear issue, including its destabilizing activities in the Middle 
East and its human rights abuses at home [including] Iran’s 
support for terrorist groups like Hizballah, . . . are at odds with 
U.S. interests, and pose fundamental threats to the region and 
beyond.”337 However, in the United States the defensive policies 
                                                 
334  See id. 
335  Id. 
336  See Bart Jansen, House to debate blocking loans for Boeing sale to 
Iran, USA TODAY (Nov. 10, 2016, 3:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/2016/11/10/house-debate-boeing-plane-sale-iran/93601314/. 
337  Iran’s Recent Actions and Implementation of the JCPOA, Testimony 
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adopted through courts and judicial proceedings have been more 
effective than the forces expressed through other means. Under 
the current law, and the Supreme Court decision, U.S.-based 
assets owned by the Iranian government, including those owned 
by the Central Bank of Iran, are likely to be available to U.S. 
judgment creditors for post-judgment execution.338 This could 
include any assets present in the U.S. for the purchase of 
manufactured items, such as aircraft.  
6.  Iran’s Security-Based Transactions with the United 
States—The Saga of the Heavy Water Trade  
Unlike the commercial transactions between Iran and a 
number of European countries, the U.S–Iran post- sanction 
rapprochement started with primarily a security based 
agreement. Iran and the U.S. entered into a seemingly 
commercial transaction with a different goal far from 
commercial motif. On April 22, 2016, the Obama Administration 
entered into an agreement in Vienna whereby the U.S. agreed 
to purchase 32 tons of heavy water (a material that is used to 
cool uranium) from Iran.339  The fundamental question is what 
was the reason for the United States to volunteer in purchasing 
the heavy water from Iran?  The justification for such 
transaction was, “to aid Iranian trade internationally by 
allowing Iran to do business normally conducted in dollars while 
abiding by U.S. laws that block Tehran’s use of the American 
financial system.”340  
                                                 
of Thomas A. Shannon Jr., Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., U.S. DEP’T STATE (Apr. 5, 
2016), https://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2016/255510.htm. The United States re-
laxed restrictions on commercial aircraft sales to Iran Air, which remains a 
state-owned company. See Seyed Fatemeh Alaei and Annette Andersson, Mas-
ters’ Thesis, Privatization: What we learn from failure - A case study of Iran 
Air (2014), hv.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2: 732837/fulltext01.pdf. Iran 
Air’s “de-listing” by the U.S. Treasury Department, and the ensuing sale of the 
aircraft to Iran, would otherwise be subject to Iran Air’s activities within the 
framework of the existing U.S. laws. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.206(a)(1). 
338  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1329. 
339  Jay Solomon, U.S. to Buy Material Used in Iran Nuclear Program, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2016, 7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-buy-
material-used-in-iran-nuclear-program-1461319381. Heavy water is a mate-
rial that can be used to cool uranium in a process to produce plutonium and 
mass-destruction substances. 
340  Id. 
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The heavy water transaction policy of the Obama 
Administration was ill-advised at best and otherwise misguided. 
Based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with respect 
to the generation of the heavy water substance, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran agreed that: 
Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international and 
technological achievement relying on light water for its future 
power and research with enhanced international cooperation 
including assurance of supply of necessary fuel. There will be 
no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy 
water in Iran for 15 years.341 
Based on the JCPOA accord, Iran agreed to cap its stockpile 
of uranium at a maximum of 300 kilograms (661 pounds) for a 
period of 15 years.342 Further, the JCPOA caps Iran’s stockpile 
of heavy water at 130 metric tons (143.3 U.S. tons).343 However, 
any purchase of this heavy water stockpile by another state 
would be tantamount to creating a market for Iran’s heavy water 
as an ordinary commodity. By purchasing this material, the 
United States has effectively encouraged Iran, as a supplier, to 
entertain future offers, for profit, of its heavy water in the 
international market.344 By purchasing heavy water, and 
thereby creating market demand for it, the United States has 
enabled the creation of a market price mechanism for the very 
substance—plutonium—that the 5+1 countries were trying to 
curtail. This directly contradicts an avowed purpose of the 
nuclear deal, namely, “to prevent Iran from producing sufficient 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon.”345 Therefore, by 
purchasing heavy water from Iran, the Obama Administration 
provided recurring market demand for such material. If 
purchasing heavy water from Iran was a prudent policy, then 
                                                 
341  The White House, Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/key-
excerpts-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa. 
342  JCPOA Annex I, supra note 5, at ¶ 14. 
343  JCPOA Annex I, supra note 5, at ¶ 14. 
344  Solomon, supra note 339 (quoting U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest 
Moniz: “That will be a statement to the world: You want to buy heavy water 
from Iran, you can buy heavy water from Iran. It’s been done. Even the United 
States did it.”). 
345  What you need to know about the JCPOA, supra note 35, at 26. 
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the Obama Administration should have applied the same policy 
by purchasing weaponry level uranium from Iran.  
Further, under the rules established by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, “the government [of Iran] shall establish 
and maintain a governmental, legal and regulatory framework 
within which all aspects of decommissioning . . . can be planned 
and carried out safely.”346 The purpose of such de-commissioning 
of the facilities was to eliminate the possibilities of violation of 
the United Nations rules concerning nuclear energy including 
radioactive waste and heavy water emanating from 
unsupervised facilities. 
Nevertheless, the “heavy water” transaction with Iran was 
not based on commercial considerations on the part of the United 
States. It was a strategically based exchange to protect a broad 
accord reached during the negotiations with Iran. It meant to 
legalistically, and within the framework of the JCPOA, enable 
Iran to enter into investment and trade agreements with 
Western countries. Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran should 
maintain supplies of heavy water tons to a particular degree.347 
Thus, the U.S. agreed on purchasing the “surplus” heavy water 
from Iran for $8.6 million. It was agreed that within a few weeks 
from the signing of the agreement, the heavy water would be 
shipped, under the supervision of the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
Tennessee.  
Therefore, the heavy water deal was not a genuine 
commercial arm’s length transaction. The United States entered 
into the heavy water agreement for ostensibly security reasons. 
That is, not finding a purchaser that might be acceptable to the 
United States, the government of Iran may undertake to sell the 
heavy water to unreliable buyers. However, there was a clear 
signal on part of the Obama Administration that the interested 
                                                 
346  Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], IAEA Safety Standards, Decom-
missioning of Facilities, No. GSR Part 6 (2014), http://www-pub. iaea.org 
/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1652web-83896570.pdf. 
347  Solomon, supra note 339 (reporting that under the agreement reached 
between the 5+1 countries and Iran, the Islamic Republic agreed to maintain 
its heavy water below 130 tons during the initial years of the agreement, and 
under 90 tons thereafter). 
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American companies could purchase heavy water from Iran on a 
regular basis.348  
The heavy water deal was a state-to-state strategic 
transaction with a very heavy political overtone. The U.S. 
Government undertook to facilitate the purchase of heavy water, 
out of fear that Iran will make the product available to the wrong 
people. Historically, Iran has undertaken transactions related to 
atomic energy products.349 The purchase of heavy water by the 
United States from Iran was a defensive strategy rather than a 
deal based on commercial interest.350 There is yet another view 
for the heavy water transaction. That is, for the United States 
to use Iran’s heavy water substance as an item of commerce. 
According to one observer, the Obama Administration’s strategy 
with respect to the nuclear agreement with Iran was an 
“effective investment in Tehran’s nuclear program through the 
purchase of excess heavy water from Iranian reactors.”351 The 
Obama Administration’s decision to purchase heavy water from 
Iran was a failed strategy. It made the purchase of heavy water 
from Iran into an authentic arm’s length transaction in a 
competitive market. Worse, the fact is that buying heavy water 
from Iran encourages it to supply more heavy water as an 
ordinary commodity, reproducing heavy water in significant 
quantities and continuing to sell it to foreign markets.  
The “commercial” transaction between the United States 
and Iran with respect to heavy water was a failed strategy. A 
few months after the completion of the first heavy water sale and 
shipment of the substance to the United States, the Chairman 
of the IAEA’s Board of Directors, on November 9, 2016, 
announced that Iran’s inventory of heavy water exceeded 130 
                                                 
348  Solomon, supra note 339, at A7 (reporting that Secretary Moniz had 
indicated that the U.S. government would make only one purchase of the heavy 
water which could be used to stimulate fissile reactions inside nuclear reactors. 
However, the Secretary indicated that “American companies could emerge as 
regular buyers of the material in the future.”). 
349  For example, in the past, the Islamic Republic has sold low-enriched 
uranium to Kazakhstan and Russia. See David Sanger and Andrew Kramer, 
Iran Hands Over Stockpile of Enriched Uranium to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2015, at A4. 
350  Solomon, supra note 339 (reporting that Republican leaders criticized 
the Department of Energy’s purchase of the Iranian heavy water and accused 
the Obama Administration that it was essentially subsidizing Iranian nuclear 
program). 
351  Berman, supra note 10. 
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metric tons.352 In his report, the Director General of the IAEA 
announced on October 25, 2016 that “the Agency verified that 
Iran’s stock of heavy water had reached 130 metric tons [and 
that] the Director General expressed concerns related to Iran’s 
stock of heavy water to the Vice President of Iran and President 
of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, HE Ali Akbar Salehi.”353 
Moreover, On November 8, 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran’s 
stock of heavy water had reached 130.1 metric tons.354  
The original heavy water deal was intended to be a one-time 
arrangement in order to lift the remaining barrier on the way to 
reaching the JCPOA agreement with Iran. Apparently, such 
view was a misconceived notion by the United States and its 
European allies. As the subsequent events indicated, after the 
discovery of the production by Iran of the heavy water substance 
for the second time, the Iranian representative at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency expressed the view that “as 
far as the additional quantity of heavy water is concerned, Iran’s 
sole obligation, based on the JCPOA accord, was to offer the 
[additional] substance in international markets.”355 The Director 
of the IAEA has stated that it’s important that in the future Iran 
would refrain from such transactions so that the confidence of 
the international community as to the enforcement of the 
JCPOA, which is the test of truthfulness of Iran, shall 
maintain.356  
Another problem with the heavy water issue is that  neither 
Iran, the United States, the IAEA, nor the European Union, 
which oversees the implementation of the JCPOA accord, had 
clearly defined what they count as “unrecoverable” material - 
uranium that is genuinely impossible to separate out and 
redeploy.357 The heavy water buyback would also lengthen Iran’s 
                                                 
352  See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Verification and Monitoring 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2231, at 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2016/55 (Nov. 9, 2016), https:// 
www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/11/gov2016-55.pdf (Report by Director Gen-
eral Yukia Amano). 
353  Id. at 2. 
354  Id. 
355  Statement by Reza Najafi, Representative of Iran in the IAEA, 
www.ParsTV.com, Nov. 18, 2016. [hereinafter Najafi Statement] (translated 
from Farsi by the author). 
356  Najafi Statement, supra note 355. 
357  Lawrence Norman, West Attempts to Fortify Iran Deal, WALL ST. J., 
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so-called “breakout” time that is the time that would be needed 
to accumulate enough material to produce one nuclear weapon 
were it to quit or violate the deal.358 Nevertheless, it is highly 
improbable that, in the absence of any judicial recourse, the 
United States and other signatory countries of the JCPOA could 
maintain a reliable surveillance of, or self-restraint by, Iran with 
respect to commercial transactions on heavy water substance. 
According to Yokio Amono of the IAEA, Iran has indicated a 
willingness to reduce its heavy water stockpile.359  
7.  U.S. Commercial Transactions with Iran that 
Remain Prohibited 
Contrary to the general impression prevailing in Iran, U.S. 
sanctions against public and private corporations in Iran are 
still largely in place. As far as the U.S. is concerned, there may 
be investment or trade activities in the future between U.S. 
companies and Iranian corporations, but these will be subject to 
the limitations established by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.  
The first of these limitations comes in the form of banking 
restrictions. Sanction control applies to major Iranian banks 
including the Central Bank of Iran and important private banks, 
and joint ventures with foreign banks are restricted in their 
international banking transactions. For over a decade the 
United States has forced foreign banks to refrain from doing 
business with Iran and has cut off Iranian banks’ activities with 
the United States.360 The restrictive list also includes banks that 
                                                 
Nov. 25, 2016, at 1. 
358  Id. 
359  Lawrence Norman, U.N. Presses Iran to Follow Accord, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 18, 2016, at A9. 
360  Harvard Kennedy School, Belffer Center for Science and International 
Affairs, Sanctions Against Iran: a Guide to Targets, Terms and Timetables. 
Addendum to Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal, at 18 (June 2015), http://belfer-
center.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf. The major Iranian banks 
sanctioned by the United States include: Bank Markazi, (the Central Bank of 
Iran) Bank Mellat, Bank Saderat , Bank Melli; the Housing Bank of Iran (Bank 
Maskan); Export Bank (Bank Saderat);Agricultural Bank (Bank Keshavarzi); 
Army Bank (Bank Sepah); and the Bank of Commerce (Bank Tejarat). Iran, 
What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions: An overview of 
O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions against Iran, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 
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were originally established to assist groups with ideological 
purposes but are presently engaged in primarily normal banking 
business. Banks that are on the sanction list include ones 
established as a result of a joint venture between Iranian and 
foreign banks.361 The second limitation consists of oil companies 
including the National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”), Naft Iran 
(the “Iran Oil”), NAFT Iran Inter-trade Company (“Naft-Iran”), 
NICO, Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company, Iran 
Petrochemical Trading Company, and Iran Petrochemical 
Commercial Company. 
The third limitation consists of mining companies including 
Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and 
Renovation Organization. The fourth limitation is steel 
companies and companies engaged in heavy industrial activities 
such as Ahvaz Steel Commercial and Technical Service GMBH-
ASCOTEC, and Metal & Mineral Trade. The fifth limitation is 
the service companies, including Iran Insurance Company 
(“Bimeh Iran”). Finally, the sixth limitation consists of the 
Iranian companies with branches abroad including Iranian Oil 
Company (UK).362  
E.  U.S. Sanctions Against Iran—A Misguided Policy 
After the U.S. rapprochement with Iran concerning 
Iran’s adherence to the nuclear-based weapons restrictions, 
continuation of strictly commercial sanctions against Iran is 
                                                 
(Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pro-
grams/Documents/iran.pdf(cataloguing “persons determined to be the Govern-
ment of Iran” and clarifying financial activities related to Iran that are prohib-
ited by the Department of the Treasury). 
361  See, e.g., Tom Arnold & Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Small Banks Help 
Iran Slowly Restore Foreign Financial Ties, REUTERS (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-banks-idUSL8N19637F (reporting on 
German Iranian Trade Bank, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG). Eu-
ropäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG is a joint venture between Iranian and 
German banks. 
362  This is only a sample list naming a few, though significant, companies 
in Iran. For a comprehensive list of Iranian companies sanctioned by the U.S 
Government: See JCPOA-related Designation Removals, JCPOA Designation 
Updates, Foreign Sanctions Evaders Removals, NS-ISA List Removals; 13599 
List Changes, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www .treas-
ury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/updated_names.aspx. 
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confusing and, at times, an exercise in futility. Consider the 
following examples. 
1.  U.S. Shares in Foreign Companies 
There are numerous foreign companies in which U.S. 
persons, real or juridical, own corporate or partnership shares. 
It is unclear whether such foreign corporations will be subject to 
the Treasury Department’s regulatory rules.  
Consider Alibaba Group Holding, Ltd., a China-based 
international telecommunications company. Originally, Yahoo, 
an American computer company, owned an approximately 20% 
share of Alibaba. Under the strict interpretation of the U.S. 
Treasury guidelines, Yahoo was unable to enter into any 
business agreement with an Iranian corporation. Yahoo could, 
however, have achieved the same goal through Alibaba by 
providing the necessary manpower and capital to its corporate 
partner in China and thus, through the Chinese partner, could 
have participated vicariously in business with Iranian 
companies. 
2. Internal Transactions and Opaque Deals among 
Commercial Entities in Iran 
The post-Islamic revolution business atmosphere in Iran, 
personified by the customary process of decision-making at the 
vertical level, has made policy decisions for large companies a 
part of Iran’s governmental strategy. Under such a scheme, 
profits made by Company A, as a result of an international 
commercial agreement, may be shared by Company B. It must 
be added that there are no antitrust laws or per se illegality 
concerning price-fixing or market division in Iran. Thus, an 
accord between a U.S. corporation and a non-sanctioned Iranian 
company may indeed benefit the sanctioned Iranian company as 
well. The following example shows the inter-company 
transactions that could obfuscate the internal transactional deal 
between two companies, defeating the very purpose of the 
sanction applied to a target company. As indicated earlier in 
mid-2016, Iran Air, the largest Iranian air passenger company, 
requested to purchase 80 new commercial planes from Boeing to 
rejuvenate its aging aircraft. According to the Department of the 
Treasury, another Iranian airline company, “Mahan Air,” has 
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been on the sanction list of the Treasury Department’s OFAC for 
a number of years for air lifting terrorist groups or participation 
in terrorist activities. Thus, in addition to the Iranian company, 
on March 24, 2016 the Treasury Department sanctioned those 
companies who were accomplices to Iranian Mahan Air.363 
The proposed Boeing-Iran Air deal has been sharply 
criticized on the grounds that “once the planes are in Iran, there 
would be no way to prevent the regime’s Revolutionary Guards 
[IRGC] from using them for airlifts to support Syria’s President 
Bashar Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah.”364 As a result, a 
transaction which is meant to be strictly commercial, might lead 
into a non-commercial activity, prohibited by the U.S. laws and 
regulations. 
It is frequently said that if Iran violates main conditions of 
the JCPOA, the U.S. will be able to “snapback” sanctions. This 
is not a realistic observation. Snapping back the past sanctions 
could “jeopardize billions of dollars of unpaid contracts to 
American and European companies and banks.”365  
 
3. The U.S. Tax Policy vis-à-vis the Treasury’s Sanctions 
Policy   
The 35% U.S. federal corporate tax is the highest among the 
developed countries of the world. There is a natural incentive on 
the part of the U.S. global companies against repatriation of 
capital and profits to the U.S. One of the implications of the U.S. 
punitive tax policy is for the U.S. companies to sell their 
interests to foreign corporations to do business abroad. For 
example, according to a report by Ernst and Young’s Business 
Roundtable, a 25% U.S. corporate tax rate “would have 
prevented foreign purchases of 1300 U.S. companies.”366  
                                                 
363  See Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Supporters of Iran’s Ballistic 
Missile Program and Terrorism-Designated Mahan Air, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
jl0395.aspx. 
364  See Emanuele Ottolenghi & Mark Dubowitz, The Boeing Sale to Iran 
Runs into Turbulence, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com /arti-
cles/ the-boeing-sale-to-iran-runs-into-turbulence-1468363087. See also notes 
307, 308 and accompanying text. 
365  Id. 
366  James Carter & Ernest Christian, Why Foreign Buyers are snapping 
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Further, the high U.S. tax of large corporations has resulted 
in an increase in the so-called corporate tax inversions, creating 
incentives for U.S. firms to buy foreign companies and transfer 
capital abroad where rates are lower “and the territorial system 
is employed.”367 Some of this money, directly or indirectly, will 
end up in business transactions with emerging countries like 
Iran which is in dire need of expanding its commerce and 
repairing its long neglected infrastructure.  
U.S. corporations, as a partner or shareholder in foreign 
corporations, may be liable pursuant to the punitive sanction 
regulations of the Treasury Department. Liability will depend 
on the degree of the U.S. person’s participation in the foreign 
corporation. If the U.S. person (real or juridical) has a controlling 
share of the foreign corporate entity, then the U.S. partner will 
be subject to the sanction-related restrictions provided by the 
Department of the Treasury. In this situation, the Treasury 
Department’s rules apply not only to U.S. corporations, but also 
to those foreign corporations in which the U.S. person (corporate 
or real) has a controlling interest. Furthermore, the prohibition 
will include any transfer of funds through the U.S. financial 
system or activities that would require special license under the 
U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”). 
F. Transactions with Asian and African Countries 
1. China 
Iran has announced a “new era” of cooperation with China, 
and has signed a number of large contracts with that country. 
One of these contracts includes the construction of two nuclear 
plants in southern Iran. The trading volume between Iran and 
China is expected to rise to $600 billion within the next decade 
(this is over a tenfold increase from the $55 billion trade in 
recent years).368  
Iran also has an ambitious plan to expand its railroad. The 
expansion would include building the “silk rail” which is aimed 
at reaching China by the railroad connection. Iran’s grandiose 
                                                 
up U.S. Companies, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
why-foreign-buyers-are-snapping-up-u-s-companies-1463345130. 
367  Id. 
368  See Coface 2016 Iran Report, supra note 167. 
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plan would cost the Islamic Republic $28 billion. Further, Iran 
is planning “to spend $20 billion on roads and $50 billion on 
upgrading the country’s Shah-era air fleet and $7 billion on 
airports.”369  
Ambitiously, China has reportedly agreed to contribute to 
the construction of an internal rail from the capital city of 
Tehran to the city of Mashhad – a $2 million loan.370 Mashhad 
is the city in which the eighth Shia Imam is buried, and many 
devout Iranians go there for pilgrimage. Nevertheless, the 
nature of the relationship between China and Iran is primarily 
business. 
2. Japan 
Iran has proposed to purchase a total of 25 planes, 
Mitsubishi Regional Jets, from Mitsubishi Company. The value 
of this contract is estimated to be $500 million. Most of the 
planes are to be provided to Iran Aseman Airlines. Mitsubishi 
aircraft is also planning to provide Iran with its regional 
passenger jets that are currently under development. Iran Air 
may also purchase 80-70 seat Mitsubishi Regional Jets for 
domestic routes.371  
3. South Africa 
South Africa was the first African country with a plan to 
embark upon the post-JCPOA commercial agreements with 
Iran. Iran and South Africa both seek relative commercial 
freedom in doing business with African and Asian countries. 
Thus, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma and President 
Rohani entered into a trade agreement worth $8 billion to be 
carried out by 2020.372  
                                                 
369  Joining the Dots: Some Treats Ahead for Railway Enthusiasts, THE 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21695765-some-treats-ahead-railway-enthusiasts-iranu2019s-new-con-
tinent-spanning. 
370  Joining the Dots, supra note 369. 
371  Iran’s Aseman Airline to get Mitsubishi Planes, PAYVAND NEWS (July 
21, 2016), http://www.payvand.com/news/16/jul/1118.html. 
372  This is a substantial increase in trade between two countries which 
stood at about $350 million in 2015. There were reportedly 180 members of the 
delegations of South Africa accompanying President Zuma. South Africa’s 
Trade with Iran to Rise to $8B: President Zuma, PAYVAND NEWS (Apr. 24, 
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G. Availability of Credit for Investment and Commercial 
Transactions with Iran, an Environment of Relative 
Credibility 
Iran’s recourse to the international credit system is a sine 
qua non condition for the implementation of its international 
commercial and investment agreements with Western countries. 
In particular, Iran’s access to SWIFT was vital to enable that 
country’s banks and other financial institutions to establish a 
credible financial communication with the Western financial 
world. Further, the cooperation of a few companies to open credit 
with non-member Iranian banks is also significant. 
Nevertheless, several factors precipitated the provision of direct 
credit to Iran including: (1) the substantial need of Iran to repair 
and expand its infrastructure; (2) Iran’s requirements to renew 
its commercial activities in the international world market; (3) 
Iran’s political stability represented by a relatively moderate 
government; (4) Iran’s relatively protective statutory laws 
supporting trade and eventually investment; and (5) willingness 
of the European companies to enter a market that until now has 
been practically closed to them (except through extra-
constitutional commercial practices). 
However, the availability of SWIFT and Coface banking 
instruments would only facilitate financial transactions among 
the banks and financial institutions involved in doing business 
between foreign companies and Iran. Such facilities would not 
per se create credit. As a result, some governments in Europe 
initiated providing credit directly to Iran. Availability of such 
credit will enable the Islamic Republic, or its state corporations, 
to purchase directly from a given source. 
Thus, in early April 2016, the Cassa Depsiti e Prestiti, 
Italy’s state financing agency, has agreed to issue €4 billion in 
credit lines to Iranian public entities in order to enable the 
Iranian partners to fund certain infrastructure projects such as 
highways and railways. However, this credit is not directly and 
exclusively available to Iran. The Italian corporations, in 
partnership with Iran, will be involved in the project’s 
development and receive a certain portion of such credit from 
the creditor. There will also be an additional 800 million pounds 
                                                 
2016), http://www.payvand.com/news/16/apr/1119.html. 
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in funding which will be allocated among the Italian companies 
doing business in Iran.373 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is one of the 
largest European state financing agencies and controls more 
than 350 billion pounds of assets.374  The significance of 
providing credit to Iran cannot be underestimated. When 
sanctions were the governing policy of Western countries, a 
substantial portion of Iran’s foreign commercial transactions 
were in cash. There were also bartered transactions between 
Iran and countries such as China, Pakistan and a few others. It 
is for the first time that Iran, through the provision of financial 
allowance by the Italian Sace, is able to have access to an 
advance credit. As an Iranian banker commented on the Italian 
deal, this could be the most substantial development in 
resuming trade between Iran and Europe after the JCPOA.375  
It is highly likely that, given the competitive nature of 
international commercial banking in Western Europe, Italy’s 
initiative in offering credit directly to Iran could be emulated by 
other banks in Europe. Iran has a long history of doing business 
with Germany, Belgium and Austria. Therefore, it is conceivable 
that Belgium’s KBC Group, NV, Germany’s DZ Bank, and 
Austria’s Erste Group Bank AG, may soon join Iran’s small 
group of creditors. Until the international financing 
organizations’ complete resumption of the credit system, 
relatively small regional banks located in Italy, the Netherlands 
and Germany have reopened letters of credit with non-
designated Iranian banks. The reopening of export credit 
agencies’ coverage for Iran will assist facilitating the necessary 
credits in which the corresponding banks in Iran will be 
involved. Particularly, for products which Iran needs immediate 
replacement, the selling companies have agreed to cooperate 
with Iran until the credit channels become functional. For 
example, in regard to the purchase of a large number of new 
airplanes to renew its fleet, Airbus has agreed to accept the 
Iranian credit.376  
                                                 
373  Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Italy Extends $5 Billion Credit Line and Export 
Guarantees to Iran, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
aac121ae-00c2-11e6-99cb-83242733f755. 
374  Id. 
375  Najmeh Bozorgmehr, supra note 373. 
376  See Ostrower & Wall, supra note 300 (reporting that enforcement of a 
substantial number of these airplanes would be “the biggest signal yet that the 
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The line of credit opened by a few European banks does not 
mean the end of credit restrictions to Iran. As noted earlier, 
certain international credit evaluation organizations, such as 
the FATF, as well as the U.S. laws and the President’s executive 
orders concerning the threat of terrorism from Iran are still valid 
laws of the land. The immediate past history shows that the 
violation of the international rules or non-adherence to banking 
conventions, or terrorism laws, might result in heavy penalties 
for the recalcitrant banks. In 2014, BNP Paribas, a French bank, 
had to pay a fine of $8.97 billion for transmitting $30 billion 
dollars in transactions mainly to Iran (and a few other countries) 
in violation of the laws governing sanctions.377 Further, the 
prohibitive statutory provisions in France or Italy, as to the 
injunction of doing business with Iran, do not exist or operate 
the way they do in the U.S. French or Italian banks could be 
more flexible in their banking transactions with Iran. There is 
still the nonexistence of export guarantees that threaten the 
expansion of trade with Iran. The German government has 
expressed its concern that “[b]ecause of high penalties German 
banks had to pay in the past due to sanction violations, all 
participants are very reluctant. . . . Without any state export 
guarantees for deals with Iran, nothing will happen on our 
side.”378 
                                                 
U.S. and Iran are moving toward normalized trade relations.”). One of the ma-
jor reasons for the air travel corporations to enter into an agreement of com-
mercially significant size is in fact the deteriorating financial position of the 
major air companies. For example, in its negotiations with Iran to sell report-
edly $25 billion worth of aircraft and various related facilities, it was agreed 
that Iran would be paying substantially below the catalog price given the scale 
of the order. According to one report, “[f]or Airbus, the sale of [the aircraft] is 
a significant milestone in securing the future of a program whose survival was 
called into question just 12 months ago by the group’s own finance director. 
The world’s largest passenger jet has not won in new customer in almost 3 
years. . .. [In fact] investors have questioned whether Airbus can recover more 
than €10 billion spent on development although it has pledged to break even 
on current running costs.” Peggy Hollinger & Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran Air to 
Buy 118 Airbus Jets, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content 
/ac4189d8-c5da-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45. 
377  Tiffany Kary, Del Quentin Wilber, & Patricia Hurtado, BNP to Pay 
Almost $9 Billion to End U.S. Sanctions Probe, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2014, 3:21 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-01/bnp-to-pay-almost-
9-billion-to-end-u-s-sanctions-probe. 
378  Gernot Heller, Balazs Koranyi & Andrew Heavens, German Business 
Lobby Says Obstacles Remain to Iran Deals, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016), 
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The extent of credibility of doing business with Iran using 
the banking facilities is relative. Under the JCPOA, the 
European banks, which have been holding $55 billion in 
repatriated wealth, could allow Iran to have access to such 
restricted funds.379 The only exception to that are banks and 
companies that are blacklisted by the U.S. However, the 
European banks were cautious in letting Iran have access to 
such funds.380 Current U.S. policy bars foreign banks from 
clearing dollar-based commercial transactions with Iran 
through U.S. banks.381 Despite President Obama’s side deals 
with Iran concerning lifting sanctions from two Iranian banks, 
Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International, such restrictions 
are likely to continue during the administration of President 
Trump.382  
                                                 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-trade-germany-idUKKCN0XP22D (quot-
ing a statement by Anton Boemer, head of the Federation of German Whole-
sale, Foreign Trade and Services). 
379  See Dave Clark, US says European banks should feel free to deal with 
Iran, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 23, 2016, 3:28 AM) (reporting that as of the end of 
April 2016, Iran had received only $3 billion of the estimated $50 to 55 billion); 
see also AFP, US insists European banks can deal with Iran, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 
22, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3554045/US-
buy-32-tonnes-heavy-water-Iran.html. 
380  See Josh Lederman, U.S. says Iran open for business, but Europe’s 
banks disagree, AP (May 12, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/73fd6c11 
e9b6474896cf59a4fc3ba108/us-says-banks-wont-be-punished-lawful-business-
iran; see also Remarks Before Meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad 
Zarif, U.S. DEP’T STATE (April 22, 2016), https://www.state.gov/secretary /re-
marks/2016/04/256536.htm [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170118160649/https://www.state.gov/secretary/re-
marks/2016/04/256536.htm] (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (statement of Secretary 
of State John Kerry: “the United States is not standing in the way and will not 
stand in the way of business that is permitted with Iran since the JCPOA took 
effect . . . and there are now opportunities for foreign banks to do business with 
Iran. Unfortunately, there seems to be some confusion among some foreign 
banks.”). As of January 24, 2017, the page containing Secretary Kerry’s state-
ment has been removed from the Department of State website. It can be ac-
cessed via the Internet Archive web address listed above, and is also on file 
with the author. 
381  See Lesley Wroughton, UPDATE 2-U.S. not against foreign banks 
dealing with Iran -Kerry, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/ ar-
ticle/iran-nuclear-kerry-idUSL2N17P1U6. 
382  See Jay Solomon & Carol E. Lee, U.S. Signed Secret Document to Lift 
U.N. Sanctions on Iranian Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 29, 2016), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signed-secret-document-to-lift-u-n-sanctions-on-ira-
nian-banks-1475193723 (reporting on secret bank documents signed by the 
U.S. during the Obama Administration). During his term, President Obama 
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VI. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms between Iran 
and Foreign Commercial Companies 
An important question concerning the post-JCPOA 
international trade agreements, is what kind of forum would be 
acceptable for international corporations and Iran in case of any 
disagreements between the parties? Under the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic, granting concessions to foreign persons on 
commercial, industrial, agricultural, and mineral developments 
is absolutely forbidden.383 However, the Iranian Constitution 
refers to the duty of the President or his legal representative “to 
sign . . . contracts and agreements between the government of 
Iran and any other governments . . . after such contracts have 
been approved by the Islamic Assembly.”384 
Iran has a long history of participating in bilateral treaties 
and commercial or non-commercial agreements. In over 170 
years, the U.S. Courts have generally applied a strong 
presumption with respect to the validity of the treaties. On the 
other hand, U.S. precedent indicates an unquestionably high 
regard and consideration of U.S. treaty obligations. Even when 
there is an apparent inconsistency between the treaty 
obligations of the United States and the act of Congress, the 
courts have tried to construe the statute to minimize 
inconsistencies with the treaty provisions. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has followed this tradition since 1801 under the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, where a U.S. 
statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international 
law or with an international agreement of the United States.385  
On August 15, 1955, the United States and Iran entered into 
the “Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
between the United States of America and Iran.” The purpose of 
this treaty was:  
                                                 
also extended Executive Order 12170 to curb transactions with the Iranian 
banks. See Press TV, President Obama extends national emergency against 
Iran (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/11/04/492062/ US-
Obama-Iran-national-emergency-. 
383  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHIRI ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 81. 
384  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHIRI ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 125. 
385  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987). 
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[T]o enter and remain in the territories of the other High 
Contracting Party for the purpose of carrying on trade between 
their own country and the territories of such other High 
Contracting Party and engaging in related commercial 
activities . . . [Article 2.] Property of nationals . . . of either 
High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant 
protection and security within the territories of the other High 
Contracting Party. [Article 4.] Each High Contracting Party, 
shall accord to the nationals, companies, and commerce of the 
other High Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment, as 
compared with that accorded to the nationals, companies, and 
commerce of any third country. . . [Article 11.]386 
The U.S.–Iran Treaty of Amity is an agreement of 
commercial nature and was signed for the purpose of developing 
commerce and protecting the commercial safety and interest of 
the two governments. The Treaty deals with each country’s 
interest in protecting that country’s products and preventing 
deceptive or unfair trade practices.387 The Treaty of Amity 
specifically indicates that, “[b]etween the territories of the two 
High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce 
and navigation.”388 Despite the Islamic Revolution of 1979, The 
Treaty of Amity has never been abrogated by either signatory 
government. Under international law, both Iran and the U.S. 
are subject to their treaty obligations. 
Iran has strongly endorsed and has effectively employed the 
Treaty of Amity. Iran’s policy reaction to Bank Markazi is a case 
in point. In Bank Markazi, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
Central Bank of Iran’s claims that it had equitable title to—or 
beneficial interest in—assets deposited with Citibank in New 
York that totaled over $1.75 billion.389 Shortly thereafter, Iran 
instituted a claim against the United States before the ICJ.390 It 
                                                 
386  Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the 
United States of America and Iran, U.S.-Iran, (Aug. 15, 1955), 
http://www.parstimes.com/law/iran_us_treaty.html [hereinafter Treaty of Am-
ity]. 
387  Treaty of Amity, supra note 386, at art. 8. 
388  Id. at art. 10. 
389  See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320-22. 
390  See Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Iran institutes proceedings 
against the United States with regard to a dispute concerning alleged viola-
tions of the 1955 Treaty of Amity (June 15, 2016), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/164/19032.pdf. 
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is likely that in a commercial dispute between Iran and U.S. 
corporations, (where the U.S. party is a publicly owned entity), 
and in the absence of any other arrangement, that court could 
apply the Treaty of Amity as a governing text for any agreement 
between the parties. 
Traditionally, Iran has resolved its contractual disputes 
with foreign corporations through arbitration mechanisms. 
Should a dispute arise between Iran and a foreign company, the 
following dispute resolution forums may be applied. First, a 
dispute resolution mechanism and governing law may be 
provided in the contractual agreement between the parties. 
Second, a choice of forum could be found in the Iranian Law of 
International Commercial Arbitration (“LICA”), which was 
passed in 1997 and has been effective and enforced.391 LICA is 
based on the UNCITRAL model law.392 LICA adopts the use of 
international arbitration if the contractual party to the 
arbitration agreement is of non-Iranian nationality.393  
With respect to post-sanctions commercial agreements 
between Iran and foreign companies, the fundamental question 
is what the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism employed 
by Iran and its commercial partners would be: adjudication, 
mitigation, or arbitration? Post-sanction agreements between 
Iran and foreign companies will most likely follow arbitration 
mechanisms traditionally employed by Iran in foreign 
contractual agreements. Thus, in referring to possible blockages 
to the delivery of aircraft purchased by Iran from Airbus or 
Boeing, Iranian officials stated emphatically that “[b]oth sides 
are committed, and there are scenarios in the contracts for 
violation of commitments or in case of force majeure to deal with 
those cases.”394 Here, Iran could defer to the international Hague 
Arbitration Tribunal, which could serve as a forum for 
alternative dispute resolution; Iran has a generally reliable 
record of adhering to and enforcing the judgments of 
                                                 
391  See Hamid G. Gharavi, The 1997 Iranian Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL, Model Law a’ l’Iranienne, 15 ARB. INT’L 
85 (1999). 
392  Id. at 85. 
393  See generally Gharavi, supra note 391. 
394  Feliz Solomon, Iran Says It Will Recover ‘Prepayments With Interest’ 
If Trump Scuppers the $16.6 Billion Boeing Deal, FORTUNE (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/12/19/iran-boeing-airbus-trump-sanctions/. 
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international tribunals. The Hague Arbitration Tribunal’s 
verdict, issued almost a year prior to the implementation of the 
JCPOA, is a case in point.395 The Iran-Turkey contract was 
signed in 1996 between BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation 
(“BOTAŞ”), the Turkish national gas company, and the National 
Iranian Gas Company (“NIGC”).396 Turkey brought an action 
before the Hague Arbitration Tribunal against Iran for non-
performance. Under the agreement between BOTAŞ and the 
NIGC, the NIGC would supply Turkey with ten billion cubic 
meters of gas annually over a 25 year period.397 Turkey’s petition 
related to the NIGC’s alleged non-performance with respect to 
the delivery of Iranian natural gas to BOTAŞ.398 In mid-April of 
2016, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal entered a judgment of $1 
billion dollars against Iran due to the NIGC’s non-
performance.399 According to NIGC officials, Iran will pay $1 
billion to Turkey in compliance with the tribunal’s award. 
For the aforementioned reasons, any post-sanctions 
contractual agreements between Iran and foreign parties will 
most likely specify that disputes will be resolved by arbitration. 
Considering that Iran has displayed a willingness to comply 
with such arbitration awards, international arbitration provides 
a reliable means for resolving any dispute that may arise. 
 
                                                 
395  Verdict on Iran-Turkey Gas Dispute Announced, FIN. TRIB. (Feb. 3, 
2016), https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/35610/verdict-on-iran-turk 
ey-gas-dispute-announced. 
396  Id. 
397  Id. 
398  Id. 
399  See Verdict on Iran-Turkey Gas Dispute Announced, supra note 395; 
see also Anthony McAuley, Dispute between Sharjah’s Crescent Petroleum and 
Iran moves to damages phase, THE NATIONAL (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.the-
national.ae/business/energy/dispute-between-sharjahs-crescent-petroleum-
and-iran-moves-to-damages-phase (reporting that Iran has also referred its 
dispute with Crescent Petroleum of Sharjah to The Hague Arbitration Tribu-
nal, and that the dispute was widely watched as Iran sought to re-establish its 
relationship with international oil companies; also reporting that Iran’s dis-
pute with Crescent involved a contractual agreement, dated 2001, in which the 
National Iranian Oil Company was obligated to supply 600 million cubic feet a 
day of natural gas from the southern field of Salman to Sharjah). 
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VII.  Sanctions and the Extra-Constitutional System 
Governing Conduct of Transnational Business in 
Iran 
In an international transaction, the foreign investor will 
normally bear the economic risks inherent in commercial trade, 
including possible changes in market conditions such as entry of 
a competitor in the market, volatilities in prices, exchange rates 
or changing financial circumstances. In certain transactions, 
provisions are made for adaptation or renegotiation in case of a 
significant change in the economic and financial context of the 
project. The investor may require the host government to 
provide protection on a number of investment related issues 
including the tax regime, the applicable law, the customs 
regulations for products needed for manufacturing, and the 
dispute resolution mechanism. While any investment, domestic 
or international, entails certain political and commercial risks, 
the risk of international investment by the European and 
American companies in Iran is of a different nature.  
In some cases the exporters of goods and services to a 
familiar country may be willing to ship goods under “open 
account” thereby supplying credit to such buyer until the 
transaction is completed. In this case, the foreign supplier of the 
goods relies on the familiar buyer’s creditworthiness. As an 
authority has indicated, “this simplifies the transaction 
considerably and may reduce the cost of the third-party 
commissions or interest.”400 However, the U.S. or European 
investors or sellers may not be willing to rely on the 
creditworthiness of the buyer or the host government. There is 
a credit insurance mechanism available for such sellers or 
investors that provides an insurance policy against non-
payment by the buyer for the goods and services, or lost 
investment abroad due to political upheavals. In the U.S., the 
mechanism of Foreign Credit Insurance Association (“FCIA”) is 
set up to, with the assistance of the Exim Bank, furnish a 
political insurance credit to U.S companies.401  
                                                 
400  JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT (AMERICAN CASEBOOK 
SERIES) 59 (3d ed. 1977). 
401  The FCIA, established in 1961, protects exporters against political and 
commercial risks which may result in default by the foreign partner of the 
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The political risks of international investment, particularly 
in the Middle East, are generally without parallel in a domestic 
environment. In the U.S. and Western Europe, the nature of the 
risk is primarily related to the prolific and at times anti-business 
regulatory atmosphere. However, there are familiar laws and 
regulatory systems, which the trader and investor would have to 
conduct business within. Above all, there is a jurisprudential 
system that makes the outcome of the business-related conflicts 
fairly predictable. This is not the case with respect to doing 
business with Iran. The following briefly indicates a sample of 
organizations that function as banks and provide benefits 
including investment services. 
A. Unlicensed Financial Institutions 
The unlicensed financial institutions (“UFI”) are business 
establishments that function as de facto banks. These financial 
outfits routinely lend money to individuals or, at times, juridical 
persons such as partnerships or small corporations. The rate of 
interest by these individuals or financial outfits is substantially 
higher than interest rates charged by official banks. Thus, a 
major impact of the extra-constitutional banking transactions by 
these business entities is contributing to the rate of inflation in 
Iran. The usurious interest rates controlled by the UFI, have 
decreased the value of Iranian money and greatly contributed to 
the inflationary economy. According to the IMF’s Country 
Report on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Monetary Policy: 
[T]he complex difficulties experienced in the financial system 
[of Iran], reflected by high nonperforming loans and 
competition from unlicensed financial institutions (UFIs), have 
brought real interest rates to very high levels that threaten 
macroeconomic stability.402  
Another problem with the UFI is their impact upon the 
function of the traditional banks. Based on the report by the 
IMF, in order to control the hyper-inflation in the country, the 
Central Bank of Iran allowed the private banks to engage in 
                                                 
United States Company. 
402  IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 14. This report was prepared 
by a staff team of the IMF for the executive board’s consideration on December 
7, 2015 following discussions with the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
on economic developments and policies. 
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inter-bank borrowing. The banks would follow the rules aimed 
at better aligning market rates with inflation developments, 
capping deposit interest rates at 7-22% for maturities up to one 
year. According to the IMF Country Report on Iran, “[e]nforcing 
this agreement has been difficult due to weak bank balance 
sheets and competition from unlicensed financial 
institutions.”403 
B. Corporate Entities Acting to Achieve Political Goals 
One of the major issues facing Iran is allotting financial 
resources on projects with little, if any, justification for their 
economic values. At times, the commercial banks—or even the 
Central Bank in Iran—support, or even finance, projects with 
very little economic grounds for such a decision. One project 
specifically indicated by the IMF as an example of the 
government arrears was a huge housing project. According to 
the IMF, this project involved issuance of about 108 trillion Riyal 
($620 million) that is, about 0.5% of the GDP of Iran. The project, 
“Mehr Housing Scheme,” involved construction of 120,000 
housing units.404 The IMF report strongly recommended that the 
government of Iran issue securities at marketable terms to 
repay or restructure these arrears.405 The site of this housing 
project was in the southeastern province of Sistan – Baluchistan, 
near the Pakistani state of Baluchistan – one of the poorest 
provinces in Iran. Clearly, this project was initiated because of 
the political considerations and not its economic value.  
C. Institutional Inefficiencies and Patrimonial Corruption 
                                                 
403  IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 6 (also stating that “Six UFIs 
reportedly represent 15% of deposits.”). 
404  See Mohammad Affianian, Mehr Housing Project Adds 120,000 New 
Units, FIN. TRIBUNE: FIRST IRANIAN ENGLISH ECON. DAILY (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and markets/23213/ 
mehr-housing-project-adds-120000-new-units [hereinafter Mehr Housing Pro-
ject] (reporting that with the addition of these units, the Mehr conglomerate 
announced that “with the addition of 120,000 housing units, Mehr Housing 
Scheme is poised to become a 1.5 million strong housing- project.” Reporting 
also that an additional 240,000 units were built but not yet connected to water 
and electricity). 
405  IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 152, at 18. 
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There are two fundamentally different sets of institutional 
entities in Iran; the constitutional powers and the extra-
constitutional entities. The extra-constitutional institutions 
have a multitude of functions; religious, political and the 
informal sector of the economy. These institutions have no 
official relationship with the executive, judicial or legislative 
branch of the government. That is, they do not function as a 
regular bureaucracy in the governmental apparatus. They do 
however, have a big impact on foreign trade.  
For a foreign investor, political risk includes interference by 
the host government with the operation of business. Such 
interference has significant implications with respect to the 
proper role of government in managing and regulating business 
affairs.406 Political risks have been measured by the indicators 
familiar in the Western investment business environment. In 
doing business abroad, the indicators at times considered by the 
Western companies may be:  
Are there chances of nationalization? What is the imposition of 
exchange controls? Of the host state government’s negligence 
to provide the foreign investor with adequate political security 
and financial protection against insurgent attacks? What 
would be the chances of failure of the host government to treat 
the investor fairly and equitably? How reliable is the state in 
terms of its political stability?407  
These investment parameters pose valid questions for 
foreign investors concerning the reliability of host governments. 
Such standards do not, however, apply to investment milieu of 
Iran. In its totality, the government of Iran has ministries, 
governmental organizations, and state agencies with a rather 
sophisticated bureaucratic system of administration with a 
vertical form of managerial organizations. Further, politically, 
Iran is the most stable country in the Middle East. It has also 
                                                 
406  Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Recommendation, 10 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 67, 77 (1979). The author has provided numerous political 
risk citations and articles from the 1960s and 1970s. See also Symposium: In-
vestment in Emerging Markets: The Challenges of Infrastructure Development: 
Article: Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 477, 481 (“existing data, as well as the inherently multi-causal com-
plexities of modern society, will often impede the calculation [of political risk] 
with any real accuracy of a probability that political event x will happen and if 
it happens that it will impose cost y on a certain project with probability z.”). 
407  Yackee, supra note 406, at 487. 
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the highest educated and professional class of individuals, 
particularly in the urban environment. These are all positive 
factors for international investment and commercial 
transactions in Iran. 
Iran’s predicament, for a Western company, lies elsewhere. 
While Iran has embraced modernity in its governmental 
bureaucracy, there are also powerful extra-constitutional 
institutions that live and operate side by side with the 
traditional governmental bureaucracies. Such duopolistic 
system of governance has created serious issues for the decision-
making and economic development of the country. In major 
structural economic decisions such as rules of privatization, 
distribution of capital, and major contractual state-tenders, the 
extra-constitutional institutions exert their influence. 
The most powerful and formidable extra-constitutional 
institution in Iran is the IRGC.408 The IRGC’s constitutional 
raison d’être is Article 150 of the Islamic Constitution, which 
states that the “Sepahe Engelab” was intended “to pursue and 
continue its role in safeguarding the Revolution.” This is, of 
course, an ideological and not an administrative or commercial 
mission. Nevertheless, the IRGC’s activities in the economic 
sphere have been expansive. The IRGC is probably the most 
powerful economic entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the 
former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, famously told, 
“it is increasingly likely that if you are doing business with Iran, 
you are doing business with the IRGC.”409 It has reportedly ties 
to over 100 companies with its annual revenue exceeding $12 
billion in business and construction. The IRGC also has 
associations with a number of banks in Iran. These banks are 
either directly owned by, or affiliated with, the IRGC.410 
                                                 
408  See Mathew Douglas Robin, Explaining the Economic Control of Iran 
by the IRGC, UNIV. OF CENT. FL STARS (2011), http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/ 
CFH0004119/Robin_Matthew_D_20135_BA.pdf. For the history of the IRGC, 
see Alireza Nader, The Iran Primer, The Revolutionary Guards, UNITED STATES 
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, Aug. 2015. 
409  Amir Teheri, Who Are Iran’s Revolutionary Guards?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
15, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119509278241693687. 
410  See Designated IRGC and Designated Iran Linked Financial Institu-
tions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center /sanc-
tions/Programs/Documents/irgc_ifsr.pdf (current as of Sept. 24, 2012). These 
banks include: Persia International Bank PLC, Post Bank of Iran, Arian Bank, 
Bank of Industry and Mine of Iran (commonly known as Bank Sanat va 
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Additionally, the IRGC has a bank under its own name, “Bank 
Sepah.”411  
In its study of the Iranian economy, the IMF concluded that 
bolstering the Iranian economy “will help better detection of 
illegal proceeds including those related to tax evasion and 
corruption.”412 The IMF has considered such shortcomings in 
Iran’s economy to be rooted in the unofficial sector of Iran’s 
economy and as “the structural weakness on the policy 
framework, taxation, and bank balance sheets.”413 For a Western 
company, commercial association with extra-constitutional 
entities or quasi-governmental organizations in Iran, would 
mean ignoring the standards for conduct of business as set by 
Western countries’ rules of doing business abroad such as the 
rules set by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and by the IMF, 
Exim Bank, the OECD, and Transparency International.414  
Considering the highly complicated political structure of 
Iran, compounded with the juxtaposition of extra-constitutional 
forces in that country, it is safe to say that the political risks of 
investment in and trade with Iran are not comparable with the 
domestic environment in the U.S. or Western Europe. For 
domestic investments in the U.S., there is usually a “regulatory 
risk.” In such a risk environment, the government, through 
fiscal and commercial policies unfavorable to conducting 
business, may change the rules of the game in a way that will 
                                                 
Maadan), Bank eh-Ansar, associated with “Ansar Institute,” an ideological or-
ganization whose main banking activity is to provide interest free loans, the 
Export Development Bank of Iran (Bank Tose-eh Saderat Iran), Europaesch-
Iranische Handel Bank (German Iranian Bank), and Future Bank B.S.C. 
411  Id. Bank Sepah started its operations on May 4, 1925, 54 years prior 
to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Currently, it is one of the most influential 
financial institutions in Iran and the Middle East. Bank Sepah has nearly 1800 
domestic branches and a few branches in Europe. See The Profile of the First 
Iranian Bank, BANK SEPAH, http://www.banksepah.ir/English/default-
1077.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
412  IMF 2015 Iran Report, supra note 151, at 18. 
413  Id. 
414  For judicial framework of Iran see, MAJID MOHAMMADI, JUDICIAL 
REFORM AND REORGANIZATION IN 20TH CENTURY IRAN chs. 5-6 (Nancy A. Naples 
ed., 2008). For quasi-governmental organizations in Iran, see STEVEN O’HERN, 
IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 115-133 (2012); GOLKAR, supra note 27, at 1–
107. For the role and the function of the Revolutionary Guards and the 
strength and weaknesses of the U.S. policy in Iran, see ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, 
TAKING ON IRAN: STRENGTH, DIPLOMACY, AND THE IRANIAN THREAT chs. 1-4 
(2013). 
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adversely affect the economics and the profitability of the 
investment. Nevertheless, in domestic investments, there are 
tested jurisprudence, verifiable statutory regime, and familiar 
regulatory tools that would permit the investing company to 
make a calculated and reasoned judgment as to the regulatory 
risks prior to making an investment commitment. 
D.  The Impact of Commercial Transactions on Extra-
Constitutional Institutions in Iran   
As important as the commercial agreements concluded 
between Iran and a number of Western companies may be, their 
real significance should be seen from a different perspective—
integration of Iran’s financial activities, in its traditional sense, 
into the global community. The commercial transactions will 
make possible integration of Iran’s vision, in law and policy, with 
those of the world community perspective. This point needs a 
brief explanation. 
Throughout the post-Islamic Revolution, two types of 
institutional establishments have functioned in Iran side by 
side. The first type is the traditional official bureaucratic 
establishment. These are government ministries, state-owned 
banks and publicly owned commercial entities. Such official 
establishments have initiated fairly developed laws, regulatory 
rules, policies, operational frameworks and bureaucratic 
procedures and programs. The second type, as was mentioned 
earlier, is forces of extra-constitutional power, ideological 
establishments, and, at times, seemingly invisible policies and 
operations that hold significant political and financial command 
and domination in the country. Extra-constitutional is best 
defined as those authorities and forces that are not specified in 
the Iranian constitution or, if there is a reference to such powers, 
their present authority and domain inordinately exceed the 
original constitutional mandate. Of the multiple extra-
constitutional or non-governmental entities, only one such 
organization has been mentioned in the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic. That is, under Article 150 of the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “[t]he Islamic Revolutionary 
Corps that was formed in the first days of the victory of this 
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Revolution shall remain active in order to continue its role as the 
guardian of the Revolution and of the fruits of its victory. . .”415  
There were no subsequent laws that would specify in detail 
or give further operational authority to the IRGC. Historically, 
the raison d’être of establishing the IRGC was political and 
originally created to assist the police in apprehending counter-
revolutionary elements. The IRGC was also assigned to train its 
members in moral, and ideological and politico-military 
issues.416 Pragmatically, the IRGC has three distinct 
institutional features: military, commercial and ideological. 
According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, one of the 
functions of the Supreme Leader is to have “supreme command 
of the armed forces.”417 Institutionally speaking, the Iranian 
military has a dual feature: classic military and ideological. The 
IRGC’s military outfit is far more expansive than the regular 
military.418  
The IRGC’s commercial activities started shortly after the 
Iran–Iraq War of September 1980 (about a year and half after 
the Islamic Revolution) when the late Rafsanjani, then the 
President of Iran and a member of the clerical group, encouraged 
the IRGC to bolster its budget by taking control of confiscated 
factories. By doing so, the IRGC would be economically 
independent. Thus, the IRGC became intensely active in the 
industrial mining, transportation, agriculture, road 
construction, and import and export sectors. The IR GC’s 
financial institutions, and affiliated organizations, are 
regulated, presided and operated independently. The IRGC’s 
funds are administered and managed separate from the public 
funds. The IRGC often undertakes its investment and 
                                                 
415  FLANZ, ET AL, CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 213, at 65. 
416  The IRGC’s domestic ascendancy over other security institutions was 
not preordained. In the chaotic aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC 
was one of the several security instruments used by the leaders of the new 
state against existential threats and, at times, wildly exaggerated challenges, 
posed by an array of armed groups. See WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144. 
417  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980] art. 110. 
418  Organizationally, the Iran military is divided into two separate enti-
ties: the regular army “Artesh” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, 
IRGC. The classic military also has the Air Force known as the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran Air Force and the Navy called Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRN). 
The IRGC also has a Navy known as Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy 
(IRGCN). 
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commercial activities under the rubric of assisting the 
economically oppressed groups and is exempt from any form of 
tax payment. In 1990, the IRGC established a juridical entity 
called the Khatam-el-Anbia Establishment.419 This 
conglomerate has over 800 registered corporations, each in 
charge of certain specialized commercial, production, and 
investment projects, and is customarily awarded in various 
fields including construction of highways, heavy-duty 
structures, and offshore construction. 
There were a myriad of reasons for bestowing such an 
enormous economic power upon the Revolutionary Guards.  
First, these organizations are not part of the traditional 
governmental apparatus, and, as such, need not report to the 
appropriate office of the president of Iran or a government 
ministry. Under ordinary circumstances, for the government of 
Iran to grant a contract to a private company, such a company 
would follow standard bidding procedures. Therefore, the 
company in question should factor in the cost of tax or payment 
of customs to the government. Those participants of the bids that 
have to make such payments are in a disadvantageous position 
as compared with companies that do not have to make such 
payments. This is a clear example of the patrimonial corruption 
where the governmental structure or the regulatory provisions 
provide for a selective group, an inherent market power or 
procurement system. Professor Susan Rose Ackerman, an 
authority in governmental corruption indicates, “a common 
abuse [in a bidding procedure] involves procurement orders 
written so that only one firm can qualify.”420 Second, of about 
25,000 engineers and employees of the Khatam el-Anbia 
organization, 10% are reportedly employees of the IRGC.421 
Khatam el-Anbia functions as the engineering arm of the IRGC 
and engages in several engineering activities, including 
manufacturing of pipelines, road and dam construction, mining 
operations, telecommunications, and agriculture. About one 
third of the imported goods to Iran have reportedly been 
                                                 
419  Literally meaning the Last Prophet, a reference to the Prophet Mo-
hammed. 
420  SUSAN ROSE ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 64 (1999). 
421  WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144, at 60. 
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“delivered through the black market, underground economy, and 
illegal jetties.”422   
The extra-constitutional organizations of Iran have been 
active in many parts of the world with the goal of acquiring 
wealth in order to finance their vast bureaucratic organizations. 
In Iran, the IRGC has been active in using foreign banks. For 
example, the Quds Force, an elite group that supports pro-
Iranian militant groups in the Middle East, has used Chinese 
banks in transferring funds in that region. According to a 
Reuters report, the Shenzhen Lanhao Electronic Technology 
Company LTD, “is one of several companies in China that 
receives money from Iran through a Chinese bank.”423 The 
financial transactions are reportedly conducted through 
supervision of Bank Markazi (the Central Bank of Iran), which 
has accounts with the Chinese National Petroleum Bank of 
Kunlun. Upon transferring these amounts by Kunlun to other 
Chinese entities, the Iranian Quds organization can use them 
for various acquisitions in other countries including the import 
of products to Iran (especially during the period of sanctions) or 
use them abroad for financing ideologically oriented groups.424  
Sanctions imposed on Iran fortify the economic position of 
the extra-constitutional organizations. That is, in the absence of 
any competitive commercial organizations, the IRGC will use 
(and benefit from) its monopolistic advantage in communication, 
banking, or bartered transactions, and will thereby acquire 
goods and services not available to official government agencies 
or corporations. The regime of sanctions makes foreign products 
for the traditional Iranian government organizations 
inaccessible and costly. Such products and services become 
inordinately expensive for the consuming population. However, 
those extra-constitutional organizations that may have access to 
                                                 
422  WEHREY ET AL., supra note 144, at 64. (statement by Ali Ghanhari, a 
member of the Islamic Assembly). 
423  Louis Charbonneau, Jonathan Saul, & James Romfret, Iran Uses 
China Bank to Transfer Funds to Quds-linked Companies, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-china-exclusive-idUS 
KCN0J20CE20141119. 
424  DAVID ALBRIGHT & JACK DISHNER, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., CASE 
STUDY: IRANIAN ILLICIT FINANCING FOR QUDS FORCE’S OVERSEAS PURCHASES 
(2014), http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Bamdad_case_stu 
dy_Iran_financial_violations_17Dec2014.pdf. 
112https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/1
2017] THE NEW ERA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAN 113 
foreign products will be in a tremendously advantageous 
position vis-à-vis their competitors. 
E.  Use of the Barter System in International Transactions 
in Iran 
As a result of imposing sanctions, Iran, in dire need of 
available markets to sell its crude oil and petroleum products 
and to buy needed products, sought politically accessible 
markets. These markets were located mostly in Asia such as 
China, South Korea, and Pakistan, as well as in Russia, 
Southern Europe such as Turkey and Greece – all with less-
developed banking systems than Western European countries, 
but willing to enter into oil agreements with Iran. Despite the 
U.N. Security Council Resolution,425 China invested in various 
Iranian oil and gas projects.426 In the absence of international 
banking facilities, one of the major channels of Iran’s foreign 
trade was engaging in barter deals. For example, Iran entered 
in trade deals with Russia and Pakistan by trading crude oil for 
Pakistani wheat, thus evading restrictions imposed by the 
electronic banking transfers.427 The barter deals included 
Russian companies that helped the Islamic Republic of Iran by 
fuel oil available for export and receiving Russian products 
instead.  The same pattern of non-banking transactions was 
followed with a substantial amount of oil delivery to China.428  
                                                 
425  See S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006) (U.N. Resolution 1696 that was 
imposed after Iran refused to suspend its uranium enrichment program). 
426  Erica S. Downs, China, Iran and the Nexen Deal, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-iran-
and-the-nexen-deal/. 
427  Cabinet Okays 100,000 Tons Wheat Export to Iran, THE NEWS INT’L 
(May 17, 2013), https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/630526-cabinet-
okays-100,000-tons-wheat-export-to-iran. 
428  Chen Aizhu and Roslan Khasawneh, Commodity traders in barter 
deals with Iran post-sanctions: sources, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-fueloil-exports-idUSKCN0WA13V. 
The Kharg, a vessel owned by the government of Iran, was used for delivery of 
crude oil to China. On March 21, 2013, the Yuan Yang Hu, a Chinese super-
tanker, visited the Kharg Island in Iran and unloaded 2 million barrels of the 
Iranian crude oil. See Eric Yep, Chinese Oil Tanker Stops in Iran; More Imports 
Ahead?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323646604578401612953165422. Iran has also sold crude 
oil to China in exchange for Chinese currency. See Collins, supra note 239. 
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In addition to paying in local currencies, bartered 
transactions, or gold, a number of Iranian vessels sailed to the 
Mediterranean, where they pulled pier side or anchored off the 
three Libyan ports of Benghazi, Sirte, and Mistrata.429 
Reportedly “at least one of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Navy 
(IRISL) ships, the Parmis, departed from Iran’s Bandar Abbas 
port, the headquarters of the IRIN and IRGCN (Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy), and made intermediate 
stops in Dubai and Egypt before proceeding to Libya.” Further, 
the Treasury Department’s announcement indicated that IRISL 
ships fly a civilian “flag of convenience,” from a number of 
different nations, but in reality, they are the functional 
subsidiary of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.430  
By enjoying a monopolistic position under the regime of 
sanctions, the establishment in Iran achieved two goals. First, 
extra-constitutional entities gained access to funds not 
otherwise available to ordinary Iranian corporations. They used 
these funds to buy products abroad that would otherwise be 
prohibitively costly. Thus, the extra-constitutional institutions 
act as a monopolistic entity. Second, the extra-constitutional 
entities accessed resources used to fund ideologically-oriented 
terrorists and special-interest groups in the Middle East and 
elsewhere.  
F.  Sanctions Fostering Economic Inefficiency in Iran  
The imposition of sanctions on Iran created economic 
deprivation, which brought with it an opportunity for the IRGC 
to use its military and economic power to engage in business 
with countries that were not bound by sanctions. Using its naval 
facilities, the IRGC was able to engage in bartered commodity 
transactions with those countries.431 Furthermore, certain 
                                                 
429  Claudia Rosette, About Those Blacklisted Iranian Ships Calling at 
Libyan Ports, FORBES (Sep. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiar 
osett/2012/09/13/about-those-blacklisted-iranian-ships-calling-at-libyanports/ 
#5ffa2bba12b5. 
430  Fact Sheet: Treasury Designates Iranian Entities Tied to the IRGC and 
IRISL, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 21, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov /press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1010.aspx. 
431  See, e.g, Valerie Parent & Parisa Hafezi, Iran Turns to Barter for Food 
as Sanctions Cripple Imports, REUTERS (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www .reu-
ters.com /article/us-iran-wheat-idUSTRE8180SF20120209. 
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groups, through means such as money laundering, “havaleh,” 
and commodity agreements, avoided the crucial banking 
services, transactional requirements, and facilities such as 
SWIFT.432  
During the period of Iran’s sanction, the IRGC was in an 
advantageous position to engage in international commerce. 
That is, sanctions created economic rent for the IRGC, which 
enjoyed the monopoly in production, import or sale of goods and 
bartered exchanges. Economic rents are the privileges, 
opportunities and income gained by beneficiaries of other 
contrived exclusivity such as labor unions and corrupt and 
paternalistic economic powers. Not being part of an official 
governmental bureaucracy, the extra-constitutional 
organizations433 are not answerable to the government for their 
profits or taxes.434 Thus, in the absence of opportunities for the 
private business sector to enter the market, the IRGC was able 
to step into the void building a network of companies that came 
to dominate Iranian industries from energy to 
telecommunications. Such structure, created a systematic 
institutional and patrimonial corruption in the country. For 
example, in 2010, when the European oil companies had to leave 
the South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf, Mr. 
Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran at the time, handed the 
largest portion of the project, $21 billion in contracts for drilling 
pipelines and platforms, to the IRGC. Therefore, the sanctions 
placed the IRGC in a monopolistic position of a rent seeker that 
could engage in substantial contracts with no alarm for 
                                                 
432  See, e.g., Erich Ferrari, Just Say No: Prohibitions Against Havaleh 
Between the US and Iran, Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (June 
24, 2010), http://www.paaia.org/CMS//just-say-no-prohibitions-against-hava 
leh-between-the-us-and-iran1.aspx. “Havaleh” is an informal system of trans-
fer of money sporadically used in the Middle East and North Africa by individ-
uals and business organizations who, throughout the years, have established 
the trust and confidence of their customers. These entities receive funds in one 
jurisdiction and pay such funds (minus commission) to the designated repre-
sentative of the original payer in another jurisdiction. 
433  These are organizations such as the IRGC, the Bonyad-e Mostzafan 
va Janbazan (Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled), the Emdad Commit-
tee for Islamic Charity, and the Deyeh Headquarters. 
434  In this respect, these organizations followed Russia’s post-communism 
pattern of generating income by practices such as monopoly of imports, loan 
for shares, and tax exemption. See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS: 
WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW RUSSIA 296−324 (Public Affairs 2011 ed.). 
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competition to reckon. Another example is during the reign of 
sanctions when the IRGC obtained a mega contract from the 
government for construction of a bullet train from the capital 
city of Tehran to Isfahan. The project was estimated to be $2.7 
billion. A confidential review of the contract showed that, after 
lifting the sanctions, there would be possibilities for purchasing 
the raw materials directly by the Government, rather than by a 
monopolist party, at a significantly lower cost.435  
G.  International Trade Policy as a Disincentive for Iran to 
Undertake Weaponry Nuclear Research  
A distinct, but rather skeptical, view in the United States 
indicates that the nuclear deal, between Iran and the 5+1 
countries, gives an opportunity (a waiting period) to Iran to 
convert its nuclear research activities into the weaponry system.  
In support of this view, it has been stated for example, that 
based on a source inside the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (“IAEA”), within a period of between 11 to 13 years, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran could replace its 5,060 inefficient 
centrifuges with 3,500 advanced centrifuges.436 Therefore, the 
centrifuge replacement clause will allow Iran, after replacing 
the old centrifuges with the more advanced ones, to start making 
nuclear weapons if it so decided.437 Thus, it is claimed that Iran, 
being able to deploy these more powerful centrifuges, after 13 
years indeed may act from the position of power concerning the 
nuclear weapons.438 
The above assumption is not logical because it does not take 
into consideration the potential impact of Iran’s international 
commercial investment and trade during the post-sanction 
                                                 
435  See Benoit Faucon, Stacy Meichtry, & Asa Fitch, Iran’s Government 
and Revolutionary Guards Battle for Control of Economy, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 
2016) http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-government-and-revolutionary-
guards-battle-for-control-of-economy-1463584510. 
436  See George Jahn, AP Exclusive: Document Shows Less Limits on Iran 
Nuke Work, AP (July 18, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/40ca41aba7a42c 
1da13792f07df4b8d3/ap-exclusive-secret-document-lifts-iran-nuke-constr 
aints. 
437  See U,S. Sen. Foreign Rel. Comm. Next Steps to Achieve a Comprehen-
sive Deal, (June 25, 2015), (Testimony of President David Albright of the Insti-
tute for Science and International Security) http://www. foreign.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/062515_Albright_Testimony.pdf. 
438  U.S. Sen. Foreign Rel. Comm., supra note 437. 
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period. The fact is that, assuming that Iran will be integrated 
into the world community and adheres to the basic requirements 
of, and standards set by, the major world commercial and 
banking institutions such as the FATF, then Iran’s population 
at large will be benefited from such integration. The possibility 
of entry into, and integration with, the global market will reduce 
the monopolistic position of the extra-constitutional 
establishment, which has traditionally dominated the economy 
of the Islamic Republic because of the West’s closed-door policy 
during the sanctions period. Diminishing the marketing power 
of the monopolistic groups will, however, be painstakingly 
gradual.  
As indicated earlier, imposition of the sanctions on Iran 
resulted in inefficiency concerning the production cost. By Iran’s 
own estimate, “sanctions were costly for our people. They 
increased the cost of transaction in our economy, 10 to 15 
percent.”439  
Another impact of sanctions has been the hyper inflationary 
economy. One reason for hyperinflation was that as a result of 
sanctions, very few corporate establishments were able to charge 
consumers and receive the economic rent from large projects. 
According to the Governor of Bank Markazi, a significant 
economic achievement of President Rohani, has been to reduce 
the annual inflation of Iran to 12% from the prevailing 
inflationary sanction era rate of 40%.440 After sanctions lifted, 
economic competition between formal Government agencies and 
extra-constitutional institutions will undoubtedly be part of the 
post-sanction “trade war” inside Iran.441 
                                                 
439  See Iran on Nuclear Deal: “Nothing Has Happened,” THE IRAN PRIMER 
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/may/23/iran-nuc lear-
deal-%E2%80%9Cnothing-has-happened%E2%80%9D. 
440  Id. 
441  The competing interest between these two institutions in Iran has 
been, thus far, maintained imperceptible. Nevertheless, it seems that the offi-
cial ministries and agencies have not been eager to defend the economic inter-
ests of the extra-constitutional organizations in Iran. In this respect, the 
avowed position of the Central Bank of Iran, during the administration of Pres-
ident Rohani, has been that the Western corporations could always undertake 
a thorough “know your customer” study before committing themselves to any 
particular commercial counterpart in Iran. “We are talking about know your 
customer here and you should know the customer of your customers so that 
you can have complete coverage for the bank that is providing the service.” In 
other words, the official government agencies in Iran are not going to exert any 
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There is no doubt that imposition of sanctions in the past 
greatly increased the market inefficiency concerning the cost of 
products and services for the ultimate consumer in Iran. A by-
product of such market inefficiency has been a major cause of 
structural and institutional corruption in that country. Even the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, after officially dismissing 
the estimates by Transparency International concerning the 
existence of a rampant corruption in Iran as “politically 
motivated,” has admitted that: 
[Sanctions] increased the cost of transaction in our country – 
10 to 15% increased cost of transaction. This is based on 
general research we conducted . . . [T]his itself can lead to 
corruption. And when you don’t have a transparent banking 
system, and it cannot provide the services needed for 
legitimate business practices, then transactions will be 
diverted to a nontransparent channel, through exchange 
bureaus or [through] some people who have expertise in this 
kind of nontransparent types of transactions.442 
Therefore, economic sanctions imposed on Iran have led in two 
different, and opposite, directions: on one hand, sanctions 
benefited the groups that were part of the extra-constitutional 
structure of the Islamic Republic; on the other, sanctions created 
inefficiencies in Iran’s economy, such as an inflationary market, 
lack of access to resources with competitive prices, and an 
expansion of institutional corruption.  
VIII. Iran’s Integration in the International Trade 
Community 
A.  The Impact of the Regional Organizations Concerning 
Commercial Transactions with Iran 
Throughout the sanctions period, the extra-constitutional 
non-governmental establishment in Iran has benefited from 
prolific unofficial trade activities through barter deals, direct 
                                                 
influence or condition or defend the IRGC’s interest. See A Conversation with 
Valiollah Seif on the Future of the Iranian Economy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (April 15, 2016) [hereinafter A Conversation with Valiollah Seif], 
http://www.cfr.org/global/conversation-valiollah-seif-future-iranian-econ-
omy/p37733. 
442  A Conversation with Valiollah Seif, supra note 441. 
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dollar transactions, undeclared trade operations, exemption 
from payment of customs fees, and preferential treatment with 
respect to certain groups. These activities have resulted in the 
origination of invisible transactions not subject to generally 
accepted standards, such as the sharing of financial intelligence 
and information that identifies beneficial owners of front 
companies.443 In the long run, Iran’s business transactions with 
European and American companies will weaken the economic 
power presently exercised by Iran’s extra-constitutional 
establishment. Such change, in turn, will help professionals and 
highly educated young people in Iran to conduct business based 
on their skills and financial abilities, and not through the 
structural nepotism traditionally exercised within Iran’s extra-
constitutional organizations. 
An outstanding example of the well-established 
institutional principles and rules, developed as a result of 
conducting business based on adhering to customary rules of 
international commercial transactions, is the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). As an 
international economic and commercial forum, the OECD 
provides principles and establishes procedures on its members 
for export credits and policies with respect to good governance. 
These issues include anti-corruption measures, sustainable 
lending policies, and environmental and social due diligence.444 
Even countries outside of the OECD, which are engaged in 
commercial transactions with the OECD’s member-countries, 
are directly affected by the principles governing the member 
countries’ commercial transactions and banking activities.  
Iran is not a member of the OECD community. However, 
throughout the negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 countries 
concerning the containment of nuclear weapons, the OECD was 
a keen observer. In fact, the OECD Secretary-General Angel 
Gurria, supported the initial understanding reached between 
Iran and the 5+1 countries concerning the development of 
atomic energy by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Secretary-
General considered the JCPOA Agreement as “a boost for the 
                                                 
443 See SARAH CHAYES, THIEVES OF STATE: WHY CORRUPTION THREATENS 
GLOBAL SECURITY 198-201 (Norton 2015). 
444  These rules are decided under the auspices of the working party on 
Export Credits and Credit Guarantees. 
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chances of lasting peace and security in a highly unstable 
region.” Specifically referring to the relationship between Iran 
and the OECD members, the Secretary-General of the OECD 
was emphatic that “[t]he understanding [between Iran and the 
5+1 countries] is also an important opportunity, and if followed 
by other positive actions, could lead to the gradual normalization 
of relations between Iran and the international community, 
which would allow for its re-integration into the world 
economy.”445  
The above-mentioned statement by the Director of the 
OECD is not merely a diplomatic nicety expressed by the head 
of an important global organization. By its own Convention, the 
OECD is legally obliged to “promote policies designed to achieve 
the highest sustainable economic growth . . . in member 
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus 
contribute to the development of the world economy.”446 Some of 
the major issues that the OECD member countries must adhere 
to (and which will have significant impact on doing business 
with countries such as Iran) follow. 
1.  Monitoring Credibility and the Degree of Corruption 
in Various Countries in the World 
The OECD sends fact-finding missions to a vast variety of 
selected countries in order to examine their state of policing and 
containing corruption and business related corrupt practices. It 
is important to note that countries under the OECD’s 
observation are not limited to OECD members. The resulting 
report by the Secretariat of the OECD contains issues such as 
“Steps Taken by the State Parties to Implement and Enforce the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions.” For example, in 2014 the 
OECD, studied the position of, or sent missions to, a vast 
number of countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in order 
to observe those countries’ degree of adherence to anti-
corruption rules.  
                                                 
445  OECD’s Gurria welcomes Iran nuclear deal, OECD, 
www.oecd.org/countries/Iran/Gurri-welcomes-Iran-nuclear-deal.htm. 
446  See id. 
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2.  Observing Regulatory Disciplines Including Anti-
Corruption Measures  
In terms of regulatory discipline of its members, the OECD 
has a forum for exchanging information on members’ credit 
systems, export credits and business activities, relating to good 
governance principles such as anti-corruption (specifically anti-
bribery measures), environmental and social due diligence as 
well as the sustainable lending policies by the member countries. 
3.  Following the Financial Disciplines Concerning 
Export Credits 
The OECD provides a legal forum for maintaining, 
developing, and monitoring financial disciplines with respect to 
the export credits by the member countries.447 These rules and 
principles apply directly to the member countries. It is 
important to note that such principles have also been applied to 
non-members such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa.448 
Adhering to the export credits disciplines provided by the 
OECD is, of course, mandatory to the member countries. 
However, adherence to any of the OECD principles of doing 
business abroad, de facto or de jure, by any non-member country 
would be advantageous to that country’s international trade. For 
example, such adherence by a non-OECD country eventually 
will enhance the OECD export credits to that country. Under the 
rules of the OECD conventions, member countries should make 
consultations “in the framework of the [OECD’s] Committee on 
                                                 
447  See The Export Credits Arrangement Text, OECD, http://www.oecd.or 
g/tad/xcred/theexportcreditsarrangementtext.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2016). 
These rules are within the “Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Cred-
its.” 
448  See Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion in Turkey, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/TurkeyPhase3ReportEN.pdf [hereinafter 
Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey]; see Better Policies for Development: Better 
Policies for Better Lives, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/pcd/48110465.pdf; see Export Credits Work at the OECD, 
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred /about.htm 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
121
122 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 29:1 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises at the 
request of a member country.”449  
B.  Application of the OECD Rules Concerning Doing 
Business with Iran 
The principles and conventions briefly mentioned above are 
incontrovertible rules which the OECD member countries 
adhere to. In their business transactions with non-OECD 
members, such as Iran, the members should, under the OECD 
rules, follow such long-established commercial precedents. The 
OECD was established in 1961 – almost 18 years prior to the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran. At present, 34 OECD member 
countries worldwide exchange information and analyze them in 
an effort to maintain a joint policy. Many of these countries are 
neither European nor North American. For example, Japan, 
economically an important country, joined the OECD in 1964. 
As was briefly mentioned above, the OECD has developed 
elaborate principles concerning conduct of investment and trade 
by its member-countries. In doing business with a non-OECD 
country, a member-country will have to adhere to the time-
honored policies and rules as established by the OECD members 
collectively.  
Considering the above explanatory note, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the code of conduct, principles, rules, 
commercial traditions, and financial regulations governing the 
OECD are applicable with respect to trade agreements between 
OECD member countries and Iran.  In implementing its 
investment and commercial transactions with France, Italy, the 
U.K., and the United States (among many other countries), Iran 
will have to modify, if not totally eliminate, some of its 
precedential commercial practices that prevailed in the Islamic 
Republic during the era of sanctions. 
As a result of the post-sanction commercial transactions 
between Iran and a number of European countries, an issue may 
be raised by Iranian authorities engaged in business 
transactions with OECD member-countries: Iran, being outside 
                                                 
449  See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Declaration by the Govern-
ments of OECD Member Countries and Decisions of the OECD Council on 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises National Treatment International 
Investment Incentives and Disincentives, Consultation Procedures (1979). 
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of the OECD’s orbit, may not have to abide by the OECD’s 
prevailing rules. The fact is that Iran’s non-membership in the 
OECD community will not affect the applicability of the OECD’s 
long-established principles with respect to corruption, 
favoritism, and preferential treatment in conduct of 
international trade. The U.S. and European companies engaged 
in doing business with Iran will have to follow the OECD 
principles concerning banking, nepotism and corrupt practices. 
In this respect, Iran’s non-membership in the OECD could not 
be used as a subterfuge to avoid this organization’s rules 
concerning conduct of international business.450  
Even in a number of cases, non-OECD members, not being 
able to obtain full credit and economic support from the trading 
partners, had to seek the OECD’s support on anti-corruption 
business practices. For example, in 2015, the government of 
Ukraine, a non-member of the OECD, unable to attract 
sufficient foreign investment, entered into an Action Plan with 
the OECD “for strengthening co-operation to help tackle 
corruption, improve public governance and the rule of law, boost 
investment and foster a dynamic business environment.”451  
Iran’s financial credibility, and its ability to restrain its 
institutional and patrimonial corruption, will have an important 
impact internationally in terms of Iran’s ability to obtain 
sufficient bank credits for its international commercial 
transactions and to conduct trade agreements with Western 
countries. According to Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, Iran’s index of corruption in 2015 
was 136, one of the highest on the globe, equal to the corruption 
index of Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Cameroon, Lebanon and Russia.452  
                                                 
450  In fact, an important issue for not admitting Turkey into the EEC 
community has been the problem of nepotism, preferential treatment and par-
ticularly corrupt business practices in that country. See OECD, Phase 3 Report 
on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Turkey, October 2014. 
451  See OECD and Ukraine to Step Up Co-operation on Anti-Corruption, 
Rule of Law and Business Environment, Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-and-ukraine-to-step-up-co-operation-on-
anti-corruption-rule-of-law-and-business-environment.htm (last visited Jan. 
24, 2017). 
452  See Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT’L: 
THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST CORRUPTION, https://www.transparency.org/ 
cpi2014/results. 
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Despite lifting the nuclear-related sanctions, the extra-
constitutional institutions, if they continue to dominate Iran’s 
economic scene, will pose two major impediments concerning 
expansion of foreign investment obtaining necessary credits and 
entering into joint venture agreements with major European or 
American companies.  
The first impediment will be Iran’s ability to obtain 
adequate financial credits for its basic investment and 
commercial transactions. Until the time that structural reforms 
in Iran (in terms of eliminating patrimonial and institutional 
corruption) effectively take place, the ability of Iran to obtain 
financial and banking credits to effectively conduct its 
commercial transactions will be extremely limited. Even at 
times, Iran will have to pay for such investment activities 
mainly in the form of cash rather than credit. For a large state 
like Iran, with dire infrastructural, building and repairing 
requirements that have been accumulated since the imposition 
of sanctions, such financial deprivation will result in draining 
the country’s financial resources. 
The second impediment to Iran’s international trade, or 
attracting foreign investment, will be Iran’s diminishing ability 
to acquire necessary insurance for international investment 
projects. That will result in a high cost of commercial or 
investment insurance for Western companies that would like to 
do business with Iran. There will be very little, if any, insurance 
guarantees for capital investment by Western companies that 
are planning to invest in Iran or the cost of such investment 
insurance will be excessively high. In the absence of adequate 
credit, the only and exceedingly costly available investment 
would be to charge the government of Iran for the requisite 
investment insurance costs. Another alternative may be to invite 
foreign investors to Iran on the basis of investment costs, 
including insurance, to be borne by the government of Iran – 
both are unattractive alternatives. Business with foreign 
companies on the basis of cash and with little access to 
international credit or investment insurance would be, of course, 
a highly inadequate alternative.  
C.  The JCPOA’s Contribution to Regional Security 
The JCPOA accord is highly controversial in the United 
States. From the Western governments’ point of view, the 
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essential purpose of entering into the JCPOA accord with Iran 
was to enhance political security in the Middle East; providing 
trade opportunities for Western commercial companies was a 
secondary goal. According to U.S. Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis, however, the actual outcome amounts to a regional arms 
race, evidenced by the fact that Saudi Arabia has reportedly 
surpassed Russia as the third largest military weapons spender 
in the world.453  
During the implementation of the JCPOA accord, it was 
clear that Iran’s political objectives were not necessarily 
comparable with Western parties. Even President Obama, who 
viewed the Iran nuclear accord as his landmark foreign policy 
achievement, characterized Iran’s response to the JCPOA as 
“respecting the letter but violating the spirit of the 
[A]greement.”454  General Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff for the 
Iranian armed forces, contemptuously remarked that “[w]e 
studied the details of the nuclear agreement, and we don’t have 
any information about its spirit.”455 
Nevertheless, the JCPOA accord has ardent defenders in 
the United States. The agreement’s proponents acknowledge 
that the Iran nuclear agreement is not ideal, and concede that 
“the U.S. arguably paid too much for too little.”456 However, they 
contend that undermining the nuclear accord with Iran, or being 
perceived as having done so, “would isolate Washington, not 
Tehran. Reconstituting the worldwide regime of sanctions that 
existed before the agreement would prove impossible. The U.S. 
would quickly face the unpalatable choice between watching 
Iran cross the nuclear threshold or starting a war in an effort to 
stop it.”457 
Conclusion 
                                                 
453  2016 Defense Markets Report Defense Products: A Market Assessment 
Tool for U.S. Exporters, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, at 19 (June 2016), 
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Defense_Top_Markets_Report.pdf. 
454  Middle East Security Challenges, C-SPAN (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?408571-1/general-james-mattis-middle-east-se-
curity-challenges (statement of General James Mattis). 
455  Id. 
456  Richard Haass, Don’t Make Any Sudden Moves, Mr. Trump, WALL ST. 
J., January 19, 2017, at A19. 
457  Id. 
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On March 2016, during the time-honored celebration of 
Nowruz, Iran’s New Year, the people of that country started with 
new hope for Iranians, of breaking the sanctions, and of 
embarking on long awaited commercial transactions and 
investment with Western countries. As pernicious as the regime 
of the economic sanctions was to the ordinary middle-class 
Iranians, it served well for a well-placed minority that belonged 
to the extra-constitutional institutions. Through a powerful and 
sophisticated network of patrimonial, structural and 
institutionally-based corrupt practices, these institutions have 
used a highly structured medium. Such medium included, but 
was not limited to, money-laundering, bartered commodity 
exchanges, custom exemptions, and trade deals with countries 
not bound by the constraints of sanctions. For this group, 
sanctions provided an unparalleled economic bonanza.  
It was only three months after lifting the nuclear-based 
sanctions, the United States Supreme Court approved President 
Obama’s executive order, to block “all property and interests in 
property of any Iranian financial institution, including the 
Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States.”458 This 
decision ignored the time-honored principle of the separation of 
powers under the U.S. Constitution and blindly approved the 
former president’s executive order with ample adverse political 
implications in Iran. While the United States, through a joint 
accord, committed itself to lift the nuclear-based sanctions, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision condoned those sanctions that 
were not nuclear-based. In his strong and eloquent dissenting 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the Court’s 
majority decision “was an unconstitutional interference with the 
judicial function, whereby Congress assumes the role of 
judge.”459 
In terms of U.S. regional security concerns, reconstituting 
the worldwide regime of economic sanctions against Iran would 
run counter to the interests of the Iranian people, and would not 
serve the political and economic interests of the U.S. in the 
Middle East. 
                                                 
458  Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012); Bank 
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310. 
459  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1310. 
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For U.S. companies, issues concerning trade with or 
investment in Iran are not limited to the political horizon. Once 
a company has decided to establish a commercial or contractual 
relationship with Iran, it will quickly become clear that the 
labyrinthine Iranian legal system differs vastly from other 
systems to which U.S. companies are accustomed. These 
differences relate to Iran’s contract laws, which derive from a 
combination of the Napoleonic Code and religious and 
ideological principles. Further, to be officially enforceable, a 
considerable number of contractual agreements between 
publicly owned Iranian companies and foreign corporations will 
likely require approval of the Council of Guardians, which 
exercises judicial review over laws passed by the Islamic 
Assembly. Moreover, any accord between Iran and a foreign 
company should be in the form of a contractual agreement rather 
than a concessionary one.460 
The political and economic impact of continued sanctions is 
clear and inevitable. By maintaining nuclear-based sanctions 
against Iran, the U.S Treasury Department will serve the 
interests of two seemingly unrelated groups. First, it will serve 
the ideologues and extra-constitutional class in Iran, who have 
persistently claimed that U.S. policy has always been against 
the interest of the Iranian people, especially economically 
disposed groups. Second, it will serve the interests of non-U.S. 
companies, particularly those in Europe, which will rejoice in the 
fact that they will not compete with U.S. corporations for a share 
of the Iranian market. In fact, these European companies will 
provide products and services to Iran in place of U.S. companies, 
which will find themselves handicapped by the Treasury 
Department’s massive regulatory prohibitions. 
Nevertheless, in order to draw the maximum benefit for the 
Iranian economy from the post-sanctions environment of zeal, 
eagerness, and exuberance prevalent in the country (and to a 
lesser degree, in the international commercial community), Iran 
requires structural reforms to its international trade and 
investment policies. The first step for such reforms requires that 
Iran limit extra-constitutional organizations’ ideologically 
                                                 
460  See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980] art. 81 (prohibiting concessionary 
agreements with foreign persons). 
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inspired powers, as well as their manifestation and exercise. 
Moreover, Iran must tame the ideologically motivated voices in 
many of its governmental structures. Iran needs to engage in 
trade with, and attract investment capital from, Western 
countries. Its domestic product is insufficient to meet the 
growing needs of its economy and its highly educated, 
enlightened, and vibrant urban population.  
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